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Covid-19 is ravaging the world at the moment. Millions of people have sadly 
lost their lives and it is our duty to turn this tragic experience into an opportunity 
to rethink what kind of society we want to live in. For this rethinking exercise, 
we can learn from history as it provides an insight into the relationship between 
nature and humans in the past. History of natural disasters forms a key part of 
this. 
Since 2016, our research group has hosted international symposiums on 
comparative history of natural disasters in cities and held sessions at academic 
conferences in Europe. These activities are based on two research projects 
below: 
National Institutes for Humanities project: ‘Archives and the human life: 
interactive study among past, present and future’, 2016-2021.  
The Grants-in-aid for Scientific Research, “History of urban disasters in the 
early modern period: the interaction between nature and humans” from the 
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 2018-2022. 
These projects resulted in the publication of this book. Particularly, it is 
based on research papers read at three recent international symposiums as 
below.   
 
・Session 7 ‛Responses to disasters in early modern capitals’, International 
Conference ‛Cities and disasters: urban adaptability and resilience in history’, 
Institute of Historical Research, University of London, 4 November 2016. 
     Chapter 12 
・International Symposium ‘The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in the Early 
Modern Metropolis: Canal, River and the Flood’, National Institute of Japanese 
Literature, 24 February 2018. 
           Chapter 6, 8, 9, 10, 13,14. 
・Main Session 7 ‛Natural disasters and the urban: earthquakes, floods and great 
fires in early modern cities:1400-1800’, European Association for Urban 
History 14th Conference ‘Urban renewal and resilience: cities in comparative 
perspective’,  Roma Tre University, 30 August 2019.   
Chapter 1, 4.  
・ International Conference ‘Disasters and Natural Environment in Early 
Modern Cities’, National Institute of Japanese Literature, 12 January 2020. 
           Chapter 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, Column. 
 
The session in Rome was organised by Matthew Davies (University of 
London), Domenico Cesare (University of Naples), Mina Ishizu (University of 
London) and myself. Dr Cesare and I drafted a text each of call for papers and 
sent to Professor Davies, who finalised it.  
Throughout these projects, many people helped us and we would like to thank 
them all, particularly those who read papers at these events and also their 
translators. In addition, we received invaluable support from Sho Makino, who 
studies early-modern Irish history, for the symposium at the National Institute 
of Japanese Literature in 2018. For the 2020 event at the Institute, Akiko Kimura 
played a key part as well.  
The structure of this book was initially proposed by Kimura and was firmed 
up through email exchanges between contributors who were based in countries 
all over the world. Its title was suggested by Professor Garrioch, whilst the idea 
to add the names of cities in the subtitle of articles came from Professor Harding. 
Various other suggestions from contributors helped me rethink the book’s 
structure. I am grateful to all of them indeed.  
A vast amount of editing and administrative work including legal process to 
hand over contributors’ public transmission rights and proofreading English 
texts was undertaken by Kimura as well. Also I would like to note my special 
thanks to her outstanding work. Ryuya Hashiguchi, who is the postgraduate 
student of Chuo University in Tokyo, helped check the papers. I appreciate his 
assistance. 
Unfortunately, it was impossible to include all the images, maps and charts 
due to a lack of funding. For this I would like to sincerely apologise to 
contributors.  
Our group’s activities were greatly affected by Covid-19. We were meant to 
host the headline session ‘Perceptions of Disasters in Early Modern Cities’ at 
the European Association for Urban History 15th Conference ‘Cities in Motion’ 
in Antwerp but the conference has been postponed for a year, and now it is likely 
to be held virtually. An international symposium in Budapest which was agreed 
in April 2019, but now we don't even have a date for this symposium due to the 
ongoing pandemic.  
Despite all the challenges, however, we can continue our scholarly work. The 
group’s meetings were held virtually three times in the evening in the Japanese 
time to allow scholars based in Europe such as London and Paris to join. This 
book in itself is an attempt to develop our studies when it is impossible to meet 
other scholars in person. History of the relationship between nature and humans 
teaches that infectious diseases are something we live with, rather than defeat. 
We seek to explore further how we can continue our international collaboration 
during a pandemic.   
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Introduction: The Ordinary and 
the Extraordinary in  
Early Modern Cities1 






Since the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, the number of historical 
studies on natural disasters has increased dramatically. It is a welcoming 
situation as historians’ interests are closely linked to what is currently 
happening in our world. However, what concerns me is that a pattern 
appears to have emerged in which historians examine individual cases 
simply by describing the extent of damage and then explaining how 
recovery was achieved. Case studies of disasters certainly form the basis 
of historians’ understanding of natural disasters and therefore it is 
natural to have many of them. Nevertheless, it is equally important that 
we explore a new perspective on the history of natural disasters.  
In my view, this new perspective consciously regards the history of 
natural disasters as part of the history of natural environment. By doing 
so, historians will be able to avoid seeing the relationship between 
nature and humans as binomial opposition where human beings conquer 
and exploit nature or the latter is seen as a threat to the former.  
  Since natural phenomena such as flooding and earthquake cause 
disasters, there are seven areas of interests for scholars of natural 
disasters: 
1. Understanding natural phenomena themselves that directly cause 
disasters such as typhoons and earthquakes  
2. Understanding natural conditions created by human beings that 
turn natural phenomena into natural disasters  
 
1 This is largely based on the English translation of “Introduction”, The ordinary and 
the extraordinary in early modern cities [Japanese] (Bensei Publication, 2019) which is 
included at the end of the book.  
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3. Understanding the situation of societies that are affected by 
natural disasters  
4. Uncovering the extent of damage. This needs to be explained in 
line with natural factors (1. and 2.) and social factors (3.)  
5. Examining the recovery process and measures against natural 
disasters  
6. Understanding natural conditions created by human beings that 
emerge as a result of recovery and measures against natural 
disasters 
7. Understanding changes in social conditions that emerge as a 
result of recovery and measures against natural disasters  
 
By exploring these seven areas as a whole, we will be able to grasp 
the image of “a society with nature embedded within it”.2 “A society 
with nature embedded within it” is a dynamic image of successive, 
interrelated historical changes in which the human society as artificial 
nature is affected by natural disasters and then, to deal with natural 
disasters, humans intervene artificial nature and therefore cause changes 
in their society which is again hit by another natural disaster that forces 
humans to take measures against it.3  
  Many studies around 4 and 5 have recently been produced in the 
history of natural disasters. In terms of 1, there are a number of studies 
 
2 “Natural disasters during the Edo period and Matsushiro Domain: society within 
nature, nature within society”, a lecture in “The History and Archives of the Sanada 
Family in Matsushiro Domain II” on 19 February 2017. Its presentation slides are 
available in the information repository of National Institute of Japanese Literature. 
Included in “Core Research for the Multidisciplinary Collaborative Project, Changes of 
Local Society in the Japanese Archipelago and Reconstruction of Local Culture from 
Natural Disasters, a unit for National Institute of Japanese Literature: Bidirectrional 
Research on Archives and Human Life: Interactive Study among Past, Present and 
Future. Annual report for 2016”. This lecture was made before the publication of the 
Japanese translation of The Shock of the Anthropocene: The Earth, History and Us in 
2018. 
3  Researchers outside traditional history have been discussing this for some time. 
Tadashi Miyamura, Flooding: Wisdom of Flood Prevention and Management (Kanto 
Gakuin University Publication, 1985, rev. in 2010), a study by a researcher in civil 
engineering, discusses “nature as a given condition” which in this book is described as 
“artificial nature” and argues that flooding is a response from nature as a given condition. 
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in natural science, although progress has been considerably slow partly 
due to the limited number of researchers of climate and weather 
compared to those of earthquakes. In terms of 1, there are a number of 
studies on earth quakes in natural science, although progress of climate 
and weather studies has been slow due to the limited number of 
researchers. For instance, historians have only started to publish studies 
on typhoons which caused large-scale flooding. In terms of 2, it is well 
known that many studies have been done in geology, physical 
geography and the history of civil engineering and they have 
increasingly been utilised by researchers of 4, although more could be 
done. It seems that not enough conscious effort has been made to work 
on 6 or 7.  
  It is the aim of this book to explore these seven areas and gain a better 
understanding of them. Looking into 2 and 3 will allow us to take 
numerous factors that are not strictly relating to natural disasters into 
account. In other words, without understanding how a city as artificial 
nature functions properly, historians cannot fully grasp natural disasters 
which cause a city to grind to a halt. In addition, it is even possible to 
put natural disasters in the wider context of artificial nature not 
functioning properly. As it is now clear to readers, “the ordinary” in this 
book’s title means a state when artificial nature functions properly, 
whilst “the extraordinary” is used to describe a situation when artificial 
nature fails to function, including such situations caused by natural 
disasters.4  
  To establish this new perspective, it is necessary to integrate different 
academic disciplines into one methodology. Historians who rely on 
written evidence cannot fully examine “pure” natural phenomena5 , 
 
4 As an existing study on natural disasters, see Takeshi Ito, Federico Scaroni and Noriko 
Matsuda (eds), Along the water: Urban natural crises between Italy and Japan (Sayusha, 
2017). This book put forward issues around architectural history and its focus is on 
natural disasters. Based on the fact that cities inherently would suffer from natural 
disasters, it explores grand themes such as “territorial history”, “historical time” and 
“cultural structuralism”. At the same time, our book is by traditional historians and it 
includes cases that cannot be regarded as crises as part of “the extraordinary”. By doing 
so, it allows us to explore continuity between natural disasters and ordinary daily lives 
and also to compare cities affected by natural disasters with ones that don’t experience 
them very often.  
5 Here, I refer to phenomena in geoscience such as typhoons and earthquakes, but the 
brackets were used because now we have a study that argues that changes in the 
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whilst at the same time needing to analyse the ground itself. In addition, 
they have to understand the urban space itself. Therefore this book is 
contributed by researchers in historical climate, archaeology and 
architectural history.  
  It is also essential to draw on studies of historians outside Japan in 
order for us to polish and rationalise our methodology. Historical studies 
in Japan have probably reached the highest academic standard in terms 
of their use of primary sources, although not enough effort has been 
made to make these findings relevant and available to a wider audience. 
A comparative approach is necessary in an attempt to make Japan’s 
history of natural disasters a meaningful part of the history of the world.   
  This book has thus been edited around four key themes: natural 
disaster, environment, integration of academic disciplines and 
comparative approach.  
Below is a brief introduction of articles in this book.  
 
Part I: Aspects of Urban Disasters 
Chapter 1 "Typhoon Damage in 1856 Edo: Integrating Archaeology, 
Climatology and History"（Koichi Watanabe, Junpei Hirano, 
Hiroyuki Ishigami, and Masami Zaiki）is an attempt to integrate 
findings in archaeology, historical climatology and history. This 
article finds out about geographical characteristics of Edo and then 
reveals which parts of Japan the Ansei East-Japan typhoon in 1856 
went past, whilst having estimates of its maximum wind velocity and 
the height of tidal waves. Based on these two key findings, it 
considers how the extent of damage in the Kanto Region and Edo 
caused by varies in relation to these estimates.  
 
Chapter 2 "The Great Flood in Pest, 1838" (Csaba Katona) looks into 
a flood caused by frozen surface of a river that blocked the passage 
of water – a natural disaster which is unique to a cold climate. It 
describes floods before 1838 and the construction of embankment as 
well as damage caused by these floods and rescue operations. It then 
points out that the river’s management plans were developed in 
response to these floods, followed by the construction of new 
 
composition of atmosphere caused by human activities occurred before the 
industrialisation (The Shock of the Anthropocene). 
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embankments, and that the new building regulations on construction 
materials greatly changed the look of the city. It also refers to literary 
works which were created to commemorate the floods. It is a 
comprehensive analysis of a large-scale flood and its impact.  
 
  Chapter 3 "Fire Disasters in European Cities, 1600-1800" (David 
Garrioch) is an overview of fires in Western European cities. It points 
out that, comparatively speaking, fires involve more social factors as 
their causes than other types of disasters, while taking into account 
impact of climate change. It concludes that large-scale urban fires 
are caused by weather and climate, building materials, 
characteristics of urban economy, measures taken by the urban 
authorities and function of firefighting organisations. This analysis 
can be universally adopted for any urban fire.  
 
Column "Disaster of Beijing in the Qing Dynasty 1644-1911" (Akira 
Horichi) is an overview of floods, draughts, severe snows and 
hailstones, earthquakes, locust plague and epidemics in Beijing 
between 1644 and 1911, providing a comparative viewpoint for 
findings and analysis in the other articles in this book.  
 
Part II: Disasters and Responses 
Chapter 4 "Prevent the Big Water. Flood Control Measures in Prague 
(Bohemia) Issued by Public Administrative Bodies in Late 18th 
Century"（Ondřej Hudeček）describes how an inland city in the 
subarctic zone dealt with flooding caused by excessive amounts of 
meltwater in a big river. Prague’s climate and topography were of 
course very different from those of Edo, but I believe a comparison 
between the two cities can be made as the way they dealt with 
disasters was driven by optimisation of administrative processes 
such as the standardisation of measures against disasters. 
 
Chapter 5 "Citizens' Awareness of Firefighting in Edo: Analyzing 
Eighteenth-Cnetury Textbooks on Firefighting" (Reiji Iwabuchi) 
analyses textbooks of firefighting and diaries of a writer who lived 
in Edo and experiences fires. The analysis reveals that traditional 
knowledge and collective experiences about how to deal with fires 
led people to prioritise their own fortune and lives in case of a fire. 
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Edo’s fire management was based on such knowledge and 
experiences among the people, rather than the authorities’ 
instructions and infrastructure development, resulting in relatively 
low numbers of deaths despite frequent fires in the city.  
 
Part III: Infrastructure as Artificial Nature 
Chapter 6 "The Ordinary Made Extraordinary: The Archaeology of 
Water Management in a Global City" (Sophie Jackson) offers an 
overview of the development of London’s water management 
system throughout history. Based on archaeological findings, it 
describes how the natural river system of the Thames developed into 
the modern water and sewage system in London. It also discusses 
what the London’s water management system would look like in 
future. This article has a strong environmental focus and invites 
comparison with Chapter 11.  
 
Chapter 7 "Management and Civil Engineering of Urban Water 
Supply and Sewage System in Edo as Seen from Archaeological 
Excavation" (Hiroyuki Ishigami) demonstrates, from an 
archaeological point of view, how Edo’s water supply was managed. 
The main part of waterworks were made of stones, but timbers and 
bamboos were used for their branch lines with a view to making it 
easy to recover from disasters. Ishigami also describes the sewage 
system and shows how the canals which could be regarded as a 
public good were managed by a complex mixture of organisations 
and associations. 
 
Chapter 8 "Dredging the Edo Castle's Moat: A Case of the Okayama-
Domain Dredging in 1765"（Reiji Iwabuchi） 
Chapter 9 "Canal, Dredging and Sedimentation in the Lowland Area 
of East Edo: Considering physical and spatial characteristics of 
canals in a historical context (Genki Takahashi) both concern the 
maintenance of canals and rivers in Edo. Iwabuchi looks at the outer 
moat of the castle, whilst Takahashi examines the canals in the city, 
with each case’s dredging methods drawing a stark contrast. 
Dredging was done in response to the natural process of 
sedimentation in the canals and rivers, but the fact that such 
maintenance and management allowed for moderate degrees of 
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sedimentation and narrowing of the waterways (changes in artificial 
nature – 6) did indeed worsen flooding’s damage, as both Iwabuchi 
and Takahashi show. Takahashi points out that that the height of the 
Tate-kawa River’s embankment in Honjo went up from 0.9 meter by 
1.2 meter, whilst Ishigami in Chapter Two concludes that the added 
soil in the Honjo and Fukagawa area was around one meter high, 
showing that two different academic disciplines, in this case 
architectural history and archaeology, have reached practically the 
same conclusion. 
 
Part IV: Hinterland and Nature 
Chapter 10 "Flooding in Edo and the Tone-gawa River and Tama-
gawa River Systems" (Koichi Watanabe) examines how the rivers 
and the waterworks normally flew in the ordinary state and how they 
changed when flooded, which is an extraordinary situation.  
 
Chapter 11 "The Great Edo Flood of 1742 and the Okutama Valley" 
(Koichi Watanabe) analyses the extent of damage in the 
OkutamaValley caused by the 1742 flood and how the Shogunate 
and urban society dealt with it and then examines the Shogunate’s 
measures to clear muddy water in a water system that supplied the 
city with water. At the same time, it looks into the Shogunate’s relief 
measures for villages along the upper and middle areas along the 
Tama-gawa River. This is an attempt to describe, in a holistic manner, 
the complex, multi-faceted relationship between the flood’s damage 
to the city and its rural hinterland and how the Shogunate, Edo’s 
citizens and peasants in the Okutama villages, all of which were 
connected through the problem of the water system’s muddy water.  
 
Chapter 12 " The Deluge of Istanbul in 1563: a Case of Flood Where 
There Was No River" (Sawai Kazuaki) is aimed at drawing some 
comparison with Chapter 11 and discusses how the Ottoman 
Empire’s government undertook its capital’s recovery from a large-
scale flood.  
 
Chapter 13 "Storms, Flooding and the Development of London 
1300-1500" (Matthew Davies) is based on his research as part of an 
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environmental history project 6  on the areas around the Thames 
Estuary and discusses its findings in relation to London’s urban 
history. He argues that land reclamation during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries was negated by the sixteenth century because of 
changes in climate, society and economy.  
 
Chapter 14 "Bridging London’s River" (Vanessa Harding) interprets 
the London Bridge as a human intervention in nature and discusses 
in a holistic manner the diversification of harbours along the Thames 
River, the social relationship around maintenance and repair of the 
bridge and the bridge’s symbolic meaning to the city.  
 
 











Typhoon Damage in 1856 Edo: 












   The Japanese archipelago is located in the eastern periphery of the monsoon 
climate zone as well as on the edge of the Pacific Plate where it is being 
subducted beneath the North American Plate. This means that these islands 
experience numerous typhoons every year and also a catastrophic major 
earthquake in around every one hundred years. 
    The early modern period in Japan began around 1600 with the emergence 
of cities (i.e. modification of nature) which led to a large-scale concentration 
of wooden houses that were located near water. This resulted in large 
population living in areas which were prone to natural disasters. 
    This paper adopts an approach which integrates findings in climatology, 
archaeology and history, and with this approach, it aims to sheds new light on 
storm and flood damages in large cities. It examines the impact and social 
effect of gales and storm-surge caused by a typhoon in 1856 which hit Edo 
and its surrounding areas in the Kanto and Tokai regions. First, from an 
archaeological perspective, it looks at Edo’s topographical and geological 
characteristics that created the conditions for how the city was affected by the 
typhoon. Secondly, it analyses the typhoon from a climatologic point of view 
and traces its course and wind speed. Thirdly and finally, based on these 
findings, it examines primary written sources as historical evidence to identify 
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the scale of the damage caused by the typhoon and also to consider its social 
impact. 
 
1. Urban space as a result of modification of nature (Ishigami) 
  This section looks at Edo’s urban development by utilising recent findings in 
archaeology. Edo’s urban development started in 15901 and could be divided 
into four phases: the first phase was the opening of Onagi River (canal) which 
changed the course of Hirakawa River, which flew into Edo Bay and was also 
used to transport materials and goods including salt; the second was the land 
reclamation of Hibiya Irie (inlet) and the construction of Funeiri Hori (wharf), 
which was used to load and unload cargo; the third phase was the opening of 
Kanda River, which was the outwork of Edo Castle, and also the construction 
of its outer moat2; and the fourth phase was the development of Edo’s low-
lying marshland. During the development, Edo witnessed a large fire in 1657. 
As part of its recovery plans, it was decided that the samurai’s residential area 
was to be moved away from the castle to low-lying marshland of Honjo and 
Fukagawa which was to be reclaimed on the eastern bank of Sumida River. As 
a result of large-scale civil engineering over half a century, Edo’s foundation 
as a one-million city was established by the eighteenth century. 
  Topographically speaking, Edo was divided into the low-lying area and the 
plateau area. Studies on Edo have established its topographical characteristics 
through boring geological surveys for urban development, whilst new findings 
have been made by scholars of geology and pedology.3 The plateau in the west 
of Edo is 20-35 meters high around its eastern edge and is a solid, firm ground 
which consists of three layers of loam in Tachikawa, Musashino and Simo 
Sueyoshi, formed in the Quaternary period. At the same time, Edo’s low-lying 
area which spreads in the east of the city mainly consists of numerous thick 
layers of unstable, weak silt soil and sand called Yurakucho Layer and Nanago 
Layer that were formed during the Holocene period. The alluvium is up to 50 
meters thick. 
  The fact that Edo was built on two completely different types of ground is 
extremely important in considering its ability to deal with natural disasters. In 
particular, the low-lying areas were certainly affected by flooding, but there 
were also a number of challenges such as soil liquefaction caused by 
earthquakes and ground subsidence resulting from excessive groundwater 
 
1 A. Okano, Why Ieyasu Chose Edo, Kyoiku Shuppan, 1999. Books, articles and sources cited in 
this article are all in Japanese unless otherwise stated. 
2 R. Suzuki, Edo 100 in Illusion, Chikuma Shobo, 1991. 
3 S. Kaizuka, Natural History of Tokyo, 2nd edition, Kinokuniya Shoten, 1979. 
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extraction. To examine the impact of the 1856 flooding, it is therefore essential 
to take into account the land reclamation of Hibiya Irie and the development 
of low-lying marshland as contributing factors that created the conditions for 
the flooding. The following paragraphs focus on Edo’s low-lying areas and 
consider how the city’s modification of nature and natural disasters were 
related by utilising topographical and geological information such as heights 
above the sea level, type of soil and manner of land creation which 
archaeological studies have uncovered. 
  Results from a few excavations, as well as one on Hibiya Irie, provide 
information about the height of the top of sedimentary layers from the sea level 
and also about people’s lives in the early seventeenth century and around the 
1870s. 
  The Atago-Shita site (in Minato Ward) lies in A-area in Figure 1, and it was 
mostly daimyo and samurai residential area.4 The east side of the excavation 
site, the Shibaguchi district, was close to the sea, and Hibiya Irie was probably 
in this district. Sedimentary layers at this site showed that a natural layer of 
black clay was next to a soil layer which was accumulated as a result of human 
activities. The borderline between these layers was just around an elevation of 
zero meter, which is considered to be the soil surface in the early Edo period. 
As part of the initial land reclamation work, the construction of earth 
embankment around 0.5 to 1.5 meters high was allowed. 
  Underneath the black clay sedimentary layer was a layer of sand which 
contained some evidence of vegetation. It showed that, in the Middle Ages, 
there were water plants such as reed and cogon grass which grow near water, 
whilst this district was around the sea level, 0 to 0.5 meters high, and almost 
dried around 1590 when the land reclamation started. Land development 
during the Edo period created many layers of soil, around one to two meters 
thick in total. This shows that many ground levelling works were carried out 
to recover from large fires and other disasters. 
 
4 Tokyo Metropolitan Archaeological Centre, Atago Shimo Archaeological Site, 3, Minato Ward 





Figure 1 (original Image ©National Agriculture and Food Research Organization) 
 
  Excavations also revealed how land reclamation works were carried out in 
the Fukagawa (B-area in Figure 1) and Honjo (C-area in Figure 1) area. 
Natural sedimentary layers were found at two to five meters above the sea 
level. However, to estimate the current elevation of the Fukagawa and Honjo 
area, ground subsidence after the modern period needs to be taken into 
account.5 Excavations indicate that, before the land reclamation, the elevation 
of this area was mostly below A.P., 6 which means this area was a mud flat and 
below the sea level. The layer of banking was around one meter thick, and its 
elevation was lower than zero meter. Also, unlike in Hibiya Irie (A-area), there 
were not many layers of soil, implying that few ground levelling works were 
undertaken, due to the low importance of this area and also a lack of funding. 
The degree of ground subsidence after the modern period has been estimated 
 
5 T. Endo, S. Kawashima and M. Kawai, Historical Review of Development of Land Subsidence 
and its Cease in Shitamachi Lowland, Tokyo, “Applied Geology”, 2001, 42, 2, pp. 74-87. 
6 A.P. is an abbreviation of Arakawa Peil, based on the watergauge set in 1868 in Reiganjima 
Island. The zero point of this shows the high tide in Arakawa River (Sumida River) during the 
spring tide. At the moment, it is lower than the T.P. (the zero elevation, or the average sea level 
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to be around one to two meters, but further analysis is required to gain more 
accurate figures. 
  Written evidence could also indicate the elevation of Edo’s low-lying areas. 
Map of Tokyo Central, 1:5000 was the first map drawn around 1870 by the 
Department of Land Surveying of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff 
Office. It was based on the French land surveying method and recorded the 
elevation of buildings, canals and each point.7 The map shows that Suzaki, 
which was the seaside part of B-area, was one to 1.7 meter high, whilst the 
tidal flat area was around one meter above the sea level. On the other hand, 
the elevation of the inland part of B-area was around 1.5 to two meters, which 
was around one to two meters higher than the estimated elevation in the late 
early-modern period, indicating that it is necessary to revisit the previously 
accepted extent of ground subsidence which was based on figures measured 
from the early modern period and onwards. The elevation of the Nihonbashi 
and Ginza area in D-area showed around four meters as they were on a 
relatively solid sunken plateau called Edomaechou. A-area’s elevation was 
around three meters, slightly higher than the Shitamachi low-lying area, which 
corresponds to the result from excavations. As Chapter 3 shows, this could 
partly explain why this area was unaffected by the 1856 storm surge. 
  To estimate the scale of the 1856 storm surge, the height of a stone 
breakwater wall and an embankment needs to be established. Historical 
records show that the embankment was 1.74 meters high. The height of the 
stone breakwater wall was measured during an excavation. To take into 
account the extent of ground subsidence, this area’s elevation was roughly 
T.P.-0.77m (A.P. +0.3m).8 Adding the height of the embankment, 1.74 meters, 
the stone breakwater wall and the embankment was estimated to be T.P.0.97m 
(A.P.+2.04m) tall. 
  With this estimate, however, the stone breakwater wall would be lower than 
the normal tide, meaning it would be hit by waves. The aforementioned land 
survey map made around 1870, as well as evidence in Section 3 of this paper, 
show that the top of the stone wall was sometimes the same level as the sea,9 
so it is appropriate to estimate an even greater extent of land subsidence. To 
calculate the elevation of the bottom of the stone wall, based on its height A.P. 
 
7 Department of Land Surveying of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office, Map of 
Tokyo Central, 1:5000, Japan Map Centre, 1984. This is the basis for Figure 1. 
8 Based on the estimate shown in footnote 5, I presumed that land subsidence of 1.5 meters 
occurred after the modern period and amended the figures accordingly. The height of the stone 
wall was 2.28 meters on average. Koto Ward Education Committee, Reports on Excavations of 
Susaki Breakwater Stone Wall and Old Yahata Moat, Koto Ward Education Committee, 1987. 
9 Suzaki Ikken, 3, National Diet Library. 
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+2.0m (which was worked out from the estimated extent of land subsidence 
as -3.2m), same as the average level of high tide during the 1856 storm surge, 
it would be T.P.0.87m (A.P. +2m). To add the height of the embankment, 
1.74m, its top end would be T.P.2.61m (A.P.+3.74m), and the storm surge 
would have to be higher than this if it was to flood the area. 
  The height of the high tide on 25 August Ansei 3 (23 September 1856) is 
estimated to have been A.P.+1.61m, 10  whilst the tide between 11pm and 
midnight on the day was A.P.+1.45m high. Based on this, if waves higher than 
2.29m came to the area and the storm surge was +3.74m higher than A.P.0m, 
they went over the embankment and flooded the area. This is purely 
calculation based on estimates and is a hypothesis.  
 
2. Establishing the course of the typhoon (Hirano and Zaiki) 
 This section aims to establish the course of “Ansei Edo Typhoon” based on 
the analysis of weather records in contemporary diaries. From the viewpoint 
of climatology, it is important to find out more about typhoons that caused 
severe damage in Japan. Since typhoons move north along the eastern 
periphery of Pacific High, analysis of typhoons’ courses enables a greater 
understanding of how close Pacific High was to Japan in this period. 
Establishing typhoons’ courses in the past is also important in terms of disaster 
prevention. Typhoons cause storm surges either through a process called 
“Suiage effect”, whereby low-pressure around typhoons’ centres raises water 
levels, or “Fukiyose effect” which flood coastal areas with high waves 
generated by strong winds. Storm surges caused by “Suiage effect” are likely 
to occur in the east side of typhoons’ courses called the “dangerous semicircle”. 
For instance, the storm surge caused by the Isewan Typhoon in 1959 occurred 
when it landed around Cape Shionomisaki and moved from the Kii Peninsula 
towards the north across the Chubu region. What about the course of the 
“Ansei-Edo Typhoon” which caused a storm surge in Edo Bay on 23 
September 1856? At that time, the official meteorological observation was not 
developed yet. However, many diaries by Edo’s citizens recorded wind 
directions and their changes, as well as how it rained. Based on information in 
these diaries, this section aims to trace the course of the 1856 typhoon. 
  The most important information to trace the course of the 1856 typhoon is 
wind directions. Wind directions in a place in the west side of a typhoon 
normally change in an “easterly – northerly – westerly” pattern as the typhoon 
 
10 http://koyomi.vis.ne.jp/moonage.htm?cmd=18560909110. To calculate the sea levels in the 
past, see this website http://www1.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/KANKYO/TIDE/tide_pred/index.htm. It uses 
recent figures of tidal changes and sets the lowest sea level (A.P.+0.02m) as the zero point. 
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moves. On the other hand, in a place in the east side of a typhoon, winds blow 
in an “easterly – southerly – westerly” pattern. In a place in the “dangerous 
semicircle” in a typhoon’s east side, where winds going into the typhoon’s 
centre and winds around it blow in the same direction, winds are likely to be 
stronger. Information on wind directions and changes, as well as strength of 
wind, helps trace a typhoon’s course.11 Based on information in historical 
documents and diaries, scholars have previously looked at typhoons’ courses 
such as the 1828 Siebold Typhoon which landed in the Kyushu region12 and 
also a typhoon in 1742 (Kanpo 2) which ravaged the Kanto region.13 In terms 
of “Ansei Edo Typhoon”, Sakazaki has traced its course, using information on 
high tides.14 However, it has been pointed out that primary evidence from the 
Izu Peninsula as well as wider Shizuoka Prefecture could provide a more 
accurate picture of how the typhoon moved. 
  This section aims to trace the course of “Ansei Edo Typhoon” by paying 
attention to timings of changes in wind directions in Shizuoka Prefecture and 
the Kanto region. Figure 2 shows wind directions between 23 and 24 
September when the typhoon went past the area. In Izu Shimoda (Location A), 
wind directions changed from east-southeast, south-southeast, south-
southwest to west-northwest. This shows that the typhoon moved north in the 
west of Shimoda. In Yoshiwara in Fuji-city in Shizuoka Prefecture, a record 
shows that “on 23 September, a high tide blocked the river mouth, around 360 
meters wide, causing a backflow of seawater, which ruined the crops”.15 With 
the seawater flowing back into the river, it is probable that a storm surge was 
caused by a strong southerly wind of “Fukiyose effect” around Yoshiwara 
(Location B). Therefore, it appears that the typhoon landed in Suruga Bay to 
the west of Yoshiwara as Figure 2 shows. Based on high- tide records, 
Sakazaki argues that the typhoon landed in Suruga Bay and went past the west 
side of Edo,16 but, as this section has shown, according to wind directions 
recorded in diaries taken around Izu Peninsula, it appears that the typhoon 
landed in Suruga Bay in the west of Izu Peninsula. In Yokohama (Location C) 
and Tachikawa (Location D) in the Kanto region, records show that strong 
 
11 J. Hirano, How to Teach the Relationships between Historical Events and Climate – Historical 
Climatologist’s Perspective, “Geological Studies”, 2017, 197. 
12 T. Konishi, 1828 Siebold Typhoon and Storm Surge, “Weather”, 2010, 57. 
13 N. Machida, Reconstruction of The Course of the Typhoon and the Climate which Caused 
Kanpo 2 Disaster, “Geological Studies”, 2014, 123. 
14 T. Sakazaki, Y. Kano, J. Omura, K. Hattori, Damage caused by Ansei Edo Typhoon (1856) and 
Estimating the Climate at that time, “Journal of Research Institute for Sustainable 
Humanosphere”, 2015, 11. 
15 History of Shizuoka Prefecture Appendix 2: History of Natural Disaster, 1996. 
16 See footnote 14. 
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winds blew from south and south east, indicating that this area came in the 
“dangerous semicircle”. 
  
Figure 2. Estimated course of “Ansei East- Japan Typhoon 
 
  It is hard to estimate the strength of winds, but according to the current 
standards set by the Meteorological Agency,17 winds of 40 m/s or more on 
average could destroy houses. If these standards are to be applicable to the 
case of the 1856 typhoon, the winds could have been stronger 
  In the north of Saitama Prefecture and Gunma Prefecture, there are few 
records of wind changes, but in Tamamura Cho in Gunma Prefecture, Diaries 
of Sanemon show that the wind direction changed from north-east to north in 
the night of 23 September. This implies that Tamamura Cho (Location E) 
came in the “navigable semicircle” in the typhoon’s west side, meaning that, 
as Figure 2 shows, the typhoon went through the middle of Saitama Prefecture. 
It also caused strong southerly winds around Edo Bay which was in the east 
side of the typhoon and a potential storm surge.18 
  “Ansei Edo Typhoon” did not hit Edo Bay and Edo directly, but it went past 
areas in the west far off the city. Therefore, it appear that Edo Bay’s storm 
surge was not caused by “Suiage effect”, or a decrease in pressure around the 
typhoon’s centre, but by “Fukiyose effect” of strong southerly winds. There 
are few records of wind changes and damage caused by gusts in Gunma 
 
17 Meteorological Office, How the Wind Blows and How Storing It is, 2000, 
http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/kishou/know/yougo_hp/kazehyo.html (accessed on 16 July 2018) than 
40 m/s or more on average as houses collapsed and trees fell in and around Edo. 
18 See Hirano in footnote 11. 
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Prefecture and Nagano Prefecture which lay in west of the typhoon, but this is 
due to the fact that these areas came in the “negative semicircle” where winds 
are relatively weaker, instead of “dangerous semicircle”. 
  After passing the south of the Kanto region, it appears that the typhoon 
moved north through the north of the Kanto region. Otaka-shi Papers in Mito 
City in Ibaraki Prefecture (Location F) show that there were strong southerly 
winds and lightning on 23 September, indicating that Mito came in the 
“dangerous semicircle” in the east of the typhoon’s passage. Diaries of 
Yoshidaya Genbei in Fukushima City in Fukushima Prefecture (Location G) 
also suggest that there were strong winds from the south-east. Therefore the 
typhoon is likely to have gone past the west of Souma City (Location G). There 
are few records of wind changes in the north of the Tohoku region and 
Hokkaido, making it difficult to estimate the precise course of the typhoon at 
the moment. 
 
3. Typhoon’s damage and the society (Watanabe) 
  This section looks at the damage caused by the 1856 typhoon. It affected a 
large part of Japan, from the Tokai to the Kanto regions. In the Tokai region 
and around Tokyo Bay, storm surge caused significant damage, while the 
Kanto region saw its major river flood and strong winds knock down numerous 
houses and trees.19 I am going to look into statistical records.20 These do not 
contain information of damage in Shizuoka Prefecture (Izu, Suruga and 
Totoumi) and Yamanashi Prefecture (Kai), which were hit by the typhoon, and 
the northern half of Ibaraki Prefecture (Hitachi) and the western half of 
Kanagawa (Sagami) were excluded too. In the Kanto region, more than 99,702 
houses and buildings were either damaged or destroyed, which counted for 
around 15 per cent of all the buildings in the region. The typhoon also killed 
at least 455 people. The percentage of buildings damaged or destroyed by the 
typhoon in each area is shown below. In the eastern Kanagawa prefecture, 
more than 30 per cent of buildings were affected, presumably by storm surge 
which also hit the coastal area of Tokyo and southern part of Chiba prefecture. 
At the same time, the southern part of Ibaraki prefecture saw around 25 per 
cent of buildings affected, and it seems that gusts and strong winds did that 
damage. This could support the estimated course of the typhoon discussed in 
 
19 Ansei Fubun Shu (H. Arakawa (ed.), Historical Sources 4, Early Modern Records on Climate, 
Cress Shuppan, 2002; Shinsai Doyoshu, National Diet Library 189/3/295; T. Yada, Damage 
Figures of 1855 Ansei Edo Earthquake and 1856 Ansei Edo Typhoon, “Studies on Historical 
Sources”, 2018, 15. 
20 Records of Damages in Eight Counties, Mikikigusa 9, Cabinet Library Publications, Special 
Vol. 2, Kyuko Shoin, 1985, p.63. 
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the previous section. 
  At the same time, as the previous sections show, Edo came into the 
“dangerous semicircle” and experienced strong winds of 40 m/s or more and 
also 2.3 meter high storm surge. Figure 3 shows destroyed buildings identified 
by town magistrates in each town headman’s area. 21  According to this, 
Fukagawa (B-area), number 17, had 2,257 destroyed buildings, which is the 
highest number in this area, followed by Shiba, number 9, which saw 1,826 
buildings affected. Both Fukagawa and Shiba were along the coastline, so it 
appears that the damage was caused by storm surge. As explained in the earlier 
section, Fukagawa was created after land reclamation since the mid- 
seventeenth century and the land there was only one or two meter above the 
sea level. Temporary shops and stalls along the coast and river were swept 
away by storm surge or knocked down by strong winds. In more inland-areas 




















      
Figure 3 
 
  Number 17 also was affected badly, but the damage was half man-made. This 
 
21 Damage in Edo, Mikikigusa 9, p.65. 
22 Shinsai Doyoshu. 
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area had an embankment built in 1689, 2,700 meter long and 5.1 meters high 
of which 3.3 meters was the foundation and 1.8 meters was the earthen wall. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, however, this embankment was partly broken 
and, in the aftermath of storm surge in 1791, local residents expressed their 
concern to the town magistrate that another storm surge could occur if no 
repair work was to be done. 23  A new embankment was built behind a 
breakwater wall, but it was only 374 meter long. The new embankment was as 
high as the old one, but the damage done to the old one was not fixed. As a 
result, the foundation of the old embankment was submerged in the spring tide 
in 1856.24 It appears that the embankment was lower than when it was built in 
1698. This is probably because, after the 1791 storm surge, the most severely 
damaged area was left vacated so there would be no more damage or victim. 
  Figure 425 shows how the embankment was damaged by the 1856 storm surge. 
Three sections of the 374 meters long embankment were broken and they were 
16.2m, 28.8m and 5.4m wide respectively. The upper half of the 5.4m section 






















23 K. Watanabe, The Formality of Agreement on 'the Clearance': the Measures to Recover from 
the Typhoon Surge in the 1790s Metropolis Edo, “Historical Journal”, 2016, 797. 
24 See footnote 10. 
25 https://www.dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/2548357 (Accessed on January 15, 2021) 
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  At the same time, numbers 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all merchants’ districts, suffered 
relatively less damage. There were few written records of the damage in these 
districts either. These were in-land districts with 4 meters above the sea level, 
avoiding the storm surge, and buildings there remained intact. An earthquake 
in the previous year showed a similar pattern of damage. This area was on a 
thin layer of alluvium which reduced the extent of vibration and therefore was 
relatively less affected by the earthquake than the other areas.26 
 Number 4 and 5 areas in Figure 4 which were in the west of the moat had a 
large concentration of Daimyo’s mansions and were severely affected by the 
earthquake in the previous year. This was because these areas had been an inlet 
in the middle ages and had a thick layer of alluvium which made the ground 
weak and unstable. However, after a number of land reclamation works, the 
ground was raised to around three meters above the sea leave, which helped 
these areas avoid the storm surge and see relatively little damage. 
  To compare the damage by the typhoon in the merchant districts with that by 
the earthquake, 3,262 houses and buildings were destroyed, which was around 
a fifth destroyed by the earthquake, while the typhoon claimed the lives of 60 
people, which was around one seventieth of those killed by the earthquake. 
The typhoon therefore caused less damage than the earthquake. In particular, 
the number of deaths was lower because it was possible to predict the arrival 
of the typhoon, whilst the earthquake was unpredictable. At the same time, 
experience of dealing with devastating earthquakes was rarely passed on 
across generations because their intervals were longer than people’s lives, but 
severe flooding occurred rather frequently, enabling people to accumulate 
their know-hows about measures against it and to therefore become better at 
dealing with it. 
  What did the shogunate do to help the citizens recover from the typhoon? 
What was notable about the shogunate’s measures was that it introduced a 
measure to control the prices of building materials such as timber and roof tiles 
and also the builders’ wages. The shogunate repeated the measures it took in 
the previous year in the aftermath of the earthquake. The shogunate made sure 
that its enforcement of the control was strict by arresting offenders. 
  Despite these efforts, the pace of recovery was slow. In the two main 
thoroughfares in front of Edo Castle, damaged buildings had yet to be repaired 
even two years after these disasters. There were also records of a family of a 
shogunate retainer who sank into poverty, rented a house, got affected by the 
earthquake and then again became victims of the typhoon, which made them 
 




homeless, and they were still unable to find a place to live ten months after it. 
  Edo was hit by the typhoon before it fully recovered from the damage by the 
1855 earthquake. Edo being ravaged by two major disasters in a short period 
changed not only how it suffered, but also how it recovered. This shows that 
these disasters did significant damage to Edo’s society. 
  My paper in London in 2016 looked into disaster relief activities by the elite 
and ordinary citizens and pointed out how Edo’s social convention to look 
after victims of disasters not only enabled citizens to support each other 
directly, but also created a more indirect reciprocal relationship through two-
way provision of labour and food. 27  It is possible that this sophisticated 
mechanism of relief and support lost its function as a resilience provider after 
Edo suffered repeatedly from devastating disasters. 
 
Conclusions (Watanabe) 
  Before it managed to recover from these two disasters, Edo was hit by another 
disaster in the summer of 1858 – the outbreak of a cholera epidemic. Therefore 
the typhoon should be considered as part of the complex series of three 
successive natural disasters. 
  At the moment, the current estimated courses of typhoons which could cause 
storm surge in Tokyo are closer to the capital than the course of the 1856 
typhoon this paper has established. Since typhoons which go past far west of 
Tokyo could cause storm surge, as we have demonstrated, the current estimate 
needs an urgent review. 
  From 7th to 8th July this year during severe rains in the west of Japan. The 
floods claimed the lives of 223 people in 14 prefectures (as of 20 July). More 
studies of water disasters have to be carried out by historians, urgently. 
 
27 K. Watanabe, State and Private Responses to the Complex Succession of Disasters in Edo 
during the 1780s, Session 7: Responses to disasters in early modern capitals, International 
conference ‘Cities and disasters; Urban adaptability and resilience in history’, Institute of 








  Hungary is one of the fortunate states that rarely have a natural disaster. 
So they are very memorable. These include the 1763 earthquake in 
Komárom or the 1879 flood in Szeged. But no natural disaster has survived 
as much in the memory of the Hungarian people as the great flood of Pest 
in 1838. Many people died as a result of the flood, and many buildings 
collapsed. There- fore, the city of Pest was transformed afterwards. Pest, 
which was united with Buda and Óbuda in 1873, is today Budapest, the 
capital of Hungary. Many of the dominant buildings in today's cityscape 
are built after the flood. March 15 is a day of remembering the heroes of 
the 1848/1849 Hungarian revolution and independence war. But only ten 
years earlier, in 1838, a devastating natural disaster occurred when the 
Danube flooded the entire Pest side of the later city of Budapest as the flat 
areas of Pest were not adequately protected against such elevated water 
levels. 
 
A little history: previous floods in Pest 
  However, there have been floods in Pest before 1838. According to 
records, between 1012 and 1838 there were 54 major floods in the later 
Hungarian capital. But more detailed data are available only for floods in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. The eccentric female writer Sarolta Vay, who 
wrote as Sándor Vay, has found some interesting data on several of these. 
For example the ice flood in 1775 destroyed about 600 houses in Pest. At 
that time, Gábor Nyitray, the rector of the University of Pest, commanded 
for the law students to help people. Many aristo- crats helped with 
donations. Count Gedeon Ráday, for example, provided accommodation 
for the fleeing people in Pécel, near Pest, where he had his possession. 
According to Sarolta Vay, he and his wife slept in a servant's room, because 
he wanted to accommodate more people. The memory of this flood was 
preserved on a plaque in Pest, just like the flood of 1744. It only destroyed 
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50 houses. After the flood in 1775, serious work began in Pest to prevent 
further flooding. The embankment that protected the city from the north, 
from the city of Vác, was built near Pest. It was raised between today's 
Nyugati Square and Lehel Square. In the south, the soroksar dam was 
completed and a wooden dam was built between today's Haller Street and 
Boráros Square. However, in 1794, the collapsed ice sheets broke the 
pontoonbridge between Buda and Pest. This is what the Saxon Count 
Hofmannsegg from Dresden, who in this year lives in Buda, saw. He also 
described how this had happened before. Pest city was flooded by the 
Danube in 1789 and 1795 too. In 1795, for example, József Lányi court 
counselor visited Baron László Orczy on a little boat. But since the boat 
was stolen by someone while talking to Orczy, he traveled back in a trough. 
There was a flood in 1799, when the suburb called Ferencváros was 
destroyed. Therefore, after 1800, new dams were built in Pest. This is when 
the Tüköry Dam between Miksa Falk and Szent István Boulevard was built, 
and another be- tween today's Dózsa György Street and the City Park. 
Ferencváros is also being rebuilt, protected by a new dam between Haller 
Street and Gát Street. These dams more or less really protected the city until 
1838. 
 
Conditions in Pest before the great flood 
  In 1838, the unregulated Danube was again threatened by a massive flood 
for decades. But the fast-growing Pest and Buda had done nothing to 
prevent it for a long time. On several occasions the idea of building dams 
has arisen, but this has not happened. The harnessing of the Danube was 
also lagging behind. This was mainly wanted by Pál Vásárhelyi, an 
engineer, a member of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, who wrote in an 
article in the Athenaeum in early March 1838 that a water level higher than 
1775 would arrive in Pest. He wrote that the main reason for this would be 
an ice barrier on an unregulated river. Later Pál Vásárhelyi prepared the 
regulation of the second largest Hungarian river, the Tisza, as an engineer. 
Lack of work has had fatal consequences. At the end of 1837 a lot of rain 
fell in Hungary. At the end of the year, there was a sudden, unexpected cold. 
On the Danube, ice blocks were formed. The river at the beginning of the 
new year, on January 6, 1838, flooded some streets of Buda. There were no 
dams at all in Buda. Fortunately, after a few days, the water retreated into 
the river bed. 
  The City Council of Pest has taken action in response to these threatening 
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signs. Quickly built dams reaching the flood level of 1775 using sand and 
manure. The council trusted that these dams would protect the city. True, 
in a short period of time, no better dam could have been built. At the 
beginning of March, melting down the river from the city of Vienna began. 
However, the enormous mass of water and ice from the north was restrained 
for several days by the ice block on Szentendre Island above Pest. The 
Danube bed is shallow, with many reefs and islands, so the flood and ice 
could only slowly retreat. In shallower areas, ice plugs were formed, the ice 
overflowed in a short time, and the river was swollen. 
  However, the water level in Buda was again high. People traveled on boats 
between houses near the coast. The people from Pest looked at it with 
interest, but thought nothing wrong. Although many smaller settlements 
were flooded along the coast, not only Buda. The popular newspaper of the 
era, Jelenkor, wrote on January 16, 1838: “The post office is not due to 
terrible snow storms. The Vienna Post of 13 and 14 January has not yet 
arrived, and the foreign journals have not yet arrived.” In fact, the Danube 
is covered with ice up to Vienna, and the ice has been flooded in many 
places. 
 
The great flood 
  At noon on March 13, 1838, the ice began to break. The crushed ice caught 
on the great Csepel Island in southern Pest. Here an ice barrier formed on 
the coast of Csepel Island, which held back the ice and then the water. The 
water could no longer flow south. It was swollen inside the city. At 10 
o'clock in the middle of downtown, at the Vigadó building, the water passed 
through the embankment. First, the lower parts of downtown were flooded 
by the river. It is the area around Váci Street and Ferenc Deák Street today. 
A little later, the Danube broke through the northern Vác dam to midnight, 
then in the morning hours to the southern barrier of Soroksár. The mass of 
water coming from three directions rained on Pest at a terrible speed, the 
windows broke and the houses of the suburbs collapsed. Panic broke out, 
and most people didn't have time to escape. 
  The rescue only started the next day, March 14, 1838. The main reason 
for this was that the people and the city council trusted the fortified dams 
and did not expect such a massive flood, which was higher than in 1775. 
The extreme danger of the situation was precisely assessed by a Hungarian 
aristocrat. Baron Wesselényi Miklós was one of the best known leaders of 
the Hungarian political opposition. He was a man of great stature, educated 
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and possessed of great wealth. At this time he was the first idol of the patriot 
Hungarian women. Under the leadership of the brave Baron, rescue of the 
victims began. They saved people by boat. They tried to take people to the 
floors and attics of the stronger houses, or to the suburban houses. About 
fifty thousand people were temporarily homeless. For others who did not 
have to be rescued, they carried food and warm clothes on the boat. 
Fortunately, there were some public buildings that could not be damaged 
by the flood. So the Újépület, which was a military barracks, and Ludovika, 
the military college. Today the Hungarian Museum of Natural History 
operates in Ludvokika. Most of the rescued people were placed in these two 
huge buildings. Stronger downtown churches also provided shelter for 
people fleeing. Thus refugees lived on Deák Square, in the Lutheran Church 
or on the Franciscan Square in the Franciscan Church. Meanwhile, János 
Lónyay (1796-1859), former parliamentary ambassador and deputy sheriff 
of Bereg County, was appointed royal commissioner by the pal- atine of 
Hungary, Joseph of Habsburg-Lotharingen. At time of the flood he was 
already a clerk of the court chancellery. The appointment of Lónyay was 
an important step because rescue and care for the injured were, for a long 
time, disorganized despite heroic courage. This action of the palatine made 
a difference. As a royal commissioner, Lónyay played an important role in 
maintaining order and providing food for the people during the flood. Many 
others also earned merit in the rescue, so Lajos Landerer, one of the most 
famous printers in Pest. 
  The best witness of the flood and the dramatic events unfolding 
surrounding this natural disaster was Miklós Wesselényi, who was not only 
an active participant during the rescue operations, but also kept a diary of 
the entire calamity. On the first day of the flood, Baron Miklós Wes- selényi 
wrote in his diary: “On March 13 at five o'clock water began to freeze. An 
ice barrier formed, which began to break as the water of the Danube flooded 
it. The water had left the riverbed, the wild river had already broken the 
dams. But as the ice swam, most people thought the danger was gone. That's 
what I hoped for. I went to the theater. But the play was not over when the 
news came that water had flooded the city. ” 
  Miklós Wesselényi wrote about the second day of the flood: “The houses 
began to fall. The sound of the houses collapsing, the frightening screaming 
and crying, and the roaring were terrible. All of this showed destruction. 
[…] I found Kígyó street nearly completely under water, so first I inched 
forward in the swirling water up to my knees, then up to my waist without 
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wanting to retreat, until I reached the city market area immersed in water 
up to my neck where I could not locate a single barge. When I reached dry 
land, my clothes began to freeze onto my skin and by the time I reached 
Helmeczy’s residence in the Trattner-Károlyi-house (which was only a few 
hundred steps away) my clothing was covered with a layer of ice. At that 
point, I had to shed my clothing and jump around a little, until my limbs 
thawed somewhat. Later, János arrived with a barge to get home. I 
immediately got dressed into dry clothes and went to look for barges at the 
Sebestyén market, where I found heavy traffic with barges coming and 
going.” 
  Wesselényi not only described the circumstances of the rescue operations, 
but also lambasted some of the bystanders sharply when he felt it necessary. 
He criticized Baron Csekonics, who tried to save his horses during the 
rescue instead of saving people, or some aristocrats such as baron Albert 
Prónay, who smoked their pipes sitting on top of secure masonry buildings 
instead of taking part in the rescue. 
  The ice block near Csepel Island held back the water for two whole days, 
so it floated on the streets of Pest. Finally, on the night of March 15, the ice 
barrier set off, but shortly afterwards, an ice barrier was formed at Budafok. 
This again pushed the water back to Pest. The flood was then 929 
centimeters high. It was 1.5 meters higher than before. The floods were 203 
centimeters high in the city center, 260 centimeters in Ferencváros and 216 
centimeters in Józsefváros. When most of the water flooded the city on 
March 15, 1838, the highest water level along today's Grand Boulevard was. 
This is where an earlier branch of the Danube stretched, which made it 
smaller than the rest of the city. People were in the most difficult position 
during the flood. The enormous body of water finally spilled out on the left 
bank of the Danube. The water, within a 20-kilometer radius, cleared 
everything that was in its way. 
 
Individual experiences from the time of the great flood 
  The tragedy was remembered by many Pest citizens. We know many 
small details of the time of the flood. We know, for example, that on the 
30th of March, 1838, the most outstanding Hungarian redactor József Bajza 
married to Julia Csajághy her fiancée in Tápiószentmárton, because her 
parents had a house in Csepel, south of Pest. And from there they had to 
flee because of the flood. The instinct for survival is evident in the 
grotesque scene described by one of the most famous Hungarian painters, 
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Miklós Barabás: "Two waiters rowing a thick, wide board from a restaurant 
called the King of Hungary. Curtain rods were used for rowing. They took 
rolls and croissants to the hotel guests who could not get out of the building. 
The rolls and croissants were wrapped in a small cloth. But they were 
unlucky because the planks overturned and they both fell in dirty water. 
"Barabas himself escaped from the floods on the boats after taking his 
money. He ordered his servant to rent a boat. Barabás confronted the owner 
of the Szarvas restaurant a few days after the flood. The restaurant stood in 
Buda, in the part where the floods could not be reached due to the 
mountains. Barabás protested indignantly: "Flooding in Pest forced 
restaurants to take small portions of coffee to give. Not in Buda. Every 
person from Pest makes a mistake if he accepts half a cup of coffee in 
Buda ”. 
  István Széchenyi, one of the most well-known Hungarian politicians of 
the period, called the greatest Hungarian by his political opponent, the 
famous freedom fighter, Lajoss Kossuth, also wrote about the flood in his 
diary. Sometimes he recorded quite small details. On March 15, 1838, he 
wrote that when he went to his wife to take her with them, because their 
house was in danger, she combed her hair. Széchenyi and his family 
survived the flood. But before that zealous-spirited count, the picture of the 
destruction of the Hungarian nation also appeared, "How will this end, I do 
not know. And what will be the consequences for me? This is impossible 
to calculate. This is a final blow for Hungary!" 
 
Consequences 
  When the flood finally receded, there was a terrible devastation in Pest. 
Before the flood, there were 4,254 houses in the city. 2281 houses collapsed 
completely. 827 was seriously damaged. Only 1146 buildings remained 
intact. So more than half of the houses were destroyed. Fewer buildings in 
Buda were damaged. 204 houses collapsed completely. 262 was severely 
damaged. And 2023 remained intact. The reason for this difference is that 
it lies on the Pest Plain, while in Buda the flood only destroyed the foothills. 
Parts of Buda in the mountains were not reached by water. The damage to 
property was tremendously high, estimated at 70 million forints. More than 
50,000 people became temporarily homeless, most of them living in Pest, 
and about 22,000 people lost everything. The merchants also suffered great 
losses, because on March 19, 1838 the famous Joseph's Day Fair would 
have been. Their goods were already delivered to Pest for the fair. They 
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were also destroyed by the flood. In the Hungarian section of the Danube, 
including Pest and Buda, a total of about 10,000 houses were destroyed and 
4,000 damaged. Of the 153 Hungarian deaths, 151 were residents of Pest. 
The devastating human and economic effects of the Great Flood of 1838 
have been compared to that of the Great Fire of London of 1666. 
The devastating destruction of Pest, of course, had consequences. Plans to 
control the river (through flood control and flood protection systems) and 
the construction of a new river embankment were immediately launched as 
authorities did not want to see this tragedy reoccur ever again. First, the 
City of Pest Council drafted a regulation on flood protection. Such had 
never happened before. In 1840, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law on 
the continuation of dam construction and the harnessing of the Danube. But 
before that, in 1838, dams and embankments were restored and 
strengthened. However, regulation of the Danube riverbed had to wait for 
decades. The application for the regulation of the Danube section of Pest 
has not received adequate plans. 
  Since 1808, the Beautification Committee, regulating the architecture of 
the city, has been operating in Pest. It was established in 1808 by the 
palatine Joseph (he was the palatine of Hungary between 1795 and 1847). 
After the flood surge, the commission said that no one could begin 
construction in Pest until the damage caused by the flood was assessed and 
a professional proposal for the rebuilding of the city was made. The aim 
was not only to reduce the damage of subsequent floods, but also to create 
a modern, less densely built city in place of the ruins. Subsequently, the 
rebuilding of Pest was indeed commenced under the strict guidelines of the 
Beautification Committee. Among other things, the use of loam was 
forbidden because it could not withstand the flood. From then on, it could 
only be used to fill a wall between pillars, and only above the highest flood 
level. The Beautification Committee also mandated the thickness of the 
walls, the height of the buildings and the depth of the foundations. 
Courtyards that were deeper than the flood had to be filled with sand or 
stone. To comply with the regulations, signs were placed in the city to 
indicate the level of the flood. Construction could only commence on the 
basis of an officially authorized blueprint. After the flood, the buildings 
completely transformed the cityscape of Pest. This is the time when the 
most important buildings of one of the greatest Hungarian architects, József 
Hild, were built. North of Pest, an aristocrat, Count István Károlyi, 
encouraged settlers to build in the northern part of the Danube. This area 
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was his property. Whoever started building here gave him discounts of 
building cost and discount of tax. The village of Újpest was established in 
1840 and it is now a part of Budapest. 
  Finally, in 1870, new plans were made to regulate the Danube. The 
Hungarian Parliament decided in 1872 to start the works. The Soroksar 
Danube arm was closed, eliminating the place where the ice barrier was 
most easily created. The next winter in 1876, another major icy flood 
arrived in Pest. It peaked on March 9, 1876 in Budapest. The ice was 
collected south of Pest at the villages of Ercsi and Budafok. The swollen 
Danube caused damage mainly to Buda and Óbuda due to the low quay. 
The Pest side could not be flooded. Shortly afterwards, on April 30, 1876, 
the new Margaret Bridge in Budapest was opened to traffic. Subsequently, 
the Dan- ube was narrowed on the section between the bridge and Vámház 
tér, and the shore wall was built. 
 
Aftermath and legends 
  After the flood, Wesselényi was given a new nickname: the boatman of 
the flood. It is a lesser known fact that the nickname of Baron is attributed 
to Mihály Vörösmarty, one of the greatest Hungarian poets. The “Boatman 
of the Flood'' is the title of a dramatic poem, which attempts to grasp rescue 
operations during the collapse of city infrastructure. Vörösmarty and his 
friends at the time of the flood moved on to Pécel, to the residence of count 
Gedeon Ráday. He was the descendant of Gedeon Ráday, who provided 
shelter to refugees in Pest during the flood of 1775. That is when the poem 
“Boatman of the Flood'' was written, which, according to baron Lajos 
Hatvany the famous 20th century literary historian and patron of art was 
offered to the beautiful actress Róza Laborfalvy by Vörösmarty the 
following way: „My dear Rozi, I have brought you something to recite.” 
Róza Laborfalvi, the wife of Mór Jókai, the most famous Hungarian writer 
of the era, performed the poem at the Hungarian Theater in Pest on April 
27, 1838. 
  One of the most important literary memories of the deep impact of the 
1838 flood is the Budapest Flood Book (Budapesti Árvízkönyv), published 
in five volumes between 1839 and 1841. The book was published by 
Gusztáv Heckenast, one of the most famous printers in Pest at that time. He 
was a companion to Lajos Landerer, a famous printer who earned merit in 
the rescue at the time of the great flood. Ten years later, at the time of the 
1848 Revolution, the printing of the famous poem of the Revolution, The 
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National Song (Nemzeti dal) written by the young poet Sándor Petőfi, and 
famous 12 points containing political demands were printed in their 
printing press. The Budapest Floodbook is very interesting in many ways. 
It was edited by Baron József Eötvös, who, as a writer and a politician, was 
one of the greatest people in nineteenth-century Hungary. He was Minister 
of Culture in the Revolutionary Government in 1848, then in the Austro–
Hungarian Monarchy in the New Hungarian Government in 1867. Most of 
the authors were among the most outstanding in contemporary Hungarian 
literature, such as the already mentioned József Bajza. Mihály Vörösmarty 
and Baron Miklós Wesselényi. What is more interesting about the book is 
that although Budapest was only created in 1873, the title of the book 
already contains this city name in that form. The publication of the five 
volumes clearly shows the severity of the trauma of the 1838 flood, not only 
in Pest, but also in Hungary. Finally, the story of the flood also includes an 
urban legend, which of course has a real foundation. It is common 
knowledge that the brilliant Hungarian composer and pianist of the 19th 
century, the world-famous Ferenc Liszt, was in Venice in Italy when the 
bad news of the flood in Pest came to him. He then decided to travel to 
Vienna immediately, where he would give a concert for the victims of the 
flood. In Vienna, Liszt finally gave a total of eight concerts. It transfers 
24,000 forints to the victims of the flood, according to other sources only 
1,700 forints. This is the right amount. This beautiful story is not quite true. 
In fact, at the time of the flood, Franz Liszt was indeed in Venice, with his 
partner, the mother of his children, Countess Marie d'Agoult. He found out 
in a newspaper what happened in Pest. He traveled to Vienna in mid- April, 
where he really gave more concerts. But it was not because of the news of 
the flood that he traveled to Vienna from Venice. Tobias Haslinger, Liszt’s 
supporter in Vienna announced weeks later, at the end of 1837, that Liszt 
would give concerts in Vienna. Liszt finally arrived in Vienna on April 10, 
1838, and gave a concert on April 18, 1838. The 1,700 forint of this revenue 
was really offered to the victims of the flood. But shortly afterwards Liszt 
gave eleven more concerts. But Liszt did not use the proceeds to benefit the 
victims of the flood. In addition, fourteen concerts were held in Vienna 
between March 29 and April 18, 1838, for the benefit of the victims of the 
flood, with the participation of several prominent artists. Liszt's April 18 





  While wandering side streets in the centre of Budapest, you’ll occasionally 
spot a marker line set in stone – sometimes chest-high, sometimes higher – 
that refers to mid-March of 1838. 
  To get a sense of how widespread this almost-unimaginable inundation 
actually was, walk up from the riverbank and far into District V to find one 
of the most graphic memorials to the 1838 flood at Egyetem Square’s 
corner with Király Pál Street. This monument features a detailed map of 
Budapest carefully carved into pink and blue marble, with the flooded 
sections clearly delineated as stretching far beyond both the Buda and Pest 
banks, including the entirety of downtown well past the Grand Boulevard. 
There is no doubt that Budapest still vividly remembers the flood that once 
destroyed the city. Unfortunately, many people lost their lives in the flood. 
Only after the flood was destroyed were the appropriate dams and 
embankments constructed. This was only completed when Budapest, a true 
world city, was created through the unification of Pest, Buda and Óbuda. 
However, the great flood was a special contributor to the creation of the 
modern capital, because after its destruction the downtown street structure, 












My recent work is on fire in European cities across the early modern 
period and into the nineteenth century, roughly between 1550 and 1850.  It 
arises partly from a long-standing interest in how early modern cities 
functioned, and particularly in the connections between human behaviour 
and the built environment.  But it is also inspired by work in environmental 
history.  It used to be thought that wildfires, those occurring in what we think 
of as ‘natural environments’, were related primarily to weather and short-
term climatic conditions such as drought and unusually hot weather.  Recent 
work, however, shows that fires in such environments are very often 
produced by human activity, not only in setting alight forests or grassland, 
but in creating the conditions – notably through changing forms of forest 
management – for new kinds of fires to take place.  In Australia, for example, 
for thousands of years indigenous people used frequent burning for hunting, 
and in the process radically changed the environment.  When Europeans 
arrived and dispossessed the indigenous people, then adopted different 
forms of land use and fire management, they made possible the giant, super-
hot fires that we now see almost every year.  Scientists and forest historians 
are also beginning to understand the influence of longer-term climatic 
change, which in recent years has contributed to making forest fires both 
larger and more common. 
The same understandings can be applied to cities. Fire is a natural 
phenomenon, but in urban environments its behaviour is shaped largely by 
human activity. It is the inhabitants who, in the past, made daily use of fire, 
and whose actions could produce major conflagrations:  a candle knocked 
over or brought too close to flammable substances could lead to the 
destruction of an entire neighbourhood. The largest fire in early modern 
Europe, the Great Fire of London of 1666, was almost certainly caused by a 
baker’s oven left alight overnight. But it was also human agency that created 




causes, such as a lightning strike, it usually only spread beyond the building 
first hit by the lightning – usually a church tower – because there were 
wooden houses built against the church.  In other words, the flames were 
able to spread because of the way humans constructed the urban 
environment. Equally significant was the inhabitants’ response to the fire, 
particularly when it first broke out. If not contained at an early stage, it might 
threaten the entire city.  Like forest fires, too, urban ones are affected by 
climatic conditions. A prolonged period of hot, dry weather, but also longer-
term climatic change, influenced their incidence and gravity. 
My larger project aims to understand why particular kinds of urban fires 
occurred at particular times. Here, I will be discussing disastrous fires, by 
which I mean very large ones that destroyed significant parts of a major city 
or town, causing serious social and economic dislocation. If that definition 
seems rather subjective, it is partly because the sources do not always offer 
reliable figures on the numbers of buildings destroyed or lives lost, much 
less on the economic costs of such fires. For earlier periods, we need to rely 
largely on chronicles and municipal records, which often give few details. 
For Venice, for example, there are records of two bad fires in 1505/6, but 
the sources tell us only that one burned the entire district of Casselaria and 
that the other destroyed ‘the whole island of Rialto’ (Gallicciolli 2:237). 
Even with such scant details, however, I think we can safely assume that 
these were large and very destructive fires. Despite their terseness, where 
such archives are complete they do enable us to gauge the frequency of such 
events, since it is unlikely that they would not record a major fire disaster. 
But a ‘fire disaster’ is also, to some degree, a relative concept. Early 
modern cities were much smaller than modern ones, and European ‘cities’ 
remained, in global terms, fairly small until the industrial period. Between 
1400 and 1700, Paris was the largest city in Europe (if we exclude 
Constantinople). The French capital grew from around 250,000 to roughly 
half a million in the late seventeenth century and then to 6-700,000 by the 
late eighteenth.  London reached 100,000 inhabitants in the later sixteenth 
century, then expanded rapidly, attaining a population of half a million by 
1700 and one million by 1800. It was then by far the largest city in Europe, 
ahead of Paris and, in third place, Naples, which reached 400,000 by the 
eighteenth century. For most of the early modern period, even the most 
dynamic urban centres – Venice, Milan, and Amsterdam – had between 
100,000 and 200,000 people. In this context, a disastrous fire, using the 





Of course, what represented a ‘house’ also varied over time and from 
place to place. Most sixteenth-century cities had a very low skyline, with 
few residential buildings more than two storeys tall. By 1800, the average 
height of an apartment building was much greater, and so too was its surface 
area. But there were equally large differences from one place to another. In 
eighteenth-century Edinburgh, the Scottish capital, which was constructed 
on a confined site, some residential buildings were ten or even fifteen storeys 
tall. In Paris, at the same period, those in the centre of the city often reached 
six to eight storeys. Yet that was unusual in Europe, and even in London or 
Vienna most of the buildings were no more than four storeys tall. 
Furthermore, in almost all European towns and cities there was a significant 
difference between the centre and the periphery, and the size of houses might 
even vary greatly within the city centre itself. Some constructions were 
much smaller, particularly in the suburbs, while those of noble families 
might be very large. Hence, a fire that burned a few hundred ‘houses’ could 
be very different in size and scale, according to the building patterns in the 
particular locality. For comparative purposes, however, it is difficult to know 
what other measure to use. 
Of course, a focus on fire disasters still requires us to consider smaller 
fires, since large ones always start out small. The key question I will be 
asking, therefore, is how and why small fires sometimes became large and 
then disastrous ones? 
 
Patterns of urban fire disasters 
The first point to make is that disastrous fires were not very common.  
One often gets the impression, reading general urban histories and even 
those that deal specifically with fire, that vast areas of European cities 
burned frequently. Urban historians have tended to see fires as a fact of life 
in early modern cities, something that just happened, in environments 
largely built of wood and in the absence of effective prevention and 
advanced technologies of fire fighting. And it is certainly true that small fires, 
and in some places even quite large ones, were very numerous.  Cornel 
Zwierlein, examining fires in Central European towns between the year 1000 
and 1939, counted 8.200 big fires that occurred in 1964 towns (Zwierlein 
2011: 82). Yet if they had happened evenly in all those places, that would 
represent an average of 4.2 major fires in each town across a period of 900 
years: one every 214 years. Many of the towns that Zwierlein included, 
furthermore, had only a couple of thousand inhabitants, and the majority of 
the fires burned at most a few dozen houses. They were terrible for the 




of significant fire disasters was very much smaller. In Zwierlein’s sample 
for Central Europe, over 900 years, there were seventy-one large fires that 
destroyed between 200 and 299 houses, forty-six that burned between 300 
and 399 houses, while ten were larger than that. Of those ten, two destroyed 
between 600 and 700 houses and the two largest burned between 700 and 
750 (Zwierlein 2011: 85). By comparison with fires in Constantinople, for 
instance, these are quite modest figures. 
There were some conflagrations in other parts of Europe that were very 
much larger. The worst of all was the Great Fire of London of 1666, which 
destroyed over 13,000 buildings. The next largest was a fire in the relatively 
small town of Aachen, in 1656, which destroyed seven-eighths of the 
buildings: some 4,600 houses and twenty churches. Another large blaze took 
place in Stockholm, in Sweden, in 1686, burning around 1800 buildings, 
although most of them were single-storey. Just two years earlier, in 1684, a 
very large fire burned a large area of Hamburg, destroying just over 1700 
houses in a city of 60,000 people.  Another fire of a similar size burned 
nearly a third of the city of Copenhagen in 1728. Other blazes, smaller but 
still disastrous in terms of the destruction they caused, took place in London 
and Stockholm, in the much smaller centres of Rennes and Chateaudun in 
France, and in a number of English towns. 
The relatively small number of truly disastrous fires is surprising, since 
fire was everywhere in European cities and towns. It provided lighting, in 
the form of candles and lamps. It served to keep people warm in winter, in 
the form of fires in chimney-places in Western and Southern Europe, while 
in Central, Northern, and Eastern Europe, enclosed stoves were more 
common for heating. Fire was also used in a very wide range of trades:  
bakers and cooks had ovens, and so did potters. The metal trades, from 
blacksmiths to knife-makers and goldsmiths, all required a forge.  Brewers 
needed to dry their grain as well as to heat the raw materials for their beer, 
while dyers, glass-workers, soap-makers, laundrywomen, and many, many 
others all used fire. 
There were also many religious, ritual, and festive uses of fire. Candles 
were an important part of Christian rites, especially Catholic ones, and they 
were the source of many fires in churches. After an earthquake and tsunami 
hit the city of Lisbon, capital of Portugal, on a holy day in 1755, most of the 
buildings that remained standing were destroyed by fires that were almost 
certainly started when candles knocked over by the earthquake set alight 
furnishings in churches and houses. Another ritual use of fire was in the form 
of fireworks. These began to be used in Italian cities in civic celebrations in 




and dynastic events such as royal births and weddings.  Similar use was 
made, in many cities, of fires in the streets: in London and Paris, for instance, 
the inhabitants were required to light bonfires to show their joy at the 
coronation of a new monarch. 
This meant that accidents were inevitable and innumerable. The Paris 
fire service was called to over 100 fires a year in the early eighteenth century 
and to around 5-600 annually by 1800, and since not all fires were reported, 
these figures under-estimate the real number. Many were caused by faulty 
construction of chimneys and flue-pipes, while others were accidental, 
caused by someone knocking over a candle, by a stray spark from a fireplace, 
or by an ember that escaped from a warming-pan or portable heating device. 
A new source, spreading in the seventeenth century, was tobacco-smoking, 
which was blamed for many fires.  Industrial accidents caused other blazes. 
One of the theatres in Vienna, capital of the Austrian Empire, burned down 
in 1699 after workers making varnish let it boil over. A major fire in Venice, 
in 1789, began in an olive-oil warehouse. When the first fire insurance 
companies were founded in London in the late seventeenth century, they 
quickly identified the most dangerous industries: breweries, dye-works, 
tobacco factories, candle-makers, sugar-works, and bread bakers. Fireworks, 
particularly rockets, also caused many fires.  
In certain respects, the risks grew across the early modern period. I will 
mention the growing risk from trade and industry in a moment, but in a more 
general sense, the growing use of the night hours meant more widespread 
use of lighting and heating. From the late 17th century, the social elites began 
to keep far later hours, first at court and later in attending theatre, opera, and 
other social activities. This meant that the service industries associated with 
such activities also continued at night: servants, coachmen, and other 
suppliers. The curfews that were pretty much universal in European cities 
until the 17th century, and in some towns well into the 18th, gradually 
disappeared. Fires were no longer damped down at night, and the danger of 
fire increased accordingly. 
The risk, therefore, was always high and in some ways increasing, and 
yet truly disastrous fires remained rare. Why? And why did they occur in 
some cities but not in others? Paris, for instance, had very few large fires and 
no truly disastrous ones, whereas Stockholm and London had many. 
 
Why did disastrous fires take place? 
Four key factors had a considerable influence on their incidence: the 




place by urban authorities; and the response of the inhabitants and the 
authorities when a fire broke out. 
In historical work on urban history, the most common explanation for 
disastrous fires in early modern Europe is the forms of construction:  houses 
made of flammable materials, densely packed along narrow streets, which 
allowed flames to jump easily from one building to the next. This was 
certainly a key factor. In most big fires, before the late 18th century, the 
buildings themselves, constructed of wood and even straw, provided the 
main fuel. Brick and stone were used in places where suitable stone and clay 
were readily available but even there, roofs were often made of flammable 
materials. Big fires, once they were under way, spread primarily at roof level, 
then burned downwards. The thatched roofs were a major factor in the great 
fire in Aachen in 1656, where a strong wind blew embers from a fire that 
began in the suburbs right across the centre of the town, setting fire to almost 
every neighbourhood. Wooden buildings were also important in Rennes in 
1720, where the fire began in the densely-built city centre. The very narrow 
streets, and houses with shared walls and abutting roofs, helped such fires to 
spread. But even when brick and stone houses became more common, they 
often had internal wooden frames, as well as floors, stairways, and often the 
linings of rooms, made of wood.  Even these new houses continued to burn, 
as in London in 1748, when the whole neighbourhood around Cornhill, an 
area rebuilt in brick after the 1666 Great Fire, was destroyed. 
Yet the building materials were far from representing the only source of 
fuel in the urban environment. We must also consider the contents of houses 
and storage areas. The consumer revolution of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries filled domestic interiors with goods, and materials such 
as cotton, wood, silks, and consumables like sugar helped small fires to grow 
into large ones. In the French town of Rennes, where the disastrous fire of 
1720 took place at the start of winter, many of the inhabitants had brought 
in stocks of wood for heating, often in the form of sticks that would ignite 
quickly, most often stored in the attics of the houses. This appears to have 
contributed to the extent and the heat of the fire. Even more significant, 
particularly in the port cities, were warehouses full of flammable materials.  
London, once again, offers the best example. The Great Fire of 1666 became 
unstoppable when it reached the warehouses along the river, where goods 
were unloaded from the ever-increasing numbers of ships in the port. These 
included coal, vegetable oil, sugar, brandy, and naval stores such as pitch, 
tar and turpentine for waterproofing, hemp for sails, and timber for 
shipbuilding. Such products were present in large quantities in the major 




fed many dangerous fires. In this way, the growth of maritime trade, and the 
importation of new products like sugar, tobacco, and later cotton, greatly 
increased the fire risk (Garrioch 2016). 
After the late 18th century, new industries added to the danger. Most 
significant was the growing use of chemicals, particularly oils and acids, in 
a wide range of industrial processes. The spread of glass-making, of sugar 
refining, and of different laqueurs for furnishings and waterproofing for 
textiles, and then, in the first half of the 19th century, the use of coal gas for 
lighting, all created a situation where a small fire could quickly become a 
large one. Furthermore, these new products were typically manufactured in 
larger factories and stored in far greater quantities. A series of large fires in 
Liverpool in the 1830s and 1840s consumed vast quantities of goods stored 
in huge warehouses, including cotton and turpentine (Ewen 2020: 55-7). 
Any fire that broke out in these new structures was likely to be huge and to 
reach higher temperatures than an ordinary house fire, melting even the cast 
iron that was by then being used in construction. Gasometers represented a 
huge danger to entire neighbourhoods: in 1865, the Nine Elms gas factory 
in London exploded, killing twelve people and destroying 100 houses. 
Yet the building materials and even their contents are not sufficient to 
explain the incidence of fire disasters. There were many wooden towns and 
cities that did not burn. Paris, as already noted, experienced no disastrous 
fires in the early modern period, even though it contained many wooden 
buildings. There were clearly other explanatory factors. 
One of the most significant was climate. The climatic zone in which 
cities and towns were situated had a powerful influence on the risk and 
gravity of fires. The foremost historian of fire, Stephen Pyne, identifies three 
main fire ‘provinces’ in Europe. The south has wet winters and long, hot, 
mostly dry summers when strong winds are common, and that is when most 
woodland fires occur. The northern regions have long winters, but the short 
summers can be warm and dry and are when forest fires typically broke out. 
The zone in between has a more restricted temperature range and rainfall 
fairly evenly distributed across the year. Across all three regions, in Central 
Europe and the eastern interior, the climate was warmer in summer and 
colder in winter. Where towns were largely constructed of flammable 
materials, they were subject to the same calendar as woodland environments 
(Pyne 1997). Hence in Stockholm, which was mainly built of wood, most 
serious fires happened in summer. This was despite the fact that heating and 
lighting were needed far more during the colder part of the year. In Vienna 
too, where the winters were cold, both large and small fires occurred mainly 




difference in cities like London or Paris, where both rainfall and fires were 
fairly evenly distributed across the year. 
Yet climate is not constant, and the Little Ice Age that affected Europe 
across the early modern period had a significant impact on the incidence of 
bad fires. Lower temperatures and wetter summers made fires less likely, 
but the effects of so-called ‘anomalies’, exceptional events that appear to 
accompany climatic change, are clear. The years 1540 and 1666 had 
exceptionally long, dry, hot summers, and Cornel Zwierlein has shown that 
these were the years when the largest numbers of bad fires occurred in 
Central Europe (Zwierlein 2011: 104, 108-9). It is conspicuous, in fact, that 
the great European fire disasters of the early modern period cluster in the 
later seventeenth century, the period when the Little Ice Age had greatest 
impact. Moscow burned in 1648, after several months with no rain. Much of 
the Scottish town of Glasgow was destroyed in 1652, after an exceptionally 
hot summer, and the same happened in Aachen in 1656.  Ten years later, the 
Great Fire of London followed six weeks of unusually hot weather that dried 
out wooden roofs and helped to limit water for fire-fighting. Hamburg 
burned in 1684, Stockholm in 1686.  Another long, dry period preceded a 
bad fire in the London suburbs, in 1699. The early 18th century, when the 
overall temperatures began to rise again, also witnessed a cluster of fire 
disasters: in the French towns of Rennes and Châteaudun in 1720 and 1723, 
and in Copenhagen in 1728. I have not included Constantinople in my 
analysis, as it was on the fringe of Europe, but a number of very big fires 
took place there in these same years (Zwierlein 2012). Heat and drought 
were crucial contributing factors, then, but so was wind. Most of the really 
bad fires, like today’s forest fires, were spread by strong winds, and these 
too were linked both to the seasons and to climatic variation, if it brought an 
increased incidence of tempests. In almost all the fire disasters in early 




with abrupt changes of direction that made fighting the fires well-nigh 
impossible. 
The third key factor I mentioned was the preventive measures put in 
place by urban authorities. The late Middle Ages were a fairly disastrous 
time for fires, almost everywhere in Europe, and perhaps climatic factors 
were again a factor, since this was a fairly warm period. Following bad fires, 
many municipalities took action. In London, a major ordinance of 1212 
insisted on the construction of firewalls between houses, and required bakers 
and brewers to plaster the walls of their premises. Roofs were to be tiled or 
at least covered with plaster, and every householder was to have a supply of 
water on hand, in case a fire broke out. The watch, undertaken by the 
burghers of the city, was extended throughout the night. These measures 
seem to have been quite effective, since were no more big fires in London 
before the seventeenth century. Other towns introduced similar rules, often 
after a similar fire disaster. In particular, they attempted to regulate building 
materials. In Paris, plaster was increasingly used for both outer and inside 
walls, and while it did not entirely prevent houses from burning, it retarded 
the flames and was almost certainly one of the key factors that prevented 
that city from experiencing disastrous fires.   
Another important preventive measure was the exclusion of the most 
dangerous activities from the central areas of cities. In Vienna, bakers had 
been relocated to the suburbs by the late seventeenth century. In Paris, too, 
the new police organization of the late seventeenth century saw more 
rigorous enforcement of preventive measures, including exiling from the 




burning, and glass-making.  This does not seem to have happened in London, 
where sugar-factories and breweries went on operating in the central districts 
and continued to cause large fires. A further important change, in the late 
17th and 18th centuries, was the widening of streets.  Great avenues were built 
in many cities, initially as a demonstration of the power of the ruler or for 
urban beautification, yet in the 18th century even small streets began to be 
widened, as a measure against fire. 
The early modern period, right across Europe, was also characterized by 
what we would call public information campaigns, intended to change the 
fire behaviour of the inhabitants. Many fire regulations, particularly after 
1600, warned people never to carry a naked flame into attics or to smoke in 
stables full of hay. They required bakers and others to stack wood well away 
from their ovens. Bans on burning straw mattresses in the street and on the 
private use of fireworks were widespread by the 1700s.   
Of course, many of these rules were disregarded, and they were not 
always sufficient to prevent fire disasters. In order for construction to be 
regulated successfully, much depended on the availability of fireproof 
materials. In Italy, good stone for building was abundant, whereas in 
northern Europe, vast forests and poor stone ensured that towns continued 
to be constructed of wood. As urban populations increased in the later 16th 
century, and in the larger cities particularly in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
pressure on housing encouraged cheap and poor-quality construction in 
wood. By the late 18th century, however, almost everywhere the cost of wood 
was rising, and brick often became a cheaper alternative, although shoddy 
buildings in brick still burned in large numbers, in the suburbs of London, 
for example. 
If a general pattern can be observed, it is in the impact of forms of 
government. In places where city governments were motivated to enforce 
fire regulations, and had the power to do so, prevention was quite effective.  
We can see this in both Paris and Vienna. In the French capital, the monarchy 
steadily increased its authority, and by the late 17th century the royal police 
was active in enforcing fire prevention.  In Vienna, once the Habsburg court 
settled there in early 17th century, the monarchy began transforming the city 
buildings, partly to provide better accommodation for the royal 
administration and the courtiers. There too, fire prevention measures seem 
to have been actively policed by powerful city magistrates.  By contrast, this 
did not happen in 17th-century London, where there was no central authority 
to co-ordinate measures. 
The fourth key factor in determining whether small fires grew into 




were put out very quickly, usually by the inhabitants themselves. Even in 
the 19th century, fire brigades often arrived to find that the neighbours had 
already extinguished the flames. Until then, fires were the business of the 
entire population, and in most cases people rushed to help. This meant that 
very few small fires became large ones. 
When they did, it was usually because the fire broke out and spread 
before people noticed it. Many of the disastrous fires began at night : in 
Copenhagen in 1728, Aachen in 1656, London in 1666, and in Rennes in 
1720. Another fire in the London borough of Southwark, in 1676, began at 
four in the morning and burned over 600 houses. Still other great fires took 
hold because they happened on holidays, when the usual vigilance and forms 
of organization tended to lapse. The Great Fire of London began on a 
Saturday night in summer, when many of the wealthier inhabitants – those 
who were responsible for directing fire-fighting – had left the city.  In 
Rennes in 1720, the fire started on a Sunday night just before Christmas, 
when according to the local authorities, much of the population had gone to 
bed drunk. When the alarm was raised, few people arrived to fight the flames. 
    Fire-fighting of course depended not only on people mobilizing but on 
their having the necessary equipment. In the early modern period, this was 
quite simple: buckets, fire-axes, hooks, and ladders. By the late 17th century, 
fire pumps began to appear in many towns. The provision of this equipment 
was sometimes the responsibility of the wealthier inhabitants, sometimes of 
the municipality or the guilds, but everywhere it depended on foresight and 
organization by local authorities. The same applied to the supply of water. 
In London in 1666, there was insufficient water to fight the fire, and that was 
one reason it became so huge. In most cities, people got their water from 
fountains and wells. In the case of wells, the quantities available depended 
on the water table, which in London was certainly low after a period of 
drought, but it had also dropped because of the growth of the population and 
hence of demand. Public fountains and conduits were usually more reliable, 
but only if the city government built and maintained them. There is some 
evidence that in London the public water supply actually deteriorated in the 
17th and 18th centuries, when the provision of water was handed to private 
companies. There are many examples, across this period, where the fire 
pumps arrived while the fire was quite small, but could not get access to 
water (Garrioch 2016). 
When a small fire did get out of control, just how disastrous it became 
was then partly determined by expert fire-fighters. The first paid firemen, in 
modern times, were possibly the four fire-callers employed in Vienna 1522, 




thirty men, it was specifically employed to fight fires throughout the city 
(Davis 1991: 169-70). Across the 17th century, a few other places, such as 
Amsterdam, introduced professional fire-fighters.  But more common was 
an obligation for certain groups to help in case of fire. In most places, the 
building workers were required to attend when the fire alarm bell rang, since 
they were accustomed to climbing onto the roofs and they knew how to 
demolish houses to create a fire break, if necessary. 
Whatever the form of recruitment, for fighting big fires co-ordination 
was essential. This meant getting enough fire-fighters – most often 
volunteers – to the right place, with the right equipment. It also meant 
stopping onlookers from getting in the way – and indeed, from stealing 
things evacuated from burning buildings. The most effective fire-fighting 
therefore, once again, was found in towns where there were clear lines of 
authority and co-operation between the different groups responsible. In Paris 
and Venice, things worked pretty well. But in Stockholm, aristocratic army 
officers often resented being ordered around by the city magistrates, who 
were usually merchants, their social inferiors. In Rennes, in 1720, recent 
conflict and distrust between soldiers and civilians led to a marked failure of 
co-operation even in the face of a huge fire. In Copenhagen in 1728, soldiers 
actively hindered fire-fighting efforts, refusing access to water supplies in 
the military zone adjoining the fortifications.  Jurisdictional rivalries might 
also hinder fire-fighting: again, the Great Fire of London provides perhaps 
the best example, since absence of co-operation between different 
authorities certainly prevented effective action in the first couple of days of 
the fire. Short-term political factors also had, in some cases, a distressingly 
great role. In London, Vanessa Harding has suggested that local government 
was disrupted by political upheaval at the national level in the preceding 
decades. In Rennes, too, there had been considerable disorder in the period 
before the fire of 1720.  In both places, this meant that when a serious fire 
erupted, the men in authority were less experienced and poorly equipped to 
deal with the situation. 
In most European cities, it was not until the 19th century that permanent, 
professional fire services (paid or volunteer) came into existence, although 
for a long time they still relied on the assistance of the population. Their 
creation has often been seen as a delayed reaction to an age-old risk of fire, 
but in fact it makes more sense to understand it as a response to a new 
problem. Older methods of fire-fighting were less effective as city buildings 
grew taller, and they were not much use against the new kinds of fires that 
were taking place in nineteenth-century factories, large warehouses and 




made explosions likely. Greater expertise and training, and more specialized 




This quick survey points to several main conclusions. Disastrous fires 
were infrequent, and when they occurred resulted from a range of factors, 
including climatic and weather conditions, the nature of city buildings and 
their contents, the failure of local authorities to introduce and police 
effective preventive measures, but also the timing of fires. This meant that 
the incidence of fire disasters was not predictable, nor linear, but we can 
identify certain patterns.  
Risk levels rose and fell over time, and varied from one place to another.  
Climatic zones influenced the timing and severity of fires, as did longer-term 
climate change. So did the nature of building materials available, though that 
could be modified by decisive government action.  The nature of the urban 
economy was a crucial factor: port cities, in the early modern period, were 
at greater risk of serious fires because of their exports, imports, and naval 
supplies. As Europe became more connected to an emerging world economy, 
so the fire risk grew astronomically. 
The nature of disastrous fires, however, changed over time. The 
definition I have proposed is no longer useful in the 19th century, when most 
of the worst fires took place in large warehouses, factories, theatres and 
department stores. A new threat then arose from fumes released by the fires.  
Yet there is not a clear break in the industrial period, since as early as the 
17th century, in the Great Fire of London, warehouses and manufactories 
contributed greatly to the destructive power of the flames.  The ‘chemical 
revolution’ of the late 18th century accelerated this trend.  The traditional 
division between industrial and preindustrial cities does not apply here. 
Nor do fire prevention and fire-fighting follow a linear progression.  
Post-medieval prevention was quite effective, but with changes in the urban 
economy, new uses of fire such as tobacco-smoking and fireworks, and with 
larger populations, the risk grew again. In this context, the way city 
authorities responded to the fire risk was crucial: in London, after 1650, they 
did not manage well, whereas in Amsterdam in the same period, facing many 
of the same dangers, they were far more effective. This reflected, in part, the 
nature of urban authority, its power, and its willingness to take action. But 
there is no direct correlation between absolutism and fire prevention, since 
Stockholm continued to burn and Paris did not, even though both had strong 




and very authoritarian, was also quite effective in preventing fire disasters. 
At the same time, the capacity of the ordinary inhabitants to influence 
government policy was quite important, particularly in demanding action 
when the fire risk was clearly apparent. 
There is, nevertheless, a long-term trend that corresponds to the changing 
nature of the state across the early modern and into the modern period. 
Everywhere, local and central governments were becoming more powerful 
and more interventionist, whatever their particular form. And everywhere, 
too, fire fighting was gradually becoming more professional, even though 
urban populations continued to play a key role until the middle of the 19th 
century. 
It is also worth pointing out that in fire-fighting, new technologies and 
forms of organization were in large measure a response to changes in the 
perceived risk of serious fires. The widespread introduction of more efficient 
fire pumps in the late 17th century was partly a response to the Great Fire of 
London, and 19th-century fire-fighting technologies and growing 
professionalization were once again a response to the need to deal with new 
kinds of urban fires.  But even then, the pattern was not the same everywhere.   
In some cases, tracing the history of individual fires leaves us with the 
impression that there was also an element of chance. The combination of 
bad weather, political upheaval, the unfortunate timing that allowed a small 
fire to spread before it was noticed, sometimes a local water pump being out 
of action and the fountain dry, all these local contributing factors appear 
quite random. One town burned, whereas another town with very similar 
characteristics did not.  Nothing, it seems, could have saved the city of 
Lisbon from the flames that destroyed what was left of it, after the terrible 
earthquake in 1755. The fire history of European cities is as complex as the 
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1. Natural disasters in Beijing in the Qing dynasty  
  Beijing lies in the North China Plain, where it is hot in summer and dry 
and cold in winter, with the average rainfall 530 millimetres per year and 
the average humidity 54 per cent. By comparison, London’s annual average 
rainfall is 600 millimetres, while that of Tokyo is 1,530 millimetres. The 
table below, based on Yin Junke, Yu Deyuan, Wu Wentao [1997], shows 
known cases of natural disasters in Beijing in the 268 years of the Qing 




  There were many cases of floods and droughts in Beijing in the Qing 
dynasty. They occurred throughout the year, with a cycle of winter floods 
and summer droughts. The period between 1662 and 1772 saw most 
droughts. Hail snows, earthquakes and locusts happened eight or nine times 
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a year on average, but their frequency was lower than floods and droughts.  
The period from the late seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries 
experienced around 85 per cent of earthquakes. Hail snow was the third 
most frequent disaster due to the region’s cold weather. Floods occurred 
most between 1875 and 1908, with 29 cases in 34 years. There were 
relatively smaller cases of earthquakes, with 39 in 268 years. In the whole 
period, there were usually more than one type of disaster a year, and it was 
very rare that only one type of disaster happened in a year. Epidemics and 
famine tended to occur after natural disasters.  
  Floods and droughts are divided into three categories of A, B and C 
according to the seriousness of the damage they caused, with A the most 
serious and C the least. A-ranked floods happened five times – in 1653, 
1668, 1801, 1890 and 1893, whilst B-ranked floods occurred thirty times. 
There were four A-ranked droughts in 1689, 1832, 1867 and 1875. B-
ranked droughts happened seventy times (Yin Junke,Yu Deyuan,Wu 
Wentao[1997]).  
  There have not been many historical studies of natural disasters in Beijing, 
with only several articles on the great earthquake in 1679 and the large-
scale flood in 1801. Even though historians have examined fire and fire 
management in the Forbidden City, it was the imperial residence that was 
completely cut out from the Beijing urban society where ordinary citizens 
lived. There is no study on Beijing’s fire, particularly ones that look into 
how a large-scale fire started. There is no study on its fire management 
organization either. Therefore it is necessary to examine what kind of 
primary sources are available on Beijing’s fire and fire management 
organization in the Qing dynasty.  
 
2. Fires in Beijing during the Qing Dynasty 
  Chart 2 shows the number of fires in Beijing during the Qing Dynasty. 
The Qing period is divided into two subperiods in the chart: from 1644 to 
1873 and from 1875 to 1911. This is because the number of fires during 
each subperiod is based on different types of primary sources. The main 
sources for the period 1644 to 1874 are imperial annals and reports from 
bureaucrats which were directly sent to emperors. On the other hand, the 
information was obtained mainly from newspapers for the period 1875 to 
1911. It is worth noting that there are more records of fires in later periods. 
This makes it harder for us to produce reliable trends in fire. The number 
of fires in the palace and in the inner city was greater than the number of 
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fires in the outer city from 1644 to 1874. On average, there were about nine 
fires a year from 1875 to 1911. The number of fires in the outer city was 
the greatest, followed by the number of fires in the inner city. Fires in the 
outer city seem to have often been omitted from imperials annals and 
bureaucrats’ reports. Therefore, the data for the period 1875-1911 is more 
likely to reflect the actual circumstances. 
  Chart 3 shows what types of buildings were damaged by fires. Buildings 
are grouped into four categories: Palace, Office, Temple and Shop and 
House. Shops and houses were the most commonly damaged buildings, but 
fires in offices were not uncommon. 
  Of a total of 367 fires, we know in which month 303 of the fires occurred. 
As Figure 1 shows, there were as many as 206 fires from January to May 
and in December, which amounted to 70 per cent of all of the fires. There 
were 155 fires from January to April, namely during the period when it was 
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Prevent the Big Water. 
 Flood Control Measures in Prague 
(Bohemia) Issued by Public 





    During the winter of 1783–1784, practically all European states were struck 
by severe floods.1 These natural disasters challenged the state bodies and their 
capacities to cope with exceptional situations. At the time, administrative bodies 
in the Czech lands were undergoing numerous and substantial reforms designed 
in the spirit of enlightened absolutism to improve efficiency and thus contribute 
to the “greater good”. 
    The aim of all these reforms was to bring security to the lives of people and 
promote their quality, because this brought advantages for the whole state.   In 
consequence, people’s lives became subordinated to the logic of economics. 
These findings lead me to propose the main hypothesis of the following paper. 
State flood prevention of the late 1780s owes its operation to experience of 
flooding in 1784 and implementation of principles of biopolitics in reformed 
state bodies. 
    The research of historical floods is quite popular among scientists abroad 
interested in climate history. Especially in the course of the last decades a new 
tendency in research has emerged focusing on the interpretation of “natural 
disasters” across different historical periods.2 To my regret, the Czech scientific 
 
1 R. Brázdil et al., European floods during the winter 1783/1784. Scenarios of an extreme event 
during the ʻLittle Ice Ageʼ, “Theoretical and Applied Climatology”, 2010, 100, 1-2, pp. 163–189. 
2 D. Groh (ed.), Naturkatastrophen. Beiträge zu ihrer Deutung, Wahrnehmung und Darstellung in 
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milieu does not seem to be affected by this paradigmatic shift yet. The research 
still prefers either a “factual” description of historical floods or an analysis of 
countermeasures. These types of inquiry were facilitated by older studies and 
only a few took advantage of new archival research. Archival sources are still 
only used in minor research projects.3 
    My research does not present a simple adaptation of some recent projects 
conducted by other researchers, but it was inspired by various projects 
employing different historical methods that aided my better understanding of 
Czech Enlightenment society, its specifics and therefore the emergence of state 
flood prevention. Some methods of approach, however, were central as a matter 
of fact, these including historical anthropology, microhistory and 
environmental history. These branches of historical research have much in 
common, and it would probably lead to no satisfactory results to try to define 
strict barriers between them. 
    The general definition of environmental history states that it studies human 
interaction with the natural world in history.4 This rather simple characteristic 
also stands as the main benefit of environmental history, i.e., its emphasis of the 
natural world and basic elements such as water, wind or soil in social sciences 
and humanities. For someone not acquainted with the current trends in historical 
research, it might sound rather odd that there were — and still are — many 
projects that do not consider the natural world. Such, however, is the situation, 
even though environmental history has helped change this. 
    Historical anthropology, my second source of inspiration, helped me break 
other long-term stereotypes in historical research.5 Marxism and structuralism, 
both great science narratives of the 1950s and 60s, had no space for an 
autonomous humanity ungoverned by unspecified external forces or structures. 
Historical anthropology and (Italian) microhistory helped change this view. 
Although they do not deny the existence of some given contexts which shaped 
 
Text und Bild von der Antike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, Narr, 2003; G. N. Poliwoda, Learning from 
disasters. Saxony fights the floods of the river Elbe 1784–1845, “Historical Social Research”, 2007, 
32, 3, pp. 169-199. 
3 L. Elleder, Reconstruction of the 1784 flood hydrograph for the Vltava River in Prague, Czech 
Republic, “Global and Planetary Change”, 2010, 70, 1–4, pp. 117-124; J. Munzar, L. Elleder, M. 
Deutsch, The catastrophic flood in February/March 1784 – a natural disaster of European scope, 
“Moravian Geographical Reports”, 2005, 13, 1, pp. 8-24. 
4 J. R. McNeill, Observations on the Nature and Culture of the Environmental History, “History and 
Theory”, 2003, 42, pp. 5-43. 
5 J. Tanner, Historische Anthropologie zur Einführung, Junius, 2004. 
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people’s destinies, they also point out that the possibility for negotiation always 
existed, although in some cases, was strictly limited. People do not behave like 
chess figures, driven by something that transcends them. Nature has a key role 
in our lives and shapes our way of life more than we are willing to acknowledge, 
and it must be included in all historical research. 
    The end of the eighteenth century climatologically saw the era of the so-
called “little ice age”, which is known for its variable climate and irregularly 
but frequently occurring extreme climate phenomena.6 For example, the cool 
and rainy year of 1769 led to crop failure and famine in the following years. In 
Bohemia alone, one tenth of the population died during this time. Adverse 
natural (climatic) conditions did not necessarily lead to the same results in all 
affected areas. These depended on the specific mechanisms invented by 
societies for coping with these extraordinary situations. 
    As mentioned above, the experience with exceptional floods in 1784 was one 
of the crucial moments that led to establishing preventive mechanisms in 
Bohemia. This extraordinary meteorological phenomenon was probably caused 
by the Laki (Iceland) and the Asama (Japan) eruptions in 1783, which released 
huge amounts of volcanic ash and gases into the atmosphere.7 This volcanic 
aerosol caused or helped cause severe winter cooling in 1784 across much of 
the European continent. An extraordinary summer full of heavy storms and 
rains was followed by a severe winter characterised by low temperatures, frozen 
soils and high accumulation of snow. When sudden warming came combined 
with heavy rainfall, vast amounts of snow rapidly melted and created flooding 
across the country. In Prague, for example, the Stone Bridge (later known as the 
Charles Bridge) was heavily damaged, its guardhouse falling into the river and 
four of five guards drowning. Not only Prague, but other villages and towns 
along rivers were affected, especially in northern Bohemia. 
    The Enlightenment reforms of state administration represented the second 
crucial reason that allowed, or perhaps better, initiated flood prevention 
governed by the Habsburg state. This was based on the postulates of so-called 
cameralism, a German version of mercantilism and its assumptions that a 
successful state is characterized by an abundant, healthy and satisfied 
 
6 R. Glaser, Klimageschichte Mitteleuropas. 1000 Jahre Wetter, Klima, Katastrophen, Primus, 2001. 
7 Ch. A. Wood, Climatic effects of the 1783 Laki eruption, in Ch. R. Harrington (ed.), The Year 
without a summer: World climate in 1816, Canadian Museum of Nature, 1992, pp. 58-77; J. F. 
Richards, The unending frontier. An environmental history of the early modern world, University of 
California Press, 2003: 177. 
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population. But accidents like floods, great fires or epidemics were a setback in 
the balance of this hard-earned happiness and had to be prevented. The goal 
towards happiness became the main topic of cameralist thinking and was the 
first task for state bodies and bureaucrats in state service, especially police 
institutions.8 The police force was overhauled from the ground up, becoming a 
centralized institution independent of municipal governments, which 
previously had the agenda of public affairs in their authority. One of the main 
tasks of the newly organised police force was to control every possible 
irregularity, contingency and risk which could endanger the state and other 
property, people’s health or social order.9 
    My view of the Enlightenment police force owes much to French philosopher 
Michel Foucault and his concept of biopolitics.10 He shows that the police 
served not only as a disciplinary force, but its purpose was rather complex, 
because at the same time it triggered the activities expected and approved by 
state authorities. For example, the state authorities attempted to foster mutual 
solidarity between town dwellers by rewarding a person who saved somebody 
from drowning. While Enlightenment thinkers continued to stress the role of 
“love for human beings” (Menschenliebe), i.e., universal interpersonal 
solidarity, elites held the view that the biggest motivation for anyone to save a 
person from drowning was a monetary reward. One aim of the Enlightenment, 
however, was to encourage people to embrace the ideal of “Menschenliebe” and 
fully identify with it. 
    How can these theoretical concepts and climatic events be traced into the 
everyday practice of late eighteenth century Bohemia? In 1788, or perhaps 
earlier, Prague’s commissioner of police initiated intensive communication 
with regional offices and an exchange of information concerning the thickness 
of the snow blanket and the ice on rivers. After the lesson learned from 1784, 
administrative bodies focused on careful preparations and departed from 
Vienna’s instructions and previous experience, issuing in 1785 a list of 
measures to be taken during flooding, flood alleviation and subsequent flood 
relief. At that time, Prague was divided into flood districts, each being allocated 
their own metropolitan and police officers. For example, the administration 
 
8 J. Sonnenfels, Grundsätze der Polizey, Handlung und Finanz. Erster Theil, Joseph Kurzböck, 1786. 
9 F. Roubík, Počátky policejního ředitelství v Praze. Sborník archivu Ministerstva vnitra Republiky 
československé. Svazek I., Ministerstvo vnitra republiky Československé, 1926. 
10 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France, Basingstoke, 
2007. 
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prepared “evacuation centers” or areas to concentrate people rescued from 
drowning. 
    The administration’s main efforts focused on being prepared and showing 
people that it was prepared. The activity of the authorities was monitored and 
promoted by the press of that time, which was, of course, subject to censorship. 
With very little exaggeration, it can be said that articles in those newspapers 
were sort of “advertisements” for the Enlightenment and enlightenment 
authorities. However, they primarily document that the Enlightenment state also 
began to claim supervision in areas that had not been controlled before, and that 
it made active efforts to achieve a more efficient administration. 
    Based on how newspapers of the time report on the event we can observe that 
the discourse adopted and internalized certain Enlightenment values. Published 
advertisements offered temporary accommodation for individuals endangered 
by the possibility of being flooded by the rising level of the Vltava River. The 
values of prevention, “love for human beings”, selflessness and willingness to 
help were obviously shared by many people, and newspapers which were part 
of state propaganda helped spread awareness among their readers. 
    For a historian, the occurrence of floods in the late 18th century may serve 
as an interesting gateway to the world of the Enlightenment society undergoing 
the period of reforms. The related official correspondence documents the new 
interest in the population, the necessity to create multilayer communication and 
then entrance of state interventions in areas, where only local authorities had 
been operating. On the basis of experience from floods in Bohemia in 1784, 
gradual formation of a flood control system can be found. It is assumed by the 
state, which, in its interest in the population, gradually begins to usurp control 
in areas, which have not been controlled by the state before (which is proven by 
the formation of the state police, which was in charge of the protection against 
natural disasters). This leads to the origination of an elaborated administrative 
system on various levels (municipal, regional, state). We can see the gradual 
development of a control system, systemisation of substantial information and 
implementation of individual instructions. 
    The goal of this paper is to argue that the birth of flood prevention in Bohemia 
was basically caused by two factors — the enlightenment reforms in state 
administration driven by principles and mechanisms of biopolitics and the 
extraordinary climatic situation in the late eighteenth century. 
    I would like to highlight the fact that this was nothing but the work of chance 
and even if the severe floods of 1784, which helped the newly reformed police 
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force demonstrate to citizens the benefits of “public well-being”, i.e., 
controlling each possible irregularity, contingency and risk, had not occurred, 
the state flood prevention policy would certainly have been adopted later. 
    Counter-arguments from proponents of constructivist theories can be 
certainly expected who will argue that “so-called (climatic) reality” is irrelevant 
in social science. In their view it is what people perceive as reality which 
represents the most important thing. I would like to oppose this approach with 
reference to environmental history, which takes the natural world into account. 
I believe that the responsibility for correct and persistent application of 
methodology falls on the individual researcher, at least in social and human 
sciences. There is no such thing as the “correct approach” to researching 
historical topics. Some approaches only lead to anticipated conclusions, while 
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Citizens’ Awareness of Firefighting in 
Edo: Analysing Eighteenth-Century 








  Throughout history, fires have occurred regularly and caused significant 
damage particularly to cities where population density is high. In early 
modern Japan, where most houses and buildings were made of wood, urban 
fires occurred quite regularly. 
  The period between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries is very 
important in the history of Japan because it witnessed the establishment of 
the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1868). Tokugawa Ieyasu, put an end to the 
Sengoku period, or Warring States period, in 1603, unified the country and 
became the first shogun of the Tokugawa shogunate. Since this period saw 
the emergence and development of castle towns which served as regional 
political centres and also cities as hubs of trade and commerce, some 
historians call it “the age of cities”. At the same time, Japanese cities in this 
period also experienced numerous fires. However, while we know relatively 
well about the shogunate’s firefighting measures and also urban firefighting 
organisations which developed rapidly, particularly in the early eighteenth 
century, historians have paid little attention to how ordinary urban citizens 
dealt with fires. (The first section). 
  The knowledge of ordinary people has rarely been written down as it 
depends on experience. Therefore this paper looks into contemporary 
publications. The Edo period saw the development of printing and 
publishing, and numerous books were published, including not only 
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religious, philosophical and literature books but also practical textbooks and 
guides. Peter Burke has argued that wisdom gained by individuals became 
collective, accumulated knowledge through the commercialisation of books 
and that this process led to the standardisation of knowledge. Burke includes 
early-modern Japan as an example of places where the commercialisation of 
books took place (Burke 2000). Indeed, specialist, technical books on 
firefighting were published in the Edo period. This paper looks at these 
firefighting books as some sort of widespread knowledge shared by ordinary 
citizens and considers their firefighting awareness. 
  In its analysis, this paper also takes into consideration the mentality and 
personality traits of citizens of Edo (commonly called Edokko) 1 because 
how to deal with fires was the main part of their identity. Edokko mentality 
was known to consist of “modesty” which helped them accept fires as part 
of their daily life, bravery of firefighters who were not afraid of fires, 
independence against the authorities, generosity (Edokko were known to 
spend all the money as soon as they earn it). However, such characterisation 
of Edokko was based on fictional characters in novels and plays and tends to 
be used to idealize the Edo period. Therefore it requires serious 
reconsideration.2  
  This paper analyses a firefighting textbook called Chinka Yojinshu, which 
contains 53 chapters of firefighting instructions. It was first published in 
1731 in Edo and Sendai, approximately 300 kilometres north of Tokyo, and 
then re-published three times between the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. It was also mentioned in late nineteenth-century magazines which 
reviewed the firefighting literature published during the Edo period as one 
of the two essential books which contained firefighting knowledge 
(Takeda1897～98)3. Based on this analysis, this paper further looks at other 
firefighting textbooks published in the same period (the third section), 
 
1 The pride of Edokko which was described in the literature works after the 1770s was that 
they were born in Edo, not stingy (spending all the money they earned on the day), wealthy 
background that allowed them to grow up under their nanny’s umbrella (this was them being 
ostentatious), three generations of their family living in Edo where people came and went, and 
their tendency for rebelliousness from samurai and the shogunate (Mitamura 1933, Nishiyama 
1980 and Yamamoto 1983). 
2 I have warned the recent trend to establish cultural nationalism in Japan. By learning from 
“Invention of tradition” theory by Hobsbawm and drawing on evidence, I have criticized 
studies which idealize the Edo culture as the representative of pre-modern popular culture. 
(Iwabuchi 2018).   
3 The other one was Chinka Yojinguruma, which the section three of this paper looks at. 
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examines Edo's favourite author Kyokutei (Takizawa) Bakin’s experience 
of being affected by fires (the fourth section) and then aims to understand 
the ordinary citizens’ knowledge about firefighting.  
 
1. Fires in cities in the Edo period and studies on them  
  First of all, this section looks at cases of fire in the Edo period and its 
historiography. In Edo, which was the largest city in early-modern Japan, 
large-scale fires happened seven times until 1856 and a fire that consumed 
five to 20 towns occurred four to five times a year, whilst it was perceived 
that one citizen was affected by a fire every three to five years. (see 
Bokasakuzakui, 1856, Chapter III) and there were at least 2,019 recorded 
cases of fire (Nishida et al, 2003). Of these cases, 654 have details of the 
areas that were consumed, whilst in 480 cases when the fire started is known. 
Many fires occurred between December and March, and around 45 per cent 
of fires that claimed people’s lives happened in March. This seems to be 
related to the fact that there were many windy days in March. Of the 480 
cases which have information about the time when the fire started, most fires 
occurred between 3am and 5am, followed by 1am and 3am. Of the 654 cases 
with information about the consumed areas, 31 killed people.  
  Although records of fires from other cities might vary, known cases of fires 
in Edo and Sendai concentrate around winter and spring. Historians of urban 
disasters have thus far studied fires and earthquakes which caused 
significant damage. Some historians call Edo “the fire city” as it witnesses 
so many of it (Nishiyama 1980). A lot of attention has been paid to the use 
of empty land and embankment which functioned as buffers to prevent fires 
from spreading, encouragement to build fire-resistant walls and roofs and 
how it worked and development of firefighting organizations called Hikeshi. 
The shogunate ran their own firefighting organization called Jobikeshi and 
also had samurai deal with fires at government buildings and facilities, and 
at the same time the early-eighteenth century saw the emergence of 
community firefighting units called Machibikeshi by the shogunate’s order. 
Local communities employed Tobi, professional firefighters, who dealt with 
fires in the townsmen district. In 1720, 48 firefighting units were formed in 
Edo and each had its own area to look after. In 1738, there were 11,429 
professional firefighters in Edo, whose population was around 500,000 
(Yamamoto 1983). They prevented fires from spreading by knocking down 
buildings on fire as they were made of wood. In novels and plays, they were 
portrayed as the ordinary citizens’ brave heroes (the flower of Edo).    
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  Despite the numerous cases of fire, it is notable that in Edo relatively small 
numbers of lives were claimed by them. In Edo, even after firefighting 
organisations were established in the early eighteenth century, the number 
of fires remained high (Nishida et al, 2004). The shogunate made no effort 
to provide guidance or information about firefighting to the ordinary citizens 
either. This could mean that there were relatively few casualties because the 
citizens knew what to do with fires. Therefore it is important to understand 
not only the firefighting measures and organizations but also the citizens’ 
knowledge about firefighting.  
 
2. Citizens’ firefighting knowledge in Chinka Yojinshu  
  This section looks into the ordinary citizen’s firefighting knowledge in 
Chinka Yojinshu. This book was published in 1731 by Edo’s major publisher 
Suharaya Jiemon and a paper merchant in Sendai called Tomiya Chuzaemon. 
It appears to be based on an earlier book for the merchant household, Kanai 
Yojinshu, by Tomiya in 1730, and therefore he is believed to be the author 
(Yoshida 1994). Incidentally, Sendai witnessed six major fires between 
1707 and 1727, including the 1708 fire which consumed most of the city 
(Saito 2004). Therefore these fires in Sendai might have prompted the 
publication of this book.  
  After published in 1731, this book was reprinted three times between the 
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in 1797, 1803 and 1823 by another 
publisher who used a new printing block and also added a new introduction 
and drawings to the 1823 edition. A copy of the first edition was owned by 
someone in Numata in Gunma Prefecture, 120 kilometres north-west of 
Tokyo, as well as another copy of the 1823 edition by someone in Nagano 
Prefecture. This shows this book had quite a wide readership. In addition, 
Hinomotoyojinki, which will be discussed in the next chapter, is likely to be 
a pirated edition, showing its high demand.  
  In the last chapter of this book, the author explained why he wrote this book. 
He said fire was the most devastating disaster of all kind, and large fires 
made everyone sad and destroyed unmeasurable amounts of personal 
property. Therefore it was vital that fires need to be prevented for himself, 
other people and the society, and that was why he wrote down his own 
experience and what he heard from other people, with a view to passing it 
down to the future generations. He advised the book to be read out to 
families and servants a few times every month so they understood and 
suggested that the knowledge of this book should be shared with other 
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people. He wrote that it was important to deal with a fire seriously, otherwise 
it would be unlikely to receive god’s help. For the author, the continuation 
of his family business was of paramount importance, whilst he believed that 
firefighting was a social responsibility and therefore he published the book 
so knowledge about it should be shared widely. At the same time, although 
writing about practical firefighting measures, he cited god as a source of 
authority. The first edition of this book had another title, Kairoku Youjinshu, 
and Kairoku meant fire but it was also the name of a fire god. This implies 
that the author relied on some kind of divine authority.  
  Let’s have a look at practical measures which the author wanted to share 
with the reader. This book contains 53 chapters, and while two of them are 
about villages, most are concerning cities. Its readership was intended to 
include poor singles, the lower class who lived in tenement houses and the 
middle and upper class who owned warehouses. These chapters consisted of 
(1) preparation for firefighting (14 chapters); (2) preventative measures (12 
chapters); (3) evacuation (18 chapters); (4) early-stage fire extinguishing 
(seven chapters); and (5) what to do in the aftermath of fires (one chapter). 
In the last chapter, 13 useful tools for firefighting and evacuation were 
mentioned.    
 
(1) Preparation for firefighting (14 chapters) – these chapters explained how 
to secure water for extinguishing fires. It was suggested that buckets with 
water should be put on roofs and in warehouses and that, when there was 
strong wind, water should be kept in all the buckets, kegs, pots and bath tubs, 
regardless of wind directions. It was also recommended that, in case of fires 
at night, readers made sure they knew where torches and temporary lights 
were, whilst keeping ignition tools at hand in each room. If there were high 
winds, readers should finish their meals quickly and also prepare more food 
than normally in seasons when fires occurred frequently.  
  Preparing firefighting tools was important too. The author listed numerous 
tools such as ladders, rooftop footholds, well buckets, dippers (or bowls), 
brooms (to bash fires with them soaked in water), buckets, pumps, tools to 
keep fire sparks away (big fans), fire blankets, sandbags to create channels 
for water and fireproof screens (Doromomen). Fire blankets were cotton 
sheets that were used instead of leather firefighting suits. They were 
massaged well with bean flour, were soaked in water mixed with potassium 
alum and then were dried. Fireproof screens were thick cotton sheets soaked 
in water mixed with salt and mud. The book suggested that cords should be 
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attached to screens so they could be hung on the wall in case of a fire, and 
both sides of the screens should be splashed with water in possible. Normally 
they should be folded down and stored with dry soil and salt.  
 
(2) Preventative measures (12 chapters) – the author listed causes of fires 
and also explained how to deal with them: keep your ovens in good condition 
so sparks would not leak out of cracks, and keep combustible items away 
from them. If you put charcoals which you used in a shed for storing timbers 
and logs, make sure charcoals were no longer burning. Don’t keep new ashes 
in sheds that kept fertilizers. Kotatsu, or Japanese foot warmers, caused fires 
because not only blankets and clothes caught fire, but also burning charcoals 
in them gave out sparks. To prevent this, put ashes on charcoals as soon as 
you finished using it. Don’t smoke in mosquito nets if you were drunk or too 
tired as you might fall asleep and then your cigarette pipes might cause a 
fire. Don’t put logs or anything combustible around warehouses. Fires at 
tenement houses for the lower class people normally started around walls, 
and this was because they put ignition tools on shelves which were old and 
faulty. To avoid this, make sure older ignition tools were replaced. When 
burning rubbish, don’t leave the fire with combustibles around it. When you 
dry jackets that were oiled to make them waterproof, wait until they got cool 
and then put them away. When you scutch cotton at night with a light, cords 
of scutching tools might snap and catch fire which might spread to cotton, 
so make sure you had firefighting brooms and mats at hand. Fires caused by 
lightning would get worse if you splash water on them, but they could be put 
out by adding another fire to them (although this sounds very much like a 
superstition). Ensure you understood this.  
 
(3) Evacuation (18 chapters) – the elderly people, women and children 
should escape first, so it was suggested that they prepare by putting a set of 
clothes, shoes and dried food in a basket each so they could take it out with 
them. Put on some sort of protection on head such as a wet towel so their 
hair wouldn’t catch fire. Other sections of this book mentioned how useful 
towels were – they could be used as some sort of smoke mask to avoid 
choking on smoke, whilst you could soak them in water and then squeeze 
them to drink when they were thirsty. Cords, a radish (per person) to use in 
case they choked on smoke and dried food (which they should prepare for 
more than that would be needed and keep in small bags so they could take 
them with you when they escape).  
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  Identify evacuation sites and make sure everyone, particularly the elderly 
people, women and children, knew where to go. When escaping, husbands 
and wives should carry weapons, important documents, small coins, clothes 
and food. Act in groups where possible.  
  Also carry a portable brush-and-ink case. Small coins would be useful to 
hire people.  
  Make a lot of baskets, using bamboo and paper, to put tools in. If you didn’t 
have a warehouse, put these baskets on top of each other in an empty plot, 
put wet straw mats on them and keep them wet so they would function as a 
warehouse. A warehouse was a fireproof storehouse made of slaked lime.  
  At the same time, the author explained how and where to protect and store 
valuable household belongings in detail. Warehouses were important. If a 
family had a warehouse, they should regularly check what was in it and make 
sure it was tidy inside. If they were bringing valuable household belongings 
in it, instruct people in a calm manner, bring valuable items inside first to 
the back of it and put in front what was needed immediately after the fire 
was put out such as clothes to change, food (rice), condiments (miso), pots 
and kettles.  
  If you didn’t have a warehouse and lived in the Western Japan such as 
Kyoto and Osaka, erect mud walls with a roof (1.8 meter high, 3.6 to 5.4m 
wide, roof stretching 1.2m), put valuable household belongings and then 
cover them with wet straw mats. If you couldn’t afford to build mud walls, 
erect a pole about 1.5 to 1.8 meter high, put household tools around it and 
then cover them with straw mats or bordered mats which should be kept wet. 
If you couldn’t do either, dig a hole around your house or in your yard and 
pack valuable household belongings in chests or baskets tightly and neatly 
(anagura). Or attach name tags and marks to your belongings and ask others 
who had a warehouse to keep them in it. If you didn’t have access to any of 
such facilities, carry a minimal amount of belongings with you, put on good 
clothes so you gain trust from other people and have small change so you 
can buy things and pay for them. However, there was no guarantee that you 
won’t lose anything, so be prepared. In that case, always keep valuables in 
small packs so they could be taken out swiftly by women and children in 
case of a fire. If you were greedy and tried to escape with a lot of things, 
that would be too much to take with you and you would end up leaving your 
belongings and losing them.  
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(4) Early-stage fire extinguishing (seven chapters) 
  It was important to extinguish a fire at an early stage. Tighten your belt to 
lift your spirit, roll up your sleeves, put on your tabi socks and go out with 
a cord. The cord was for using a bucket and also to tie it to tile pins and facia 
boards in case your ladder fell. You should also carry a water bucket, a sickle, 
a fork and a fire hook. A sickle and a fork were to take things out of a fire, 
whilst a fire hook would be used to stop you from sliding and falling from a 
roof.  
  If a fire was nearby, take a small bucket and a bowl with water, splash the 
water on the origin of the fire and put it out. What was important was to 
extinguish a fire where it started, and as long as it was done, your belongings 
would be safe, so that must be done first, rather than protecting your 
belongings. And if you behave in that way, other people would follow you 
and help each other. A god would surely give a helping hand too.  
  When a fire was spreading from a temple and a samurai mansion in a less 
populated area, it was caused by flying sparks, so make sure that each house 
put up a ladder and get onto the roof with a broom, and protect houses in the 
windward. When a fire occurred, everyone assumed that houses would be 
burned and focused on saving their belongings, but it was unwise to do so. 
Fires spread and got worse because you didn’t put out the flying sparks when 
they were small, and eventually you would lose your “treasures” in your 
warehouse. Make sure you understand this and it is important to put out 
flying sparks as soon as possible.  
  If a stranger came to you to help, this person could be a thief, so ask him to 
go up the roof or to carry water.  
 
(5) What to do in the aftermath of fires (one chapter). 
  If a house caught fire and the person who was taking care of valuable 
household belongings had to escape, stay around the house, prepare a bucket, 
a ladder and a pail with water and hold a hoe and clogs in hand. Once the 
fire was put out, run to the house and uncover the cellar (anagura). Check a 
wall of the warehouse which was close to the fire, and if it was on fire, splash 
water on it from the roof, and if the water stopped changing, open the 
fireproof door slowly. If you opened the door in a hurry, things would start 
to catch fire because of the heat that had penetrated through the wall and 
stayed inside the warehouse. This was based on my own experiences. Bear 
it in mind.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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  This is the summary of Chinka Yojinshu. Its main part was (3) evacuation. 
This implies that readers were keen to find out how to protect their valuable 
household belongings and lives. Relatively fewer pages were used for (4) 
early-stage firefighting, and this also proves that, once a fire started or spread, 
protecting lives became the priority. Also the author’s emphasis that early-
stage firefighting and stopping a fire spreading would help protect valuable 
household belongings suggests that people did not help others’ firefighting. 
In (1) preparation for firefighting, he condemned people’s reluctance to 
invest in firefighting as stupid as they eventually lost their valuable 
household belongings.  
Chinka Yojinshu thus showed that urban citizens were keen to protect their 
lives and valuable household belongings. The author talked about the lower 
class who didn’t have much fortune, so he must have included them in the 
book’s readership.   
 
3. A summary of firefighting textbooks during the Edo period 
  This section looks at other firefighting textbooks and draw a comparison 
between them and Chinka Yojinshu.  
  I have been able to find seven such firefighting books. Except for (4), a 
summary for each book is available,4 although there has been no attempt to 
compare their contents. Therefore the section below looks at each book.  
 
(1) Atago Miyage (a souvenir from a firefighting god)  
  This book was published in Kyoto in 1699 by an unknown author. The 
author said he did research about firefighting, put the knowledge in practice 
and summarized it in this book. The title meant a souvenir from Atago 
Shrine in Kyoto, which was dedicated to a firefighting god. The book started 
with the shrine’s oracle, and out of its 109 chapters, around a third (36 
chapters) were on religious charms, Chinese classics and myths from ancient 
and medieval Japan. The other two thirds contained practical information 
such as what to prepare on a daily basis, prevention of fires, early-stage 
firefighting, firefighting tools, evacuation, treatment. The author wrote these 
 
4 For summaries of each book, see “Tenka Taihen – natural disasters in Edo in primary 
sources (National Diet Library Exhibition, 2003) for (1) and (7); Women’s book archives for 
the Edo period, 48 vol (Taikusha, 1996) and Shigeo Negishi, “Biography: Firefighting 
manual in the Edo period “Chinka Yojinshu”, Musashino, 71 (2) (323), 1993 for (2), (3) and 
(6); Aga Murakami, ” A Study on the risk management of cities in the Edo Period (1)” 
Bulletin of Atomi Junior College 42 for (5).  
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poems so readers could remember key messages of the book. Part of this 
book’s practical information was referred by Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714), 
Confucianist philosopher and herbalist, in his encyclopedia of daily life 
Banpohijiroku, which compiled simple, basic knowledge of life which 
everyone can put in practice, and then repeated in other firefighting 
textbooks. For instance, Chinka Yojinshu’s advice not to open the door of a 
warehouse immediately after the fire was put out was based on this book.  
 
 (2) Chinka Yojinshu  
  Published in 1731. Its contents were summarized in the previous section. 
In this edition, there was little mention of the role of gods in firefighting. It 
is also important to note that emphasis was put on evacuation, instead of 
early-stage firefighting.  
 
(3) Chinkayojinguruma 
  Published in 1766 in Edo, Osaka and Kyoto with a new edition published 
in 1788. The new edition was probably prompted by a large fire in Kyoto in 
the same year. The introduction said that the original draft was written by 
someone in Edo and it was edited by another person in Kyoto, although the 
details of the authors are not clear. However, description of wells, 
warehouses and cellars was based on how they were done in the Kyoto area. 
The first third of the contents was on prevention and early-stage firefighting, 
whilst the rest of the book discussed what to do after a fire started such as 
evacuation and protection of valuable household belongings and spent many 
pages on warehouses and cellars. There was no reference to gods or religion. 
A copy of this book was owned by a merchant in Tsuruoka, a regional town 
in the Eastern Japan, around 340 kilometers away from Tokyo.  
 
(4) Hinomotoyojinki 
  Published in 1767 in Edo and Osaka by an unknown author. The contents 
were almost the same as (3), whilst a new introduction and six chapters were 
added. The wording was slightly changed, and chapters were in a different 
order. This appears to be a pirated version of (3).  
 
(5) Bokayojintsuchi 
  Published in 1829 following a large fire in Edo by an unknown author, 
although the author seems to be someone who was involved in a religion. 
The tone of this book was rather religious, arguing that belief in firefighting 
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would help avoid fires and discussed the importance of preventing a fire at 
a time and a day whose element was fire according to the Yin and Yang 
philosophy as well as religious principles in choosing where to relocate and 
how to rebuild or repair a house. This book also contained records about 
major fires in Edo between 1657 and 1829 and also how the capital’s 
important buildings were affected by them.  
 
(6) Hinoyojinshikata 
  Published in Edo in 1837 by Kamono Norikiyo, who was from a family of 
Shinto priests at Kamigamo Shrine in Kyoto and, as a leading religious 
figure, advised the shogunate and worked on social improvement. Because 
of this background, the author spent half of the book to discuss the rituals 
and ceremonies to calm fire-gods, prayers and how to arrange timbers to 
build houses by following divine teaching. At the same time, in an attempt 
to calm people’s intense emotions (“put out fires in people’s mind”), the 
latter half of the book discussed how to deal with the moral degeneration in 
the increasingly stratified society. He explained how to run free schools 
which would help children from poor families develop their personality.  
 
(7) Bokasakuzukai 
  Published in 1856 by Oda Togaku, who was a doctor from Gunma 
Prefecture, 100 kilometers north-west of Tokyo. After serving a daimyo 
(feudal lord) in Gunma Prefecture (the Yada clan) as a doctor, he moved to 
Asakusa in Edo and started practice. The author showed, with drawings and 
illustrations, measures to avoid fires and also to deal with natural disasters 
such as earthquakes and typhoons. It seems that the author was prompted to 
publish this book by a major earthquake in Edo in the previous year and also 
a severe rainstorm in 18565. The author noticed that old buckets used by 
Tofu makers to keep bittern (nigari) in didn’t burn very much, so he soaked 
a thick straw mat (nekoda) which was normally used as a rug in “firefighting 
water” made of bittern water and used it as a fireproof screen to wrap a 
building so the building wouldn’t burn. He also showed how to build more 
robust houses and warehouses with braces so they could withstand a 
 
5 For this rainstorm, see Junpei Hirano and Masumi Zaiki, “Tracing of the Course of East Japan 
Typhoon in 1856”, Koichi Watanabe, “Damage Situation and Reaction of Edo towards the East 
Japan Typhoon in 1856”, in Koichi Watanabe and Matthew Divies (eds.) The Ordinary and the 
Extraordinary in the Early Modern Metropolis: Artificial Natural Environment and Water 2020, 




  These are the summaries of seven firefighting textbooks. Firstly, in most 
cases, it is unclear who wrote these books, but it appears that they were 
mostly written by those who lived in cities such as Edo and Kyoto, implying 
that fires were regarded as an urban disaster. Secondly, little is known about 
the readership of these books, and there are only a few cases of known 
ownership of them too. However, these books were written mostly with 
hiragana characters, and kanji or Chinese characters had hiragana alongside 
them. They were written in plain Japanese, while some had simple slogans 
written like poems. This implies that these books were not only aimed at the 
rich but also for ordinary citizens. Thirdly, the fact that the publication of 
these books was prompted by large fires and that they were re-published as 
pirated versions after fires shows that firefighting knowledge was needed in 
the aftermath of natural disasters, whilst it appears that such knowledge was 
not widely shared. This could be due to the transient nature of urban 
population. Fourthly, (1) spent around a third of the book on religious 
matters, and (5) and (6) had religious elements, but after the publication of 
(2) Chinka Yojinshu, most books focused on practical measures. In addition, 
the later textbooks spent more pages on evacuation and what to do in the 
aftermath of a fire, rather than fire prevention.  
 
4. Kyokutei (Takizawa) Bakin’s experience of fires 
  How was the advice from these firefighting textbooks put in practice then? 
Practical measures to deal with fires were rarely recorded in the Edo period, 
even though these were taken in extraordinary times. Most of the city’s 
residents were lower sorts and they didn’t leave any document or written 
record either. This paper instead examines diaries of Edo’s popular author 
Kyokutei (Takizawa) Bakin, who is known for his popular books such as 
Nanso Satomi Hakkenden, and his letters to his friend in Ise Matsusaka and 
considers how people dealt with fires.6 Kyokutei (Takizawa) Bakin (1767-
1848) was born in Fukagawa in Edo and moved around the city. And then 
he lived in Iidamachi (A - north west of central Edo) from 1793 to 1824, in 
 
6 For Bakin’s diaries, see Kyokutei Bakin Diaries, vols I-IV and Supplement (Chuo Koron 
Shinsha, 2009-2013); Collection of Bakin Letters, vols I-VI and Supplement (Chuo Koron 
Shinsha, 2002-2004. I would like to thank Koichi Watanabe for his advice on Bakin’s 
comments about fires. For quotation, only the date is cited for diaries and the date and the 
recipient for letters.  
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Kanda Dobocho (B - central Edo, currently the Chiyoda ward) after leaving 
his adopted son to run his shop in Iidamachi in 1824 and in Yotsuya 
Shinanomachi (C - western outskirts of Edo, currently the Shinjuku ward) 
from 1838 when he moved as his grandson started a new job. His diaries and 
letters were mostly from after the 1820s, in which he was in his old age. This 
means that the period under consideration in this section was when he had a 
number of health issues such as weakening eyesight, declining strength and 
also when he was fearful and afraid how a fire would affect him. In winter, 
in particular, if sunny and windy days continued, he was anxious about fires, 
and when fires did happen in Edo, he and his families were unable to sleep. 
The rest of this section will look into his diaries’ entries from the afternoon 
of 2 April in 1832 (I), when a fire occurred in Kanda Dobocho (B), from 7 
to 10 February in 1834 (II), when Kanda Dobocho (B) saw fires three days 
in a row and ones from 1 December 1839 (III), when a fire happened in his 
neighbourhood in Yotsuya Shinanomachi.  
  
(1) Bakin’s perception and experiences of fires  
  When fires occurred three days in a row in February 1834 (II), Bakin wrote 
to his friend Josai (Tonomura Sagobee): “I thought big fires in Edo happen 
every thirty to forty years, so recent fires that have happened three days in a 
row are extremely unusual because it’s been only six years since the last big 
fire in 1829. I guess you must have heard about this in Matsusaka”. It is clear 
that large-scale fires were thought to occur in Edo every thirty to forty years. 
In another letter to Keisou (Ozu Hisatari), another friend of Bakin’s in 
Matsusaka, he was worried that his friend’s shop in Nihombashi which had 
been re-built after burned down in the 1829 fire might be affected again, 
lamenting that it would be too soon as it was only six years since it caught 
fire. This indicates that Bakin and general public thought that fires did occur 
in Edo but that large-scale ones were rare, whilst they didn’t think they 
would become a fire victim themselves.  
  Were different parts of Edo affected differently by fires? In terms of 
Iidamachi (A), Bakin wrote to Josai in Matsusaka as below: he left his books 
in the upstairs of his adopted son’s shop in Iidamachi (A) even after he 
moved to Kanda (B) because he thought “fires are unlikely to happen in 
Iidamachi”. However, there were two fires in the neighbourhood after he 
moved to 
 Kanda and one of which reached the backyard of the building and burned 
many of his books. "Having learned the hard way”, he had about forty of his 
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books kept in Iidamachi sent back to him as he came to feel that “if my books 
are meant to be burned, it’s better to have them at hand”. 
  In terms of Yotsuya Shinanomachi (C), in his letter III to a friend in 
Matsusaka, Bakin wrote that he had thought that, although it was an 
inconvenient rural place to live in, it had its merit in that fires were unlikely 
to happen. However, “if there is a fire in the nearby town of Naito Shinjuku, 
I can’t relax because my house will be in the leeward side”. These letters 
show that he felt that, although fires might have been relatively frequent in 
Kanda Dobocho (B), neither Iidamachi (A) or Yotsuya Shinanomachi (C) 
were safe after all.  
  How often was Bakin actually affected by fires? In his diaries, around thirty 
entries a year touch on fire incidents.7 But in fact his own house was never 
affected. Indeed in his letter II to Josai, he wrote that: “I have seen three big 
fires in 1772, 1806 and 1829 in my life, but I managed to escape from 
danger”. There were two fires right next to his house in Iidamachi, it still 
didn’t catch fire. After his experience of III, he wrote in his letter to Keisou 
that he felt lucky not to have been affected by any fire even though he was 
born in Edo, showing his understanding and acceptance.  
  In Edo, it was generally thought that only small number of people would 
actually become victims of a fire and that people’s houses would rarely catch 
fire as Bakin himself indeed was never a fire victim himself. However, it 
was also understood that one was lucky if he or she was unaffected by any 
fire. In winter, particularly, people were constantly anxious about fires. 
 
(2) Measures against a fire 
  What did Bakin do to deal with a fire? His diaries suggest that he took 
precautionary measures as below: 1. he did not raise flags outdoors or light 
a lamp during a festival (II, on 11 February); 2. he packed necessary items 
for each person so they can take them out in case of fire (II, a letter to Josai 
on 18 February 1834) and tidied his house, put things away and packed them 
in boxes (on 16 February); 3. he followed the advice of his landlord and 
asked him to keep his books and hanging scrolls in his warehouse (II); and 
4. he lent firefighting tools to his landlord (diary on 7 February). These are 
basically precautionary measures to protect household goods.  
 
7 The number was taken from “excerpts on fires” (in Kyokutei Bakin Diaries, Supplement 
(Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2010)) based on seven volumes Bakin’s diaries between 1828 and 
1834 except for the excerpt.  
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  In terms of what was actually done when a fire happened, Bakin mostly 
wrote about how to protect household goods. He only mentioned firefighting 
measures when his grandchildren prevented flying sparks from starting 
another fire by climbing onto the roof and using a pump (a letter to Keisou 
on 8 January 1841 and another to Josai on 9 February 1841).  
  When there was a fire, Bakin’s adopted son went along to the scene of fire 
(a fire on 21 March 1829, Seiemon’s action, diary). He did so not because 
he was just an onlooker – rather, he wanted to understand the situation and 
also help his friends take refuge from the fire (Kinkamimai). Indeed, when 
Bakin’s house nearly caught fire, his friends as well as merchants and 
tradespeople he dealt with rushed to help his family take out household 
goods. In the letter about the case of the fire I, around 50 to 60 people helped 
him, whilst in the letter about the case of the fire II, approximately ten came 
to his house to assist. There were cases where a crowd of onlookers 
prevented families and friends from helping the fire victim. The Shogunate 
issued decrees to ban people from gathering around the sight of a fire as a 
crowd often included thieves, but such decrees didn’t have the desired effect 
(I, letter to Josai on 28 April 1832).  
  When it came to actually protecting household goods, neighbouring 
landlords immediately got rid of floorboards and tatami mats, whilst 
removing cookers and dissembling water vases (I, letter to Josai on 28 April 
1832). At Bakin’s household, they took necessary items away and left them 
at his friend’s house in Shitaya in the north of Tokyo (I, diary on 2 April). 
In the case of a fire in II, his friend in Hatchobori came to Bakin’s house to 
ask him to keep his papers, indicating that such arrangements to look after 
friend’s important documents and household belongings in case they were 
affected by a fire were customary practices and that Bakin and his friends 
had agreed to ones of their own. In addition, in the case of III, rats and mice 
drilled holes in his warehouse so he was prepared for “everything to be 
burned down”, thinking that “if the building caught fire, I would take out a 
few valuable household belongings with me and take refuge in my back 
garden, hiding under a straw mat” (letter to Keisou on 8 January 1841).  
  At the same time, in the case of I, as Bakin’s wife didn’t properly put the 
lid on a box which was sent to his friend, some clothes fell off the box and 
were lost on its way to his friend’s. On this, Bakin wrote that “I was calm 
and relaxed about it, but my family were upset and confused. So even though 
we had discussed what we should do in case of a fire, it didn’t go as planned” 
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(letter to Josai on 28 April 1832).  
  In terms of items that were not taken out immediately, it appears that they 
put them in the warehouse with the help of their friends and then sealed it 
up. In the case of III, his grandson and his friend closed the windows and the 
door of the warehouse and sealed the gaps around them with plaster (letter 
to Keisou on 8 January 1841).  
  There were people who only focused on protecting their own household 
belongings so much that they ended up causing trouble to others. Social 
sanctions were imposed on such people. In the case of the fire in I, the 
merchant from whose house the fire started was absent, so his wife instructed 
her servants to deal with it. The door of the warehouse was sealed with miso. 
The wife also shut the gate of the alleyway so sparks wouldn’t start another 
fire. This prevented those who lived in the same premises from getting out, 
whilst those who were out and about weren’t able to come back to their 
house, eventually losing their household belongings. After the fire was put 
out, the merchant’s household belongings were safely kept in the sealed 
warehouse and escaped any damage, but those who lost theirs felt angry with 
the merchant’s family. They threw stones at the merchant’s family when 
they went to the warehouse to collect their household goods, stopping them 
from doing so.  
  Bakin’s letters and diaries on fires show four key points about how people 
dealt with fires: 1. in winter in particular, precautionary measures were taken 
such as packing valuable household belongings, keeping goods in the 
warehouse and having arrangements in place with your friends so they could 
keep items that were immediately necessary; 2. in case of a fire, friends and 
acquaintances helped people take out household belongings and warehouses 
and evacuation sites were utilised; 3. however, facing an actual fire, people 
were often too scared and confused to carry out plans and agreements to deal 
with a fire; 4.there is evidence that a merchant family behaved selfishly to 
protect their own household belongings, ending up causing trouble to others. 
Such behaviour could well have been seen elsewhere. What is notable is that 
Bakin wrote mostly about protecting household belongings. Although he 
was part of a wealthy class that could afford to collect and keep valuable 
goods such as books and hanging scrolls, but 4. shows that rescuing 
household belongings was a practice that was widely carried out. As has 
been discussed in the “firefighting textbooks”, Bakin’s behaviours and 
perception show that, while people gave up stopping a fire, they were 
prepared to do everything they could to protect their household belongings. 
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Old sayings such as “Edokko” and “spending all of the day’s earnings before 
midnight” need to be taken just as an image, rather than a reality.  
 
Conclusions  
  Historians have previously studied the frequency of fires, firefighting 
facilities and systems. However, the firefighting textbooks which this paper 
has analysed show that, instead of instructions from the shogunate or 
firefighting infrastructure, it was urban citizen’s knowledge accumulated in 
these textbooks that helped them deal with fires.  
  In addition, in terms of how Edokko tackled fires, it has been suggested 
that the character of Edokko, such as a strong sense of duty and obligation 
and also warm-heartedness, was strongly influenced by the brevity of Tobi 
(firefighters) (Yamamoto 1993). Historians have also argued that Edo 
citizens had the habit of not keeping many valuable household belongings 
because they were very used to being affected by fires (Yamamoto 1993, 
Mitamura 1933，Nishiyama 1980). However, the firefighting textbooks 
demonstrated that what was most important for Edo citizens was to protect 
their lives and valuable household belongings. By the time (2) Chinka 
Jojinshu was published, many cities established their own firefighting 
groups and organizations, and firefighting was undertaken by professional 
firefighters. Fires were dealt with by destroying buildings, so fires were 
rarely extinguished. This was why the protection of valuable household 
belongings and safety was prioritized even when their own residential area 
was affected.  
  This paper concludes that such accumulation of firefighting knowledge 
among urban citizens was both their achievement and limitation in the Edo 
period. On a related note, the recent flood in July in 2018 in the western 
Japan killed over 200 people despite alarms raised by local authorities. At 
the same time, last year’s Typhoons Faxai and Hagibis exposed serious 
issues around a lack of evacuation centres, where evacuation centres were 
set up and the timing of evacuation warnings. People’s sense and awareness 
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The Ordinary Made Extraordinary: 
The Archaeology of Water 





  The most ordinary archaeological features that we excavate in London are 
associated with drainage and waste water. Sometimes the ditches, drains and 
pits are the only surviving evidence of houses and communities, like this 
shallow ghost of a ditch that once collected rainwater falling from the 
thatched roof of a round house built on the outskirts of Roman London, 
nearly 2000 years ago. Drainage features are so common in London’s 
archaeology because there has always been a need to control and remove 
waste water since the city was founded and also because drainage features 
tend to be channels or pits dug into the ground which have a better chance 
of surviving later development above. 
  Almost every human settlement has to come up with solutions for water 
and we can learn a lot about the evolution and organisation of communities 
from archaeological evidence of drainage.  
  This paper examines how recent archaeological excavations in London are 
helping us to understand some of the complexity of the interaction between 
topography, people, drainage and flooding and in particular how the latest 
extraordinary response to London’s waste water, the Tideway Tunnel, 
literally builds on the solutions of the past and in doing so is exposing 
evidence of historic exploitation of London’s river systems. My paper has 
five parts: 
1. A very brief introduction to how London’s river system has been 
transformed by waste water, and how by the 19th century this 
unfiltered system led to the pollution of the River Thames and the 
spread of disease. 
2. A brief summary of the ambitious drainage system designed in the 
1850s by engineer Joseph Bazalgette, which intercepted the waste 
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water from the Thames tributaries, but which can no longer contain 
both flood and pollution.     
3. A description of how the massive Tideway Tunnel engineering project 
will build on the 19th century improvements.  
4. An introduction to how the excavations for this project are exposing 
past evidence of the exploitation and management of London’s rivers.  
5. I will also briefly describe how the company undertaking the work is 
planning to use archaeology, history and public art to change 
perceptions of the Thames as well as celebrate this extraordinary 
project. 
 
1. The transformation of London’s rivers 
  As Chapter 13 and 14 have noted, the topography and underlying geology 
of the Thames Valley are key factors in explaining the location of London 
and its development. The Thames river valley has a long and complex 
history dating back millions of years. Initially a fast flowing arctic river (and 
a tributary of the river that was to become the Rhine), it finally settled down 
into its current location approximately 15,000 years ago. Changing sea 
levels, variations in climate and human intervention since the last Ice Age 
have created a mosaic of islands, abandoned channels and ‘lost’ tributary 
rivers which underlie the modern City.   
  The tributaries were a useful source of food and resources for nomadic 
groups in the Mesolithic period, and evidence can still be seen at very low 
tides on the Thames foreshore today, of prehistoric timber structures, 
possibly fishing platforms that once extended out into the river in the area 
of a lost tributary, the Effra.   
 In front of the UK government’s Secret Intelligence Service building, 
archaeologists are recording some of these prehistoric timbers, under close 
observation. 
  The foundation of London by the Romans in the 1st century AD brought 
two of London’s major tributaries, the Fleet and the Walbrook, into an urban 
environment, and the process of transformation from natural rivers to 
industrial and drainage channels began.   
  Although the population of Londinium was only about 30,000 at its peak, 
archaeological evidence reveals just how much effort and engineering went 
into transforming the landscape and exploiting the tributaries. Recent 
archaeological excavations on the Walbrook, have revealed considerable 
land raising activity in the first 40 years of Roman occupation, lifting the 
ground level in the Walbrook valley by nearly 4m in response to the risk of 
flooding. An extensive network of timber drains managed the flow of storm 
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and waste water across the Roman city, into the natural water channels and 
ultimately into the Thames.   
  The Roman masonry culvert, which may have taken waste water from a 
major public building, ran for a distance of more than 80m and still worked 
when we uncovered it in the 1990s, carrying water down the slope into the 
river Thames.      
  The Roman administration abandoned Britain in AD 410 and the area of 
the old Roman City was not reoccupied until the 9th century. The response 
to drainage in the medieval period was to continue to use the tributary rivers 
as sewers, with individual properties relying on cess pits for the temporary 
storage of human waste. These pits were emptied by ‘nightsoil’ men who 
would carry the waste for a fee to the market gardens and farms beyond the 
city limits.   
  Cess pits, now thankfully sterile after many hundreds of years, are some of 
the most informative and rewarding archaeological features, containing 
artefacts dropped by accident and environmental evidence for diet and 
disease.   
  From the 13th century the City of London Corporation made efforts to 
secure fresh water supplies from the Tyburn river via an organised system 
of conduits, cisterns and lead and wooden pipes. This system was primarily 
for the wealthier citizens, and most people continued to draw drinking water 
from communal wells and pumps in the street or from the Thames. Although 
the causal link to disease was not recognised at this time, the continuing 
pollution of tributaries with sewage and refuse had become a matter of 
public concern from the 15th century and there are many historical records 
that relate to the punishment of individual property owners for failures to 
maintain drains or culverts on their properties.  
  Greater regulation of waste disposal from the 17th century was 
undermined by rapid population growth, and pollution of the tributaries 
worsened. Once the tributaries were culverted, covered and no longer visible, 
as this 16th century map illustrates in the case of the Walbrook, the problem 
was largely transferred into the Thames which itself became an open sewer 
that failed to clear with each low tide. Water companies continued to 
distribute untreated drinking water from the Thames.     
  In the early 19th century many writers commented about the state of the 
river. Charles Dickens wrote in his novel Little Dorrit, “Through the heart 
of the town a deadly sewer ebbed and flowed, in the place of a fine fresh 
river,” (1855-57). Cartoons and newspaper articles maintained a steady 
critique of the authorities and their failure to fix the problem. In response to 
concerns about public health in 1848 the newly founded Metropolitan 
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Commission of Sewers required the blocking up of 200,000 of London’s old 
cess pits and the diversion of sewage into the inadequate and leaking drains.  
This unfortunately made the situation worse and resulted in the poisoning 
of water supplies and pushing more raw sewage into the Thames. 
  By the mid-19th century, London was suffering from recurring epidemics 
of cholera, with more than 10,000 killed between 1853 and 1854. It was 
thought at the time that cholera was caused by foul air or ‘miasma’. The 
1854 outbreak was investigated by a physician, Dr John Snow and he 
worked out that the spread of cholera was due to contaminated water and 
not the ‘miasma’. His argument included the fact that none of the 70 local 
brewery workers had become infected as they only drank beer and they 
didn’t touch the local street water pump, which it was later revealed had 
been contaminated by a leaking sewer.   
  The miasma was particularly bad during the hot summer of 1858 creating 
the 'Great Stink of London', which overwhelmed all those who went near 
the Thames including the government which was situated in the newly built 
Houses of Parliament, on the river. The fear of disease and the stench led to 
the Parliament evacuating to Oxford, but they did pass legislation enabling 
another new organisation, the Metropolitan Board of Works, to begin work 
on sewers and street improvements. Only eight years later most of London 
was connected to the new sewer network. 
 
2. The mid-19th century solution 
  Joseph Bazalgette, had been appointed as Chief Engineer to the 
Metropolitan Board of Works in 1856, and was responsible for the design 
and implementation of the solution. His scheme was and still is one of the 
marvels of modern engineering. It transformed public health in London and 
changed the look and smell of the city.  
  Bazalgette’s design involved replacing hundreds of miles of old sewers 
with new, larger capacity sewers, many of which followed the line of the 
former tributary rivers. The flow from these sewers was intercepted by east-
west running lower-level sewers, which led to outfall sites to the east of 
London at Beckton and Crossness. 
 83 
 
SLIDE:  Joseph Bazalgette’s intercepting low level sewers 
  Bazalgette created a largely invisible masterpiece; majestic brick sewers 
which are still in excellent condition today. There were also pumping 
stations at Deptford, Abbey Mills and Crossness and described by 
architectural historian, Nikolaus Pevsner, as ‘A masterpiece of engineering 
– a Victorian cathedral of ironwork’. 
  The more dramatically visible elements of Bazalgette’s scheme were the         
Albert, Victoria and Chelsea Embankments. These replaced the tidal mud 
of the Thames foreshore with 52 acres of reclaimed ground for riverside 
roads and gardens. These new embankments protected Bazalgette's sewer, 
as well as providing space for a subway and the underground railway. The 
embankment was a grand unified design, including the river wall, trees, 
benches and lamps.   
  His scheme was brilliant, ambitious and very expensive, but it didn’t 
entirely solve the problem. The Thames estuary was still massively polluted 
downriver of the sewer outfalls and sewage played a part in England’s worst 
ever passenger ship disaster. The Princess Alice was an excursion steamer 
run by the London Steamboat Company. On an evening in September 1878 
she was returning from a trip to Gravesend and collided with a coal ship.  
Within 4 minutes the ship has sunk. 
  650 people died; most were trapped on board but many of the survivors of 
the immediate accident subsequently died from pollution. The sewer 
outfalls at Barking and Crossness had just completed the evening release of 
170 million cubic metres of raw sewage one hour before the collision: the 
heavily polluted water was believed to contribute to the deaths of those who 
went into the river. Sewage treatment works were only added at Beckton 
and Crossness in the 20th century.   
 
3. The extraordinary solution today – The Tideway Tunnel 
  The problem for London today is capacity. Bazalgette’s system was 
designed to capture both rainwater run-off and sewage for 4 million people. 
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As a failsafe, to prevent the system becoming overloaded with rainwater in 
heavy storms, and flooding people’s homes and streets, Bazalgette designed 
the system to overflow into the River Thames via a system of combined 
sewer overflows (CSOs). 
  Today the population of London is over 8 million and estimated to reach 
10 million by 2026 and the current system is running out of capacity. The 
CSOs, which were originally meant to operate during very heavy rain a few 
times a year, now regularly release combined raw sewage and rainwater at 
an average of 50 times a year. As little as 2mm of rain can trigger a discharge 
and leads to about 30 million tonnes of untreated sewage being dumped into 
the river each year.   
  This increase in overflows into the river is not surprising; the system is 
dealing with a population at twice the level it was designed for, there is 
considerably more paving than in the 1870s meaning more rainwater runs-
off the streets into drains and less is absorbed and our weather appears to be 
getting more extreme.   
  Various solutions to tackling discharges into the tidal River Thames have 
been examined and the Thames Tideway Tunnel has been determined to be 
the most cost-effective solution. It’s a simple principle; in times of heavy 
rain the overflow that was heading for the river is intercepted and diverted 
into a shaft which leads down to a tunnel deep beneath the Thames. The 
tunnel will work with gravity. The combined sewage and rainwater will flow 
downhill to the east and will be pumped up nearly 70m to new pumping 
stations at Abbey Mills (near the 2012 Olympic Park) from where it will be 
transferred into another tunnel and on to Beckton sewage works for 






 SLIDE – SCHEMATIC ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SCHEME 
 The project is necessarily large in scale. In order to capture waste water 
from the 34 CSOs, 24 sites are required along the 25km route of the tunnel, 
to enable boring of the tunnel, and to put in place the necessary interception 
infrastructure. There are three main tunnel drive sites, where large shafts, 
30m in diameter will be excavated from the surface. Other sites involve the 
excavation of access shafts, maintenance sites and improvement works.  The 
majority of the construction sites are either land-based adjacent to the 
riverfront, or on the foreshore, usually to provide shortest connections to the 
existing sewage infrastructure.   
  Once built there will be a number of permanent structures in place at the 
sites. These will include ventilation structures, access points to the tunnel 
and a kiosk to house control equipment. Where replacement CSOs have 
been built over the foreshore there will be extensions to the existing 
embankment.   
 
4. The archaeological project 
  As most of the new shafts connect to sewers that were originally tributary 
rivers, the Tideway Project provides a unique opportunity to investigate 
archaeological deposits in these river systems and we hope that this project 
will uncover physical evidence of earlier infrastructure including remains 
associated with water management and exploitation extending back through 
all of London’s history.   
  The archaeological work has so far involved desk-based research and 
surveys for the Environmental Impact Assessment process and, over the past 
two years, a programme of test excavations at selected sites. This has 
allowed archaeologists to identify which sites have the most potential for 
surviving archaeological remains and to plan for larger programmes of 
archaeological excavation, integrated with construction. The archaeological 
work is being undertaken by MOLA (Museum of London Archaeology) in 
 86 
collaboration with another archaeological organisation, Headland 
Archaeology. The company that is building and managing the overall 
project is called ‘Tideway’. 
  At the time of writing, this work is at an early stage and this paper includes 
a very brief overview of initial results to provide an indication of the type 
of deposits that we are encountering and what they may say about 
exploitation of London’s Rivers. 
  One of the sites is in the area of London known as Nine Elms, close to the 
location of the new American embassy and Battersea Power Station.  
Archaeological work here in recent years has shown that a large part of this 
area was once an earlier channel of the Thames, with localised islands and 
deep alluvial deposits, laid down during periods of changing climate 
conditions. The site is named after the nearby road, Kirtling Street. The 
excavation took place within a 30m diameter concrete ring, which 
eventually extended down 60m below ground level. The layers of 
archaeological interest extended 11m down from the ground and the 
deposits encountered provide fascinating detail of the development and 
exploitation of the river Thames in different periods.   
  At the base of the archaeological sequence was a complex series of flood 
and river deposits which illustrate the differing river conditions within the 
former course of the Thames. Gravel deposits at the base would have been 
originally laid down in fast flowing glacial meltwaters. Then multiple layers 
of silt and sands and gravels indicate different river regimes, all overlain by 
a thick organic, peaty layer, laid down during a period of dryer conditions, 
with later evidence of floods carving new channels. Radiocarbon dates from 
these layers indicate that the earliest deposits are probably 18,000 years old 
and the latest 18th century. The first evidence of human exploitation dates 
from post-Roman period, and is part of a fish trap, designed to catch fish as 
the tide went out.   
  Over this was an early 19th century dock and finds included a Baltic tar 
barrel re-used as a sump or drainage feature and helpfully stamped with the 
date ‘1830’.   
  This panorama of London’s waterfront from 1829 illustrates the landscape 
at the time and the expanse of green marshy fields is the area of naturally 
wetter ground over the former course of the Thames.  
  Towards the eastern end of the scheme, Chambers Wharf is one of the 
largest construction sites. Following trial excavations in 2015 (and 
foreshore surveys and recording in 2016–2017), the excavation is due to 
start in the next few months and is expected to reveal the timber river walls 
from at least three, perhaps up to seven, waterfront revetments (river walls) 
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dating from the medieval period through to the 18th century, representing 
successive phases of land reclamation. These are predicted to include a dock 
or slipway, and remains of the maritime-related industries along the river 
frontage – remnants of buildings on the reclaimed land, and debris from ship 
repair, breaking, and perhaps construction.   
  A stream or drainage channel emptying through the river wall is expected 
in later work, and appears to be of medieval date. Ships and boat timbers are 
also expected, both debris from boat-breaking, and re-used in the revetments, 
as well as dumps of refuse from a nearby 17th-century pottery, perhaps the 
Rotherhithe pothouse, in operation from 1638 to 1663. Some 19th-century 
features will also be present, including the remains of granaries on the 
riverfront. 
  The archaeological deposits on this site are thought to represent all aspects 
of London’s maritime history from land reclamation, to ship building and 
dismantling, industry, docks and of course drainage, utilising earlier natural 
channels. 
  Further to the southeast, the Deptford Church Street site is away from the 
river Thames but archaeological deposits here tell the story of London’s 
evolving waste water systems.   
  The site contained remains dating to the beginning of the 19th-century and 
was occupied by terraced houses, a public house, and large buildings dating 
from the early 19th to early 20th-century. 
  Relatively little survived of these buildings apart from the drainage 
structures below ground level. As noted at the beginning of this paper, 
sometimes drains are all we have. There were remains of 18th and early 19th 
century cess pits which were replaced by new later Victorian drains and 
pipework, reflecting the development in sanitation described earlier in this 
paper.    
 
5. Celebrating the project – The Heritage Interpretation and Public 
Arts Strategy  
  Tideway, the company responsible for the tunnel have a wide vision ‘to 
promote a change in the relationship between Londoners and their river: 
Reconnecting London with the Thames.’   
  This vision includes a project-wide Heritage Interpretation Strategy (HIS), 
which is to help inform the design of the new structures and open spaces 
that will be created by the project as well as inspire public art. It also forms 
part of the overall communication about the project, including the 
archaeological messaging. It’s an interesting approach, designed to help 
focus and frame interpretation. The overarching theme set out in the strategy 
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is the ‘River of Liberty’, specifically the relationship between the Thames 
and Londoners of the past and today.   
  The stated aim of the Heritage Interpretation Strategy is to ‘open new 
perceptions and perspectives of the river so that people are inspired to 
encounter the Thames and experience its history and influence on London’s 
contemporary culture and ways of living.’ The objectives of the strategy are 
to   
● Communicate the River Thames’s unique cultural heritage and 
awaken Londoners, and others, to its value to the city and to the lives 
they live, stimulating interest, experience and exploration;  
● Respond to heritage knowledge and resources embedded in the river 
and woven into its architectural fabric, that engage and foster a sense 
of connection and cultural authenticity; 
● Celebrate the achievements of the 19th century engineers responsible 
for the sewage infrastructure and explore its contribution to London 
as a World City;  
● Encourage the creation of inspirational designs and memorable local 
places of sustainable and lasting cultural value; 
● Sustain heritage authenticity by promoting the retention of extant 
features of interest wherever possible. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  As I hope this paper has demonstrated, the whole Thames Tideway project 
is an extraordinary response to an ordinary human problem of how to 
dispose of waste water. Joseph Bazalgette’s solution and now Tideway’s 
massive improvements on this are all linked back to London’s topography 
and earlier exploitation of tributary rivers. The excavations for the new 
CSOs will expose evidence of London’s development along these rivers and 
it is appropriate that this archaeological and historical link will be given 
such prominence through the Heritage Interpretation Strategy and new 
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I. Conduits of Water in Edo 
  Edo was built on the waterfront. When Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616) 
selected the site of Edo as the capital of his domain territory in the Kanto 
region in 1590, the Edo Castle was on the foreshore of the Edo Bay. The 
city of Edo was built on the man-made lands by draining and filling the 
foreshore. The city was developed on the waterfront specifically in order to 
take advantage of waterborne transport arteries. For example, Oda 
Nobunaga (1534-82), the prominent warlord during the Warring States era 
(the end of the fifteenth century - the end of sixteenth century) built his 
Azuchi Castle (built in 1579) on the hilltop by the Lake Biwa, Japan's largest 
lake. Oda was able to move large amount of commodities across the lake by 
boats to promote commerce in fairs and markets in his territory in the peace 
time. He was also able to move food stuff and weapons easily in warfare. 
Many castles and castle towns were built on the waterfront following the 
example of the Azuchi Castle. 
  The city of Edo was equipped with the extensive network of canals and 
conduits. Edo was the de facto political capital of Japan where the 
Tokugawa shoguns resided and the city’s population reached one million by 
the early eighteenth century. To supply commodities to the city’s 
population, there was an urgent need to import vast amount of commodities 
into the city. Designated piers were built for unloading the cargos that 
shipped goods from all over the country to Edo. The unloaded goods were 
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then moved through the extensive network of canals that covered the area 
particularly in the eastern side of the Edo Castle, into the city. However, 
most canals are now filled and cannot be seen. Only archaeological 
excavations can reveal their structures. 
  The most vital urban infrastructure to support Edo’s increasing population 
was its urban waterworks. The city was equipped with two waterworks, the 
Kanda Water Supply and the Tamagawa Water Supply. The Kanda 
Waterworks drew its water from the Inokashira spring while the Tamagawa 
Waterworks took water from the River Tama. Both waterworks were 
formed of exposed aqueducts and culverts. The Kanda Water Supply carried 
water in exposed aqueducts (this part of the waterworks was the Kanda 
River) from the Inokashira spring to Sekiguchi (today's Bunkyo-ku 
Sekiguchi) from which water was delivered through a culvert. The 
Tamagawa Water Supply conveyed water in exposed aqueducts from the 
Hamura Water Weir to Naito Shinjuku, then delivered the water in the 
culvert within the city. Archival sources can sometimes reveal how the 
structures of water supply and sewage were formed, new evidence is 
becoming available from archaeological excavations. 
  Many studies that draw on archaeological evidences tend to focus on the 
engineering aspect of water supply system and sewage by paying more 
attention to how they were formed and how they changed over time. 
However, it is equally important to consider the waterworks in wider living 
and social contexts. This presentation therefore examines the civil 
engineering of waterworks and sewage system in relation to the issue of 
urban public goods, namely, who was responsible for the management of 
Edo’s infrastructure. 
 
II. Excavated Conduits 
1.Water Supply System 
  There are many types of waterworks that archaeologists discover from 
excavations because the infrastructure of water supply and river 
management concerned various aspects. People in the past used water for 
drinking, fire prevention, decorative fountains, and irrigation, but the 
different usages of water did not necessarily require separate waterworks. 
For example, the water from the Tamagawa Waterworkd was not only used 
for drinking but also for irrigation in the newly reclaimed Musashino Plain 
(fig.1). Thus water resources often served dual or multiple purposes. Let us 
turn our attention first to the examples of Edo’s waterworks as it being the 
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most advanced infrastructure in the city and examine their structural 
characteristics. 
  Two major waterworks in Edo were the Kanda Water Supply that was built 
around 1590 (the 18th year of Tensho) and the Tamagawa Water Supply 
that was completed in 1653 (the 2nd year of Shouou).The Kanda 
Waterworks drew its water from the springs of Inokashira (in today’s 
Musashino and Mitaka Cities, Tokyo), Zenpukuji (in today’s Suginami 
Ward, Tokyo) and Myoshoji (in today’s Suginami Ward). A large scale weir 
was built in Sekiguchi (in today’s Bunkyo Ward, Tokyo) to divert the flow 
of the Kanda River to supply water to the area in the north of the Edo Castle. 
Because the Kanda Water Supply took water from the north side of the 
Kanda River, in order to supply water to the area in the south of Edo, a 
bridge conduit was built in Ochanomizu to deliver water beyond the Kanda 
River into the city. 
  Most parts of the Kanda River were in fact built as canals, and the lower 
end of the River formed the outer moat of the Edo Castle, which was for the 
military purpose. 
  The Tamagawa Water Supply was built in order to cope with the increasing 
population in Edo. It drew its water from the Hamura Water Weir in the 
upper Tama River and delivered the water to the area in the south of the Edo 
Castle and the commoner’s quarter in Ginza and Nihonbashi. The distance 
between the Hamura Water Weir and the outlet to the outer moat of the 
Castle was 43 kilometres with the altitude of 15 meters. Its construction was 
likely to require very advanced engineering. The waterworks carried water 
from the weir to Naito Shinjuku (a post town on the Kosyu Highway Road, 
today’s Shinjuku Ward) in the exposed aqueducts, and within the city of 
Edo, in the culvert. Additional smaller waterworks that took water from the 
Tamagawa Waterworks were also built. 
  All waterworks had similar structural characteristics. The water was 
carried in the exposed aqueducts through the surrounding villages and 
delivered in the culverts within the city. The water mains were formed of 
canals and pipes both made of stone. For instance, some remain of stone 
masonry of the Kanda Waterworks has been excavated that shows the 
waterworks delivered water through the upper residence of the Mito 
Tokugawa Clan to the Suidobashi. (We can see its replica in the Tokyo 
Waterworks Historical Museum in Bunkyo Ward, Tokyo). The water taken 
from the mains was delivered in wooden or bamboo pipes that were 
connected to the mains. As no pump was involved, Edo’s waterworks was 
built to use natural water flows of down slopes. The water flowed into the 
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wells from which people or the users pulled up water. Many wells were 
dotted across the city and they were used to store the supplied water (water 
supply wells), to monitor the water quality or to adjust the water flow (called 
tame-masu). There were also artesian wells that were used to extract 
groundwater. Advanced level of engineering was required to maintain 
sufficient water pressures in the water pipes.  
  The residence of daimyo lords often sheds light upon how the city’s 
waterworks operated. Daimyos, originally war lords, governed the 
provincial territory that was legitimated by the Tokugawa shogunate. In 
return, every daimyo was required to move between Edo and his domain 
spending alternate years in each place. His wife and heir were required to 
remain in Edo. He needed the space to administrate his fief’s governments 
and to house a group of his retainers. For these reasons, typically every 
daimyo had several residences in Edo. As these residences contained many 
buildings and houses, numerous water pipes were built to supply water to 
them.   
  In this presentation, we look at the Shiodome Site (in Minato Ward, 
Tokyo) the former residences of Wakisaka Clan, Date Clan and Aizu 
Matsudaira Clan (fig1) Fig.4 shows the map of waterworks found in the 
Site. The excavation of this large area, thanks to a recent large scale urban 
regeneration project, has revealed the numerous and intricate water pipes 
that supplied water to the daimyo residences. Let us look at Date’s 
residence. Fig. 5 shows two stages of the residence’s waterworks, one is of 
the period between the mid seventeenth century and the late eighteenth 
century and the other is of the period between the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century and 1867 (the end of the Tokugawa period). It shows a 
long water pipe that ran from the intake of the first water supply to the other 
end of the residence. Interestingly, the pipe ran up to the edge of the garden 
pond, which suggests that the water was used to replenish the ornamental 
pond. A similar example has been found in the Iidamachi Site in Chiyoda 
Ward (the former residence of Sanuki Matsudaira Clan). These examples 
have led some scholars to believe that a larger proportion of water was used 
for the ornamental ponds than used for drinking.  
  The water pipes were connected to the water supply wells from which 
water was pulled up for use, and it likely that the height of the wells and the 
position of the water pipes were adjusted so that the water was delivered to 
all areas of the residence. There is little difference in the pipe size or the 
methods used to connect the pipes to the wells amongst the three daimyo 
residences in the Shiodome Site (Note1). On the other hand, the size of the 
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area that was equipped with the water pipes and the number of wells were 
different, which suggests the differences in the residents’ activities and 
economic levels in each residence (Note 2). 
  Interestingly, Fig. 5 shows that the water pipes were frequently repaired. 
One of the possible reasons was the damage caused by earthquakes and 
fires. Edo was prone to disasters and in particular frequently suffered from 
fires. 
  The three Shiodome residences suffered from fires at least ten times in the 
early modern era, and the buildings were rebuilt many times. When the 
residence underwent rebuilding, the spatial structure of the buildings could 
have greatly changed and this may also have changed its conduits system. 
  In addition, as the water pipes were made from wood or bamboo, they 
needed repairing when they were worn out. They also needed fixing when 
the water quality declined because too much sands accumulated at the 
bottom. It would have saved the trouble of repairing many times if stone 
pipes had been introduced, but the wooden and bamboo pipes were not 
replaced by stone pipes. Due to the lack of archival sources, we can only 
speculate that wooden and bamboo pipes were favoured partly because they 
were economical and simple to maintain.  More importantly, wooden and 
bamboo pipes were probably more suited to Edo’s residents because they 
were easy and quick to repair when damaged by disasters (Note 3). Edo’s 
infrastructure management took into account the need of building materials 
that were suitable for swift repairs because the city was so prone to disasters. 
Let us summarise the notable features of Edo’s water supply system. The 
main water pipes were made of stone and well built and it is likely that they 
were provided by the government. However, the water pipes in the daimyo 
residences and the commoner quarter were made from wood and bamboo. 
It is likely that wooden and bamboo pipes were chosen partly because of the 
economic convenience but it is also possible that the disaster management 
was taken into consideration. For the actual details of the preservation and 
management of Edo’s water supply, please see the presentation by Professor 
Watanabe who is able to draw on the rich archival sources. 
 
2. Sewage system 
  According to the archival sources, there were three sewer routes in Edo 
and the city’s waste water was collected through them before eventually 
pouring into the Edo Bay. They were the main sewer or o-gesui, the 
connecting sewer or yokogiri-gesui, and the minor sewer or sho-gesui. Rain 
water and waste water from individual commoner’s houses and daimyo 
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residences would gather in the minor sewers. Several minor sewers would 
then flow into the connecting sewers which would convey the sewage into 
the main sewers. The main sewers eventually flowed into canals or rivers. 
Although there have been some excavated examples of Edo’s sewage 
system, unlike the waterworks, the complicated sewer routes in Edo means 
that our understanding of the entire waste water system has been limited.   
  Let us look at the archaeological evidence again. Figures 6 and 7 show the 
photographs of the boundary moat between the residences of Wakisaka Clan 
and Date Clan, found in the Shiodome Site. The boundary moat, built on the 
border of the residence and the sewer, collected waste water from the 
residence which eventually poured into the Edo Bay. The masonry 
revetment structures of the boundary moat of the Wakisaka residence were 
smaller than that of the Date residence. Also the stones used in the Date 
residence were more neatly cut and the moat appeared to be better built. The 
differences between two residences suggest that the boundary moat was 
independently managed by the owner of the land. Similar examples can be 
seen in other excavation sites, too. 
 A figure shows some of the masonry revetment structures including the 
boundary moat of a daimyo residence in the eastern side of the Edo Castle, 
the Yanagihara Bank, and the sewer of the commoners’ quarter. Public 
masonry structures such as the Yanagihara Bank of the Kanda River used 
large stones and the masonry was of high quality. The boundary moat of a 
daimyo residence found in the Marunouchi 1-chome Site was also built 
using large masonry because it also formed a part of the Castle’s inner moat. 
On the other hand, the stones used to build the boundary moat in other 
daimyo residences were of uneven sizes which shows a market difference 
from the pubic masonry structures (Note 4). 
  The sewer found in the Nihombashi 1-chome Site (Chuo Ward, Tokyo), 
the former commoner quarter, was made using smaller stones and it also 
appears that the sewer was repaired several times. We know that the area 
suffered from fires a number of times as many damaged household items 
and burnt soils were also found. After clearing the debris, fresh soil was 
added on the top of the burnt soil. Every time the surface level was raised, 
some new stones were added on top of the existing sewer masonry. The 
evidence from this site shows not only how often Edo suffered from fires 
but also that the city’s commoners maintained the damaged sewer in their 
quarter by themselves. 
  The boundary moat, found in the former site of the Suigen-ji/Syoken-ji 
temples (Shinjuku Ward), was built using recycled small graveyard stones 
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that were used to keep flowers and water. This example also suggests that 
the owner of the lands was in charge of the management of the sewers. 
 
  Studies of archival sources have revealed who was responsible for the 
maintenance costs of the sewers and the moats (Note 5). The main sewers, 
o-gesui, were provided by the government but the maintenance costs were 
shared between the government and the commoners. For example, when one 
of the worst floods destroyed the main sewer in the Ichigayatamachi 3-
chome in 1742 (the 2nd year of Kyoto), its repairs costs were shared 
between the commoners who paid to fix their side of the masonry revetment 
and the government who paid to repair the other side. The commoners 
pooled money into the communal fund called machi-iriyou to pay for the 
repairs of the stone revetments and sewers or for emptying the debris from 
the sewer pipes in their quarter, whilst landlords also contributed. In daimyo 
residences area, each daimyo was responsible for the maintenance costs of 
the sewers in their premises. 
  In short, the government was in charge of the main sewers while the 
commoners and the users were in charge of the connecting sewers yokogiri-
gesui. The minor sewers shogesui were maintained by the owners of the 
land. However, considering that the sewers and moats were in essence 
public goods as they were also used for the prevention of fires, it is curious 
that they were managed by different parties in Edo. The evidence available 
from the excavations show the complex system of Edo’s urban 
infrastructure management. For further details about how the sewers and the 
boundary moats were preserved and maintained, please see the 
presentations by Professors Iwabuchi and Watanabe who would show us the 
evidence from archival sources. 
  This presentation has drawn on the archeological evidence of Edo’s 
waterworks, sewers and canals. Although we did touch upon in the 
presentation, it is notable that the prevention of urban floods remained 
insufficient throughout the period. This is apparent when we think of the 
disastrous floods of the Sumida River that affected many properties even in 
the Meiji period. The lack of sufficient flood prevention measures perhaps 
shows that the urban planning in the early modern period placed more 
emphasis on how to make the best use of living by the water, rather than on 
conquering the forces of water. People in the early modern Edo saw the 
positives of living on the water, of using the water borne transport arteries, 
or of enjoying the pleasures related to the waterfront such as boating. This 
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might have meant, on the other hand, that the city’s disaster management 
measures remained limited.  
  Tokyo’s urban planners today are rediscovering the benefits of its 
waterscape and urgently required to find how to harmoniously build the 
urban life by the water. As modern urban planning placed emphasis on how 
to control the water, its priority was so often placed on the development of 
convenient urban life that it built over the waterfront space that the people 
in the early modern period had developed to enjoy the water. What has 
remained is only people’s memories. I believe that the legacy of the pre-
modern Edo’s water conduits can be best appreciated by the historical 
insights into the management and preservation of the conduits. I hope that 
we can encourage more interests and better understanding of the city’s 
conduits. 
 
   (Note 1) There are two types of wooden water pipes that are found in the 
Shiodome Site. In the first type, the pipes were carved out of wood into the 
shape of a ditch and covered the top with a lid. In the second type, four 
wooden planks were out together to form a rectangular pipe. A joint 
connected the pipes, while the each end of a pipe was connected to various 
water tanks that were used to supply water or to divert the water flow. There 
was also a special basin that was used to monitor the water quality. The 
pipes of the Wakisaka residence are 16-24 cm wide outside and 9cm wide 
inside. Those of the Date residence are 23-25cm wide outside and 9-12cm 
wide inside. The average length of the pipe is 4.3m in both residences (Saito 
2011). 
  (Note 2) We can see some differences in water supply in the three 
residences in the Shiodome Site. For example, while the number of wooden 
pipes found in the Wakisaka residence was 176, there are 480 pipes in the 
Date residence. On the other, the Wakisaka residence had 429 bamboo pipes 
while there were only 33 bamboo pipes in the Date residence. It is 
interesting that the number and materials of water pipes were different 
between the two residences. The number of water tanks that were used to 
supply water or to divert the water flow was 338 in the Wakisaka’s while 
436 in the Date’s. It is likely that these differences reflected the daimyo’s 
wealth and the activity level (Saito 2011). 
  (Note 3) According to Shinshi, in Musashino-shokudan’s volume 23, there 
is an account that the government’s Councillor Akimoto Tajima-no-kami 
Takatomo of the Genroku era stated that wooden water pipes were 
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earthquake-proof (Shinshi 1964). It is possible that people were aware of 
the benefits of wooden water pipes. 
  (Note 4) Public masonry revetments were constructed by the government’s 
order. For example, many engraved stamps in the masonry were discovered 
from the excavation of the Edo Castle’s outer moat. Each stamp represented 
the daimyo who was appointed to carry out the riveting. The stamps allowed 
the researchers to identify the parts of the moat with the daimyo who carried 
out the job. The riveting works and its wooden foundation structures have 
revealed how the appointed daimyos coordinated to complete the 
government’s order (Kitahara 1997). 
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Dredging the Edo Castle’s Moat:  
a Case of the Okayama-Domain 








    Edo—the capital city of Edo and the bakufu’s seat—has always 
attracted attention for its waterways playing an important role in 
transportation and sewerage. However, the dredge of the Edo Castle—
apart from the outer moat that was constituted partly by Kanda River—
has rarely been discussed within this discourse of Edo’s waterway 
(Kitahara 1997). However, Edo Castle’s moat was connected to the Edo 
harbor through by a river (fig.1). This report focuses on the east side of the 
outer moat, which is connected to the area where the townspeople lived. 
Here, a few days after dredging the moat, there was a high tide that filled 
the moat completely with water nearly 1m higher than a usual high tide. 
The outer moat had a harbor that samurai and merchant classes used, and 
after dredging, restoration of the riverbank and passing of merchant ships 
were approved. There has been much scholarly discussion on such harbors 
(Yoshida 2009). 
    This report uses the dredging of Edo Castle’s moat—heavily burdened 
on the daimyos—as a case study to examine the environment of the Edo 
Castle’s moat, the technology and methodology of dredging, and issues of 
dredging in cities.  
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1. Dredging the Edo Castle’s moat 
    There are three ways in which waterway construction was done during 
Early Modern Japan: 1. A large scale construction done by the bakufu, for 
development or restoring after natural disasters 2. Construction by the 
landowner (bakufu, daimyo, or hatamoto)  3. When the controlled classes 
constructed for themselves (jibushin) (Ohtani, 1986). The projects were 
funded by themselves for 3, and even for 1 and 2 it was very rare that the 
owners of the land would pay for all of it, and would usually just be some 
funds. Within 1, there was those that were done by: a. Bakufu’s direct 
choice b. Bakufu’s orders to daimyo as a necessary military investment 
(gun-yaku) (Yoshizumi 1967), and c. collecting expenses from daimyos 
with less than 200 thousand stones.  
    For the bakufu, it was important to limit its own expenses between 4-
13% of the whole budget for construction when ordering daimyos to help. 
Initially, local citizens and farmers did the physical work, and the daimyo 
supervised the work based on the bakufu’s orders. However, such projects 
often came with complexities of unclear estimates and fairness. In light of 
this, in 1767 experts were given positions within the bakufu, and from 
1775 in Gai district’s dredging “Okanetetsudaifushin 「御金手伝普請」
was established within the government that allowed the bakufu to do the 
actual building, then collect expenses from specific daimyos (Matsuo 
1973). 
    Although water construction in rural villages was much discussed in 
relation to farming and production, research in the context of urban areas 
were only taken up after 1990s (Sakazume 1999). Especially as for Edo 
Castle, the actual building of the moat was much discussed in relation to 
the development of the Edo city as a whole, but Itoko Kitahara’s work 
(1997) is the only research on the maintenance after the construction. Her 
work uncovered the general trend of maintenance after the 18th century 
based on resources from the public office of the bakufu. Some of the trend 
was as follows: 1. There was a set depth to the moat of the Edo Castle, and 
the proper level was maintained by the public officials who regularly came 
for inspection. 2. The actual dredging was carried out by contract workers, 
who either worked in exchange for living in the city yashiki (mansion) for 
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10 years, or hiring irregular contractors to dredge the moat. 3. Moreover, 
when the moat started to get generally filled, a larger dredging project was 
carried out by contract workers from the orders of the bakufu and expenses 
from the daimyos. There had been 11 times when daimyos had been 
ordered to do this (Sakazume 1999). 4. Eventually, they developed a group 
of people who regularly dredge the container that catches all sewage in the 
moat, and thereby reducing both bakufu and daimyo’s expenses.  
    Among this system, I want to focus on 3, the irregular large-scale 
dredging, since I suspect it reflects issues that could not be dealt with 
within the usual system that they developed. In 1770, a merchant of selling 
dirt became approved with the development of the system outlined in 4. 
This helped the constant dredging of I and IIb in this report (Yoshida 2009) 
but even after this there has been large scale dredging by the government, 
and the root problem was left unsolved.  
    Kitahara examined especially the dredging of the south side of 1762 
Yamatokoriyama han’s moat (fig. 1,△9 Toranomon ~ △ 11 
Ymashitamon, 760 m) . The government gave the go-ahead of the dredging 
based on the possibility of ships passing through the Mio Way. They 
drained the moat first, estimated the amount of expenses, made a 
designated team within the bakufu in charge of the dredge and ordered 
Yamato-gun to go ahead with the dredging. The work took 4 months to 
complete, and cost 45000 ryo. The length of the actual dredging process 
was 33 days, with a workforce of 158,348 people of which only 30% of 
were actually dredging. The other 70% were put to carry the mud away. 
According to Kitahara, the han actually had no active participation in the 
dredging process since it was merely a transmitter to tell the orders form 
the bakufu to the workers, but still having to burden all of the expenses. 
    With Kitahara’s analysis as a premise, this report will deal with the 
daimyo dredging in 1765 (fig 1-I, II, III). This area has undergone large-
scale dredging twice consecutively, we can assume that this was especially 
an important economic area for the bakufu (Kitahara 1997). Also, the river 
that connects to the moat is one of the most important rivers that flows out 
to the Edo bay, and therefore a significant aspect of the Edo Castle’s 
drainage (fig1). This may have been the reason why workers were allowed 
to work around this area with no charge (Iwabuchi 2004).  
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    Historical records in the Okayama-han include A. reports from Edo, B.  
record written by the local workers, and C. document written by the chief 
executive. Based on these findings I would like to introduce technical 
history to the field of archaeology as well, and reconsider the role of the 
han which has been long understood to not have any active role.  
 
2. 1765 Dredging by Okayama-han 
2.1 Summary 
    The dredging in 1765 started with research in September in the previous 
year, and Tosa-han was allocated Fig.1-I, Okayama-han Fig 1-IIa and IIb, 
and Matsuyama-han Fig. 1-III. Okayama-han and Tosa-han were ordered 
by Edo Castle on 18 February in the same year, allocated their working 
sites on 27 March, began working 25 April, and dredging was completed 
on 23 September. For Matsuyama-han, they were ordered by the Edo 
Castle on 16 May, and worked between 13 July and 13 October. 
    Firstly, I will describe the situation of the area based on the report of 
orders given to the Okayama-han on 18 March (C). On the table is the 
goals and situation of each working section. Fig.2 is a diagram of the moat 
situation with notes inscribed by the Okayama-han’s executive (C).  
Okayama-han’s working section included No.1-4 (Fig1 IIa) and No.5 -15 
(Fig.1 IIb), which were 788.6m and 1896.2m big respectively, and a total 
of 2684m.  The depth of the dredge was ideally 2.7m (deepest area, mio, 
should be 2.4 at the highest tide), but this was based on the bakufu’s 
measurements. The difference between the deepest area and the edge 
would vary about 1.5m between lowest and highest tide, so work was 
heavily affected by the tides. At this point, the moat was still shallow, more 
than 81 – 133cm than planned. In the research in December the previous 
year, small boats could not even pass (‘Shojochou’ vol.29 ). The mouth of 
the Kyobashi river in No.14 was the most important place to dredge. It was 
because the harbor of the three major families of the bakufu (Yoshida 2009, 
Iwabuchi 2000).  
    The actual procedure was as follows: stop the river water flow, drain the 
water by making a hakodoi (gutter, Figure 5) and have people go inside to 
dig. There were 15 working sites (No.1-15) and the process was: 1. 
Preparing (March-April), 2. Actual dredging (15 May – 23 September), 
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and 3. Cleaning up (-5th October). The bakufu wanted the dredging 
completed within 130 days, and Okayama-han finished the work generally 
within this time frame. The initial estimate of the bakufu was 7700 tons of 







The total of 
length (m) 
 
The average of 
width (m) 
 
The condition in high tide (m) 
 
The depth of the dredge 












○a  The depth of mouth of Tatsunokuchi：0.9～1.2 
No.1 The depth of the moat buried at the deepest area：0.8 The depth of the 













No.4 The depth of the moat buried at the deepest area：0.9 The depth of the 














No.6 The depth of the moat buried at the deepest area：0.5 The depth of the 














No.8 Width：about 7.6 Depth：0.3 
No.10 The depth of the moat buried at the deepest area：0.8 The depth of the 
moat buried at the edge：1.1 





12～15 635.45 59.0905 
 
No.13 The depth of the moat buried at the deepest area：1.3 
 




2.2 Preparation (March) 
 Fig. 2 shows the situation of the workplace, with facilities made to 
carry out the dredging.  
 
1. There were the following two facilities: kaisho (the bakufu’s 
public office of about 430 square meters), dekoya (the han’s public 
office) and igoya (Figure 5) (another of the han’s public office of 
about 1320 square m3, Fig. 3, 5)). The kaisho was the bakufu’s 
central office for giving orders to the workplace, and they swapped 
after a 10-day cycle, with both day and night time workers and 
guards. Next to the kaisho was motokoya (wakikoya) for each han, 
and there was always one person during the day and two during the 
night, to keep watch over tools and reports (B, 23 April). 
Initially, Okayama-han was recommended to borrow 1300 tsubo of 
land within the working section for igoya and shitakoya. However, 
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they decided to commute from their nearest han residence, and 
instead have an increase of 100 tsubo for their igoya. 
In this way their areas were determined, and the blueprint was given 
to them by the bakufu yakusho on 21 March (B, C). Everything was 
basically completed by 14 April, and the executives from Okayama-
han and Tosa-han came to examine them (C).  
2. The worker’s resting area (yunomijo) and the mobile guard 
place were established. 
For these areas, the han was given permission to choose 8 areas to 
place them. (B, 26 April) 
3. A post was put up to measure the diameters and the depth of 
the moat (specifically called mizumorikui).  The latter was 3.9m 
long, and 12cm in diameter. The bakufu distributed 141 of them, and 
were put up on that day. 
4. The mizushiboriba (a temporary place to put the mud and dry) 
and tsuchiokiba (a place to put the dry mud) were established. 
The plan was to place the tsuchiokiba at the east side of the moat, 
and the mizushiboriba on the west side as the moats were being 
expanded. There was also a temporary tsuchiokiba near Ryukancho 
and Konyacho, and a tsuchisuteba near Tsukiji and other areas of 
reclamation work. Also, 100 posts (1.8m long, 9cm on each side) 
were given out for a temporary tsuchiokiba (B, 25 April) 
Setting the specifications of a dam (oohshimekiri) and a drainage 
(toi) in the Tatsunokuchi (Fig 2, ○a), the east mouth of the area, there 
were steps made so that the water flows out of the moat. In the 
Sukiyabashi (○13) mouth at the south end was initially closed, but 
was reopened to dredge the bottoms further. Apart from these, in the 
border between Tosa-han and the working area was a dam 
(shimekiri) but this was probably under Tosa’s responsibility. The 
two mouths were outside the northern Ikkoubashi (Fig 2, ○i ) 
connecting to Nihonbashi River( Fig 2, ○j) and Bikunibashi (Fig 2, 
○k ). The former’s dimensions were 11.8m in bottom width, 7.9m in 
top width and 40m in length, and the latter was 3.9m in bottom width 
and 1.9m in top width, and the height was ordered to be 45cm higher 
than the water level at high tide. Also, the bakufu’s initial plan was 
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to use two partitions to make the moat, but the workers made an 
alternative suggestion to make a frame within the partitions so they 
can avoid problems in case of heavy rain and high tide. They also 
suggested to take off the stone walls for a short while to avoid water 
leaks, but only the first suggestion was approved. 
There were two hakodoi (drainpipe): letting water flow from  to , 
and  to outside of . Initially, the dimensions for the former was 1.5m 
in width and 91cm in depth, and for the latter 91cm in width and 
61cm for depth, and the Suikyumasu was 2.1m in diameter and 1.2m 
in depth. However since water would increase at times of rain, the 
masu’s width was increased to 1.8m. (B, 12 April). Workers made 
these beforehand and the preparations were done by 19 April. These 
drainpipes and masu boxes were secured by piles made from pine 
trees (length of 5-5.9m, and radius of 9-12cm). They suggested to 
place these by the street by the city side, but the government advised 
them to place them 1.8-3.6m away from it (C, 12 April). As for 
draining wastewater, they requested that they want to drain it out the 
Seikonyacho ooshimekiri (Figure 4) and Ikkokubashi ooshimekiri 
(Figure 3) and was approved  (C, 12 April). 
 
2.3 Construction (25 April – 13 August) 
1. Situating the drainpipe and shimekiri  
On 25 April, the construction began under the supervision of the 
bakufu executive, and executives from Okayama-han and Tosa-han. 
The drainpipe was installed, followed by the shimekiri and draining 
the water. 
The drainpipe to drain water from Sukiyabashi mouth to 
Seikonyacho shimekiri began on 25 April, and the one from 
Ryunoguchi on 1 May, and the two ooshimekiri started on 28 April. 
As the work progressed, it became clear that some soil was too hard 
to place a pile, and in such cases it was allowed for them to be placed 
in different places (B, 26 April). The Bikunibashi’s ohshimekiri 
finished by 10 May, and began draining. However there was water 
leakage and the water did not go through the drainpipe, and it was 
the 13 May when it was finally finished. On the other hand, the 
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ishiishibashi could not hold all of the water, and because it could not 
be extended, they had to make another row of temporary shimekiri 
(length 33m, width 16kan, and depth 3.6m). They held the water 
between the temporary shimekiri and the oohshimekiri (4 June). 
2. Building the drainage between Sukiyabashi and Hibiyamon 
Okayama-han was also in charge of building the drainage from their 
working area to saikonyamachi ooshimekiri, which was within 
Matsuyama-han’s working area. It was done by breaking a part of 
the stone walls and making a drainage in the bottom (length 14m, 
width 1.9m, depth 1.3m). They were given the land on 27 April, 
began work on the 1 May, and finished on 12 May. 
3. Dredging 
In this way preparation was done, and actual dredging began on 15 
May. Work was carried out in each han, with a person in charge and 
their workers. However, working areas 1-4 had to wait for the 
Ikkokubashi Oohshimekiri to be ready, and 1-2 working areas began 
on 26 May, and 3-4 working areas from the 28 May. 
    A day’s work was as follows: start at 8am, break at 12pm, break 
at 2pm, and finish at 4pm (C, 24 April). The han decided whether or 
not to proceed with work on days of bad weather.  It was the han’s 
responsibility to report the content of the work and the number of 
workers that day, but there are only some reports remaining in the 
diary between the actual periods of work. Therefore, it is not clear 
exactly how many people were part of the dredging, but there are 
54,162 people (54,124 workers and 38 carpenters) just between June 
1-5, amounting to at least 10,000 people a day.  Also, an executive 
from Okayama-han estimates that there would be some days with 
30,000 workers at the site. This is a number far greater than the 
number Kitahara had analyzed. The work besides dredging included 
such things as changing water, getting rid of mud, and also repairing 
facilities on site. 
    By 30 June, working sites 1-4 were done, and Zenigamebashi 
( ○d) was repaired and reinforced, followed by a drainage on top and 
the releasing of water from Ryunoguchi on 12 July. Working sites 
5-7 and 8-11 were finished by 8 July and 13 July respectively. 
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    However, the other remaining working sites faced some 
difficulties, Firstly, in site 13 the mud raised from the moat crumbled 
down and broke the drainage, causing water to flow into site 14. 
Therefore, site 12’s work was postponed to after 13 July, and they 
were forced to do some repairing. Furthermore, a heavy rain on 22 
July caused the mouth of the drain in site 14 to break, along with 
water flowing over in the drainage, followed by water completely 
full in sites 14 and 15, and sites 12 and 13 increasing in water levels. 
Therefore, it was ordered it to be repaired and water to be changed. 
However, the han requests to the bakufu that because even a small 
amount of rain could break the drain mouth in site 14, they want to 
do it after water changing in sites 12 and 13 are generally complete, 
and the same for sites 14 and 15. This order would allow water to 
flow to site 13 in case site 14 overflowed, and thus shorten working 
days required for changing water. According to the han, sites 12-15 
were difficult working sites that are easily affected by weather, so  
they wanted to know as soon as possible when water was basically 
changed and dredged. After such issues, it was finally completed on 
29 July. 
    In addition, on 15 July, water increased in Ryunoguchi shimekiri, 
and the dredging area would not go back to its original state. 
Therefore, they had to stop releasing the water in order to dig deeper 
by a tool called joren, and they were able to make estimates by 11 
August (A, C) and 12 August for Zenigamebashi shimekiri. Lastly, 
they got rid of the Ikkokubashi shimekiri on 12 August, and let water 
flow through Tsuchibashi to Ryunoguchi mouth. In this way, the 
whole process completed on 13 August. 
4. Dealing with dredged mud 
The mud that was duf up amounted to 120.000 m3 with all the 3 hans 
combined. The mud was kept in the kariokiba (temporary place to 
put mud) and was dealt with after end of June. 
    Initially, the bakufu’s plan was to dry the mud at Kandahori (Fig 1, 
3▲C) and Sotokanda (around Fig 1, △2) , widen sites 8-15, and decide 
later on where to take the dried mud. Apart from this, each of the sites 5-
15 had a place on the north side of their site to drain the water out of the 
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mud, and a tsuchiokiba on the south side of the site (Fig 2). Also for sites 
1-4, water was drained from the mud around ・, and took those mud to 
tsuchiokiba in sites 12-15 (26 May). However, on 1 June it was realized 
that the lack of water draining areas in sites 3-4 are causing problems, they 
were allowed an extension of the area. It was probably difficult to place a 
huge amount of wet mud temporarily, and extending was not enough.  
    On the other hand, the bakufu decided against reclaiming the Fukagawa, 
due to transportation expenses. Instead, it recruited alternatives from the 
city to repair open land that is not smooth, and reclaiming rivers that are 
not used for transport recently (Takahashi 2017). The reclaimed land was 
going to be a site for a new city. After a series of discussions, they settled 
on 3 areas for disposing mud:  
A: Sunamura shinden (Fig 1, ○a) – After all, the bakufu decided to 
reclaim Fukagawa river. On 18 June it ordered for 16.000 m3 of mud, 
but was raised to 24,200 m3 when another reclamatioin was decided 
to (Fig 1, ●b). The reclamation was under the responsibility of the 
bakufu’s acting administrator Ina Hanzaemon, and was a city worker 
in Suzakibentenmae city (C, 5 Oct). On 24 that same month, he 
received the harbor on Nihonbashi River (Fig1, ▲1) and on the 28th 
releasing dredged mud around  Gofukubashi area (around sites 7,8). 
Also, he received the harbor in Tsukiji (Fig 1, ▲2), brining the mud 
from IIb to here, and send the mud to Sunamura shinden by a ship. 
There was a problem of the two harbors being too narrow and small, 
and on top of that  Ikkokubashi was dredging so it was very crowded. 
Ships were not able to depart and thus he requested to directly take 
the mud from Ikkokubashi to Horiuchi, but was rejected. On 1 
September all clean-up in the sites were finished and was decided 
for ships to directly come in and take the mud. On 10 September, it 
was also approved to collect all mud in the residence of the han’s 
merchants in Sunamuratemae to raise efficiency. All transportation 
of the mud was completed on 5 October. 
B: Reclamation of Reigishibashi (Fig 1, ●b) – On 29 June, citizens 
of the city requested 8,200 m3  of reclaimed land in Reikishibashi, 
and the bakufu approved. The Okayama han received the area on 14 
July. The transport was by land, and though they requested for water 
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transport, it is unknown whether it was approved or not (B, 9 Aug).  
C: Reclamation of Kandabori through Hamachoiribori (Fig 1, ●c) – 
It was initially a part of an area designated for drying. On 21 July, it 
was ordered to make new land here for extending the city, and 
14,300 m3 of mad was carried in.  
   Apart from this, 65,000 m3 of dredged mud was put in the banks 
of sites 12 -15, and Fig 1, ▲3. For the latter, 31,000 m3 reclaimed 
and made banks for the Uchishinden city, which is next to the 
bakufu. The remaining mud was used for roads in the townspeople 
area or samurai areas. The procedure is unknown since it was not 
within Okayama han’s responsibility. On the other hand, when 
Okayama-han did the riverbanks of sites 7-15 (length 1420m, width 
11.8-13.8m), they first cleaned, dug about 30cm, put the mud in and 
leveling them all even (B, 17 August). 
5. Removal of sites and repair – After dredging was completed, 
it was necessary to remove all facilities at the same time as removing 
the mud to a state like before. Putting the Sukiyabashi (○13) moat 
back (completed on 16 August), removing the goyodanjo, getting rid 
of all small shimekiri (finished on 25 August), cleaning the 
tsuchiokiba at Ryunoguchi (finished on 2 September), preventative 
methods to avoid rubbish from flowing at incoming tides (1-18 
September), repairing the banks of Dosanbashi (○c) and 
Hyoteijomae (○b), dredging Ikkokubashi (○i) shimekiri and banks 
in on both sides (finished on 16 September), dredging Seikonyacho 
ooshimekiri (○l) and the area around it, leveling all roads and 
mizushiboriba between Sukiyabashi (○13) and Ikkokubashi (○h) 
and took out all piles within the moat on Mio way. On 21 September 
was strict feedback on estimates which were amended, and on 28 
Sept estimates were finished by the roju (an official of the highest 
rank in the Shogunate government). On 3 October, the Hanshu 
(leader of han) paid a visit to the Edo castle, and was given a reward 
by the shogun (A, C).  
 
Conclusion 
    To conclude this paper, there are some points to be remarked upon. 
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1. A characteristic of the dredge of Edo Castle  
Under conditions that the ditch mouth was narrow and that it was 
easily affected by the ebb and flow, Okayama-han government had 
to meet the need, which shogunate had required, to adjust the depth 
as defined. In order to realise the dredge, a technology to construct 
a shimekiri and todoi that would stop the water flow was necessary. 
In the area assigned to the Okayama government took a long time in 
dredging, since water would accumulate especially in the blocks 
from the twelfth to the fifteenth that there had been a high rate of 
mad before the river scoop.  
2. A common problem in the Urban dredge 
Certainly, the most serious cause of the reason why Okayama-han 
took a long time to dredge in the southern area assigned was the 
collapse of the mizushiboriba of the thirteenth part (11 July). 
However, shown in the mud storage that fell in at the twelfth (1 July) 
as well, the actual reason was, rather, that they could not spare 
enough space for disposing of mud. As for this, we can see that the 
Tosa-han too experienced the mud collapse three times (17, 28 June 
and 25 August). When to attempt to dredge in a large scale, they 
could not deal with the considerable amount of sludge, using to 
mend roads and enlarge banks; Therefore, they sought to make use 
of it for reclamation. In other words, in the urban area, it was 
inevitable to face to a vicious circle that the dredge which was a 
restoration of facilities would increase the reclamation which caused 
to build new facilities. 
3. A general problem that regards to civil engineering.  
The massive scale of dredge as such could only be realised when 
there were both governmental engineers who would make a plan and 
civil contractor who possessed techniques. Even though Okayama-
han frequently made some suggestions and confirmations about 
alterations of measure, yet, indeed, the almost all of them were 
proposed by the civil contractors. In the Okayama-han’s district, 
though some were overlapped, in addition to fifty people who shared 
themselves to manage the dredging and progress in the fifteen 
construction areas, there were forty people for gutters (hakodoi and 
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todoi, and ukemasu: three for the big dam: forty for carrying the 
mud: besides 4 for being in charge of a shed and hut for external 
usage (hakobansho, kaisho and igoya), five to provide special 
retainers necessary for rituals towards shogunate bureaucrats and 
three for catering. Surely, the 1765 Dredge of Edo Castle is paid 
attention for the fact that the construction had an aspect of the poor 
relief and employed labourers broadly (Kitahara 1997), but the 
contractors with skills and managing abilities were necessary for the 
construction as well. The reason why they could socially increase 
was continuous urban developments. And Okayama-han ran the bid 
(B), while two contractors for regular dredge and the shogunate 
official towns people (c 「御金手伝普請」was established within 
the government that allowed the bakufu) five townspeople with 
governmental recommendation were offered (B), the fact that people 
had communicated with Okayama-han was chosen is observable. 
Furthermore, regarding workers, there were ‘day labourers’ that 
would go for the work day by day, but contractors in the gutter and 
in both dredging and carrying the mud had some people from 
suburban areas around Edo. flood control was necessary also for the 
rural area, it is conceivable that a certain level of civil engineering 
technologies existed generally. I have already raised some questions, 
towards 'Social History of Civil Engineering', that it needs clarifying 
human-networks including both urban and rural areas, and that it 
also needs scrutinising a relation to a bid-rigging in the modern 
period onwards by considering of the bids of civil engineering and 
construction (Iwabuchi 2009, 2010). Hence, the Edo Castle Dredge 
is also to be examined as an example of such civil engineering 
business. 
    The dredge, for Okayama-han, was the first public duty after the 
Han-lord's succession. Although I did not touch upon this point here, 
in fact, they paid attention to many respects of the construction such 
as an establishment of meeting-places, the format for border stakes 
and manners to communicate with shogunate bureaucrats. 
Persistently pressed by the shogunate government for the schedule, 
even though they experienced the large-scale construction on the 
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land along the river in Kanto in 1742 (Otani 1986), Okayama-han 
seemed to cope with erection with much tension.  Also, they were 
asked to do with other various duties other than the construction to 
control the district assigned, such as the fire prevention and support 
for the meeting-place for shogunate officers and measurement 
towards the dead or the something lost on the road. Moreover, surely 
the skills of dredge and management of the labour should be 
dependent on the contractors, it is notable that some of them had 
already contracted with the Han government. Okayama-han did not 
merely mediate, as Kitahara states, between the shogunate and the 
contractors, but Okayama-han could reflect their interest. From now 
on, in conclusion, it is important to contemplate relationships 
between Han duties and the shogunate government, thinking that the 
Edo Castle Dredge is one example of the Daimyo large-scale 
constructions before 'Okaneotetsudai' construction.  
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Figure 3. Ikkokubashi ooshimekiri and hakodoi, ○f kaisho and ○e○g igoya (Figure 2—○h Ikkokubashi, No. 7~5, 
○16 Tokiwabashi)   ©Okayama University Libraries 
 
 
Figure 4. Nishikonyacho ooshimekiri and hakodoi (Figure 2—No. 13~11, ○14 Kajibashi) The places surrounded by 
boards are tsuchiokiba.  ©Okayama University Libraries 
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Canal, Dredging and Sedimentation 
in the Eastern Lowland Area of Edo: 
Considering Physical and Spatial 
Characteristics of Canals in a 
Historical Context 
 
Genki Takahashi  




    Canals in Edo were man-made rivers, created as a result of coastal and 
waterways engineering.  And importantly, most of these canals were 
under the strong influence of the tides because of their proximity to the 
sea. 
    It was therefore vital to maintain the canal’s function to service water 
transport vehicles such   as boats by undertaking dredging works called 
kawa-zarae to keep their depth and width. This work involved clearing up 
rubbish and mud on the canal bed by using a tool called jorenguwa and 
also enclosing a section of a canal, draining the water inside the enclosure 
and then work on the canal bed. This dredging work, kawa-zarae, was 
done regularly (jō-zarae) to clear sediment and also on an irregular basis 
(rinji-zarae). 
    There were two different types of such canal dredging – one was kōgi-
zarae (government-funded dredging) and the other was jibun-zarae (self-
funded dredging) [KOBAYASHI 2002]. The former was planned by 
bakufu (shogunate) and funded by the shogunate, daimyō (feudal lords), 
chōnin (townsmen) and shōnin (merchants). At the same time, the latter 
was undertaken by towns, samurai families, shrines and temples, 
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approved by the shogunate and normally funded by the landlord along the 
canal which needed dredging.  Throughout the early modern period, the 
shogunate did not establish any distinction between these two types of 
dredging, and there was no clear official or legal definition either. The 
shogunate also had no centralized administrative system which enabled it 
to control over the maintenance and management of the entire canal 
system in Edo. 
    If you look at old maps, it is clear that the canal system created during 
the Edo period was passed onto Tokyo after the Meiji Restoration. How, 
then was this possible? In other words, how was the canal system managed 
and maintained throughout the early modern period? Was there actually 
very little change in it as well? 
    In my previous work, I have examined canal dredging projects in the 
central Edo area on the western bank of Sumida river, and demonstrated 
that: 1) sedimentation of soil on the canal bed universally occurred 
throughout the period; 2) canals were not adequately managed or 
maintained, and some canals were left with a thick layer of sediment 
which blocked the passage of boats; and 3) some canals, at the same time, 
did not need dredging despite their sedimentation [TAKAHASHI 2017]. 
  Based on these findings, this paper looks into dredging works in the 
Honjo and Fukagawa area which was built in the marshland on the eastern 
bank of Sumida River from the eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries. By 
exploring relationship between this area and its frequent flooding, it aims 
to consider the spatial and historical characteristics of the canal in this 
period. 
 
1. The canal system in Honjo and Fukagawa 
  The eastern side of Sumida River used to be the shallow sea and became 
reclaimed land after the mid-sixteen century. Honjo and Fukagawa on the 
eastern bank of Sumida River consisted of an area built on the river banks 
around the mouth of Sumida River in the early seventeenth century and 
also another area reclaimed by the shogunate which carried out large-scale 
engineering works after the Great fire of Meireki in 1657 until the late 
seventeenth century (Fig. 1). 
  Fig. 1 shows the canal system in Honjo and Fukagawa and allows us to 
understand its scale, whilst Table 1 contains information about canals in 
Honjo and Fukagawa in the early eighteenth century. Fig. 1 shows that 
canals in the Honjo area, planned by the shogunate from the late 
seventeenth century, ran straight horizontally from east to west and 
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vertically from north to south. At the same time, those in the Fukagawa 
area developed in a more organic manner by merchants in the early 
seventeenth century. The contrast of the canal system in these areas is 
striking, although it is possible to categorize these canals in three different 
groups in terms of its width. 
  Firstly, there were canals which were used as main transport routes. 
They were normally 27 to 36 meters wide on the water surface and 18 to 
27 meters wide on the canal bed, such as Tate-kawa River, Yoko-kawa 
River and Sendaibori River (group Alpha). Secondly, canals such as 
Jikken-gawa River and Abura-bori River, with 18-27 meters width on the 
surface and 9-18 meters width on the canal bed. They functioned as a sort 
of by-pass routes, linking main and wider canals (group Beta). Thirdly, 
there were canals which were 3-5 meters wide and functioned as drainage 
or river wharf which was passable by boats (group Gamma). Information 
about the depth of the canal water in the early eighteenth century is limited 
and available only for the Honjo area (the depth was measured during days 
around the new moon and the full moon, when the tidal difference was the 
largest and the water level was the shallowest), but group Alpha’s depth 
was 1.5-1.8 meters and group Beta 1.2-1.5 meters, corresponding to the 
size of the canals in these groups. 
  Table 2 shows various sets of information about canals on the western 
bank of Sumida River in the mid-nineteenth century. Comparing 
information in Table 1 and 2, it is noticeable that most of the canals in 
Honjo and Fukagawa were as wide at the canal bed as Nihonbashi River 
in the eighteenth century, which was the most important waterway in Edo. 
It is also important to note that these canals were quite deep as well. 
  However, we need to bear in mind that we are comparing two different 
periods. Records of dredging works in the Honjo area after the nineteenth 
century show that the depth of canals in groups Alpha and Beta was 0.9-
1.2 meters, and there was very little difference in the depth of canals in 
the eastern and western banks of Sumida River. As will be pointed out 
later, the width of canals in the Honjo area in the early nineteenth century 
was almost as half as that in the early eighteenth century. In other words, 
although canals in Honjo and Fukagawa seem unchanged on maps, they 
were, below surface, undergoing a significant change from the late 
eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. 
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2. Maintenance and management of Tate-kawa River 
This section looks at how, and by whom, canals in Honjo and Fukagawa 
were managed and maintained, by examining the case of Tate-kawa River, 
a main waterway which connected Sumida River in the west and Naka-
gawa River in the east. 
Table 3 shows the dredging works planned and carried out on Tate-kawa 
River in the eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries that were identifiable 
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by documentary sources. Although the scale and timings were 
inconsistent, these dredging works were carried out on average around 
once in twelve years, which is considerably frequent, compared with 
canals of the similar size in the western bank of Sumida River 






2-1. 1705 (Hōei 2) to 1808 (Bunka 5) 
  Tate-kawa River’s dredging works could be divided into two groups in 
terms of their scale. 
 
(A) Large-scale dredging 
  The first large scale dredging work that was known to historians was 
undertaken in 1705 (Hōei 2).1 Tonegawa River’s embankment had been 
destroyed by heavy rains in July in 1704, which caused severe flooding 
(shussui) in Honjo and Fukagawa. The dredging work in 1705 was part of 
a large-scale restoration project which ensured that roads were re-paved, 
embankment was built using sediment soil removed from the canal and 
drainage pipes and sluice gates were made. 
Another large-scale dredging on the entire Tate-kawa River was carried 
out in 1784 (Tenmei 4). 2  As discussed in the following section, 
maintenance works of smaller scale were done after 1705, but this was the 
first large-scale project by the shogunate in almost 80 years. It is worth 
pointing out that the shogunate planned a separate large-scale dredging 
 
1 Honjo kawazarae michitsukuri gesui nado gofushin kakitome（『本所川浚道造下水等御
普請書留』）, Archival document of National Diet Library. 
2 Tenmei senyō ruishū, vol.16, Tatekawa sarae no bu（『天明撰要類集』16,「竪川浚
之部」）,  Anei  senyō ruishū, vol.16, Tatekawa sarae no bu（『安永撰要類集』16、竪
川浚之部）and Kawazarae kakitome vol.2, 『川浚書留』2, Archival document of National 
Diet Library. 
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project in the aftermath of flooding in late July and August in 1742 (Kanpō 
2).3 It appears that this project did not go ahead, but it is noteworthy in 
considering how flooding and sedimentation in canals in Honjo and 
Fukagawa were related. 
In the early nineteenth century, the shogunate carried out large-scale 
dredging works in 1801 (Kyōwa 1) on canals in the Honjo area including 
Tate-kawa River and also in 1808 (Bunka 5) on Nihonbashi River, Onagi-
gawa River and Tate-kawa River.4 These works were done in order to 
make these canals suitable for the shogun to use (shogun onari). 
 
(B) Partial dredging 
  Apart from these large-scale projects, partial dredging works were 
carried out as follows: 
 
● 1730 (Kyōhō 15)5 
● A merchant (land owner) along Tate-kawa dori dredged part of the 
canal at his own expense and repaired its riverbank, embankment and 
road on it. 
● 1735 (Kyōhō 20)6 
● Fushin bugyo (commissioners of engineering works) undertook 
dredging between 
● Ichinohashi and Ninohashi. 
● 1752 (Hōreki 2)7 
● Funamochi (ship owners) in the Honjo area requested machi 
bugyosho (town commissioners’ office) to allow them to dredge a 
section between Ichinohashi-kiwa and Okawaguchi, roughly 69 meter 
long, at their own expense. 
● 1757 (Hōreki 7)8 
● A merchant (land owner) along Tate-kawa dori dredged a part of the 
 
3 Shussui ikken, vol.16（『出水一件』16）, Archival document of National Diet Library. 
4 Nihonbashikawasuji tatekawa onagigawa sarae ikken kakitome, Tatekawa sarae no bu, 
no.2 and 3（『日本橋川筋竪川小名木川浚一件書留』，「竪川浚之部」2・3）, Archival 
document of National Diet Library. 
5 Tatekawa  dori  sarae  ikken  kakitome,  vol.2-1,  item.35（『竪川通浚一件書留』1-
2、35 件）,  Archival document of National Diet Library. 
6 Tenmei  senyō  ruishū,  vol.16,  Tatekawa  sarae  no  bu（『天明撰要類集』16,「竪
川浚之部」）,  Archival document of National Diet Library. 
7 Kyōhō  senyō  ruishū,  vol.19,  Horikawa  sarae  no  bu,  item.19（『享保撰要類集』
19，「堀川浚之部」，19件）, Archival document of National Diet Library. 
8 Tenmei  senyō  ruishū,  vol.16,  Tatekawa  sarae  no  bu（『天明撰要類集』16,「竪
川浚之部」）,  Archival document of National Diet Library. 
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canal at his own expense and repaired its riverbank, embankment and 
road on it. 
● 1798 (Kansei 10)9 
● The shogunate carried out a dredging work on some part of Tate-kawa 
River. It appears that it was done around the mouth of Tate-kawa 
River or the river wharf on embankment which was used by the 
shogun. 
 
  Not much is known about these works, apart from the fact that they were 
dredging works and actually carried out. It is therefore entirely possible 
that there were other small scale works that were not recorded in any 
document. However, it is hard to imagine that there were any large-scale 
dredging works other than the ones described in the section (A). 
 
2-2. After 1812 (Bunka 9) 
  In 1812 (Bunka 9), Edo’s zaimoku toiya (timber wholesalers) sent a 
petition to the shogunate to offer to dredge Tate-kawa River regularly in 
return for the privilege of exclusive rights to trade, which the shogunate 
approved.10 This means that the timber wholesalers would   clear the 
sediment on mio-suji (channel line) on 200 days a year, using ten boats a 
day. 
  It is worth pointing out that another similar request to clean up Tate-
kawa River was sent to machi-bugyō sho (town commissioner’s office) in 
1781.11 This request was not approved, but, as Table 3 shows, little effort 
had been made to dredge Tate-kawa River in this period, and this request 
indicates that sediment in the canal had accumulated so much that it could 
have caused some kind of problem. 
  At the same time, it is important to note that, despite the regular 
dredging approved by the shogunate after 1812 (Bunka 9), irregular 
dredging works did take place. The shogunate ordered the timber 
wholesalers to dredge a section of Tate-kawa River between Ichinohashi 
and Matsui-bashi in 1824 and also sections between Ōkawaguchi and 
Ninohashi and Itsutusme-watashiba and Nakagawakuchi in 1829 (Bunsei 
 
9 Nihonbashikawasuji  tatekawa  onagigawa  sarae  ikken  kakitome,  Nihonbashi  no  
bu  no.1（『日本橋川筋竪川小名木川浚一件書留』，「日本橋之部」1）, Archival 
document of National Diet Library. 
10 Kawa-zarae  kakitome,  vol.3（『川浚書留』3）and  Edo-bashi  yori  ōkawa  deguchi  
made  jō-zarae  ikken kakitome（『江戸橋ゟ大川出口迄定浚一件書留』）, Archival 
document of National Diet Library. 
11 Tokyo shi shi kō, Sangyō hen, vol.27（『東京市史稿』産業篇、第 27 巻）, pp.285-
288. 
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12). Each of these works became necessary to get rid of layers of sediment 
accumulated in Tate-kawa River after flooding in Sumida River in Honjo 
and Fukagawa. 
  In December 1841, as the shogunate disbanded the timber wholesalers, 
the regular dredging works stopped. Afterwards the shogunate planned to 
undertake dredging of the entire canal system in Edo, and works on Tate-
kawa River were carried out in 1846 (Kōka 3). 
  Three points can be drawn from the discussion so far. 
 
1) Throughout the early-modern period, the shogunate planned and 
carried out dredging works on Tate-kawa River. This is probably due 
to the fact that it was part of the official route used by the shogun. 
There were only two dredging works during the eighteenth century, 
but the nineteenth century saw three dredging projects in its first 50 
years. 
2) At the same time, it is important to note that dredging works were 
undertaken by merchants and townsmen, even though their scale was 
relatively small. In particular, a lot of works were done around the 
embankment and the eastern and western mouths of Tate-kawa River 
where it was connected with Sumida River and Naka-gawa River. 
This implies that the works by the shogunate were not adequate to 
maintain the canal’s function. 
3) From the early nineteenth century, regular dredging was undertaken. 
However, this arrangement was not enough to maintain the canal, and 
irregular dredging needed to be carried out. This suggests that the 
early-modern canal management and maintenance was no longer 
effective and that sedimentation in the canals in Honjo and Fukagawa 
caused by flooding became increasingly intense. 
 
3. Changing Tate-kawa River 
3-1. Flooding and Sedimentation 
  Due to its low ground, Honjo and Fukagawa suffered from flooding of 
rivers, high tides, high waves and tsunamis caused by typhoons and severe 
rain every year, with a flood occurring in every five year on average.12 
The frequent occurrence of flooding resulted in continuous accumulation 
 
12  Surprisingly, there has been virtually no historical study of flooding in Honjo and 
Fukagawa, not least  Edo, with the exception of pioneering works including ICHIKAWA 
2010 which examined large-scale flooding in Kanpo 2 and the restoration effort in its 
aftermath, as well as WATANABE 2013, 2016 and 2017. 
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of sediments on the canal bed, and this must be the reason why dredging 
works onTate-kawa River were carried out. 
  The storm and flood in 1742 (Kanpō 4) did an unprecedented damage 
to most of Honjo and Fukagawa. In the aftermath, there emerged a couple 
of sandbanks in Tate-kawa River – one around its eastern mouth, with 2.7 
to 4.5 meter width, and the other between Ichinohasi and the western 
mouth which was 1.8-5.4 meter wide. 13  According to a record of a  
dredging work  in  1784, 80 years after a large-scale dredging project, 
“Tate-kawa River, being sandwiched by Sumida River and Naka-gawa 
River, is where sediment from both rivers gathers”, and its sediment was 
0.9-1.2 meter deep.14 Moreover, just before a dredging work in 1808 
(Bunka 5), the canal was as shallow as 0.3-0.45 meters at low tide in the 
spring tide, even though another dredging work had been done seven years 
earlier in 1801 (Kyōwa 1).15 
  As has been pointed out, irregular dredging works were undertaken 
along with regular ones, and this was because of the effect of frequent 
heavy rains and tsunamis. A land survey in 1829 for a dredging work 
recorded levels of sediment in Tate-kawa River: 0.45m between 
Ichinohashi and Ninohashi; 0.24m between Ninohashi and Sannohashi; 
0.27m around Yonnohashi; and 0.3m between Itsutsume-toba and Sakai-
toba (Fig 2).16 
Results of this survey on the state of Tate-kawa River show that 
sedimentation in the canal bed was inevitable. At the same time, the fact 
that partial dredging works concentrated around the areas where Tate-
kawa River met Sumida River and Naka-gawa River indicates that there 
tended to be thicker layers of sediment at both eastern and western mouths 
of Tate-kawa River. 
 
3-2. The change in the canal’s shape and function 
  Lastly, this section looks at how the sedimentation changed the canal’s 
shape and function. 
  Fig 3 (left) is a section drawing of the canal, a point between Sannohashi 
and Shinohashi, drawn after a dredging work in 1705 (Hōei 2). Based on 
 
13 Shussui ikken, vol.16（『出水一件』16）, Archival document of National Diet Library. 
14 Kawazarae kakitome vol.2（『川浚書留』2）, Archival document of National Diet Library. 
15 Ibid（同上）. 
16 Honjo Tatekawa dōri sarae basho ezu in Tatekawa dori sarae ikken kakitome, vol.1-1（「本
所竪川通浚場所絵図」『竪川通浚一件書留』1-1）, Archival document of National Diet 
Library. 
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this, I drew Fig 3 (right). Although not clearly stated in the 1705 section 
drawing, it appears that [wr] and [wr’] indicates the top width and the base 
width of the canal respectively. 
Fig 3 shows that the river banks were raised by 0.9-1.2m from the original 
height [rb] to the current height [rb’] by using dredged materials. What 
happened underneath the water surface is noteworthy. The canal’s depth 
[dw] (mizusoko) is 1.9m, the depth of low tide at the spring tide. The canal 
bed [ds] (umari) shows the state of sediment after dredging and is 1.2 
meter thick at the deepest point of the canal. 
  Fig 3 also shows that Tate-kawa River’s original depth was 
approximately 3.6 meter. This means that the thick line in the right 
drawing indicates what Tate-kawa River was like in 1659 (Manji 2), 
which was when the canal was initially dug up. In other words, the 
dredging work, carried out in 1705 (Hōei 2), was not a serious engineering 
work as it failed to clear up all the sediment and just managed to regain 
some depth. 
  This implies that dredging works in the early modern period aimed just 
to clear some sediment and regain a little bit of depth, rather than bringing 
the canal back to the original state by getting rid of all the sediment. 
Sediment depicted in Fig 3 was the soil, sand and mud accumulated after 









  Table 4 contains information about Tate-kawa River’s top width, base 
width and depth which was recorded in a document to prepare for a 
dredging work. This shows that the canal became shallower, with the 
depth changing from 1.5-1.8m at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century to 0.9-1.2m in the late eighteenth century. The base width also 
changed from 29m in the eighteenth century to 11m in the nineteenth 
century. This information shows that Tate-kawa River became 
shallower and narrower by almost half from the eighteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries. 
  As has been discussed in the previous section, even though numerous 
dredging works were done after the eighteenth century, these failed to 
maintain the canal’s original function. The nineteenth century saw more 
frequent dredging works on Tate-kawa River, and it signifies the fact 
that the canal had changed its nature as space considerably. 
 
Conclusion 
  Floods caused by heavy rain, high tides and tsunamis put houses 
underwater and destroyed them, affecting the lives of people in Honjo 
and Fukagawa. At the same time, floods brought in huge amounts of 
sediment, paralyzing the canal system which was a very important 
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infrastructure for transport and distribution in the area. In this sense, 
flooding was indeed an extraordinary situation for the city and its 
residents. 
  However, Edo was on the Kanto Plain, whose location naturally 
caused an increase in rainfall during the summer months, which raised 
the level of water and therefore accelerated the pace of the 
sedimentation in the canal, whether there was flooding or not. In a 
sense, the canal’s sedimentation in Honjo and Fukagawa was an 
inevitable natural phenomenon because this area was created by large-
scale land reclamation. The fact that the canal got shallower and 
narrower over the course of the early modern period implies the 
inadequacy of the canal management and maintenance system at that 
time. This change in the canal, in other words constant sedimentation 
on the canal bed and its resultant elevation, lowered the amount of water 
it could contain and, as a result, led to more frequent flooding, which 
was an extraordinary situation in the lives of Edo’s people. However, 
looking into the early modern system to manage and maintain the canal, 
which was part of the ordinary state of Edo’s civic life provides some 
clue to rethink the relationships between human beings and nature in 
the urban context in the 21st century. 
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Flooding in Edo and the Tone-gawa 








  My current research interests focus on how the water flowed in and out of 
the early-modern metropolis Edo [Watanabe 2017]. In this paper, I am going 
to be discussing the former point – where and how the water came into the 
capital. There appear to be virtually no comprehensive studies on this 
particular topic, although many historians of water management have looked 
at individual cases and uncovered quite a lot of facts and details. There have 
also been studies by archeologists and historians of civil engineering and 
physical geography. In addition, water management departments of the 
national government and local authorities have complied a number of 
historical records on flooding and water engineering too.   
  Utilizing findings by these previous studies, this paper will examine 
primary sources on flooding, particularly looking at how the water flowed 
into Edo and how people’s daily lives were affected by large-scale flooding 
caused by typhoons and torrential rains. In doing so, it is important to widen 
the scope of analysis and take the water system in Edo’s hinterland into 
account, rather than focusing on the city itself.  
 
1. The river system that brought the water into Edo – the Tone-gawa 
River system  
  The Tone-gawa River’s river source was in the north east of the Kanto 
region, north-northwest of Edo, approximately 200 kilometers away from 
the metropolis. It currently flows eastwards into the Pacific Ocean, although 
until the twentieth century the Tone-gawa River flowed into the Edo Bay 
(Tokyo Bay). The lower section of the present-day Tone-gawa River was 
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called the Hitachi-gawa River, which had a different river source. From the 
mid-sixteenth century, water engineering changed the course of the Tone-
gawa River, and with Edo becoming the capital in the seventeenth century, 
more works were carried out, resulting in the Tone-gawa River connected to 
other rivers and some of its water flowing eastwards. And this river 
engineering had a number of positive impacts in Edo – improvement in 
water transport, making flooding less damaging and helping the 
development of new fields in the north-east of Edo (the Saitama Plains). 
[Okuma 1989; Hashimoto 2010] 
  New embankments were built to make the Tone-gawa River flow 
eastwards. However, if they were broken, flooded water flowed southwards 
along the older river course of the Tone-gawa River and reached the eastern 
Edo area (Honjo and Fukagawa).  
  In the eastern Edo area, large-scale projects were undertaken to develop 
and reclaim land after the Meireki Fire in 1657 with a view to addressing the 
capital’s land shortage caused by the rapidly increasing population. This area 
was renowned for the frequent flooding, and after the devastating floods in 
1680 people who had moved into the newly developed land moved out, 
whilst the shogunate put a halt to its development projects. However, several 
years afterwards, land development started again, signifying the shogunate’s 
intention to make Honjo and Fukagawa a habitable area and also a hub for 
water transport, despite its proneness to flooding.  
  The eighteenth century Edo, particularly its eastern area like Honjo and 
Fukagawa, witnessed a number of floods. It is notable that the rainfall in the 
early-eighteenth century Japan was greater than in the other periods 
[Nakatsuka 2018]. It has also been suggested that the increase of arable land 
as well as the deforestation of hills and mountains throughout the 
seventeenth century caused frequent flooding [Kasatani and Mizumoto]. 
These two factors – climate change and human activities – appear to have 
contributed to frequent flooding in Edo.  
  It has been demonstrated that the direct cause of flooding in Edo in this 
period was the collapse of two embankments in the middle section of the 
Tone-gawa River, Gongendo Tsutsumi and Chujo-Tei. Historical records 
show that Chujo-Tei burst in 1631, 1723, 1736, 1743, 1786, 1791, 1859 and 
1868. At the same time, Gongendo Tsutumi was destroyed at least six times 
in this period in 1704, 1742, 1757, 1786, 1802 and 1846, and all of these, 
except for 1757, caused flooding in the eastern area of Edo. [Hara 1995; 
Katsushika-ku 2007; Hashimoto 2010] 
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  Out of these, the flooding in 1786 was the severest. The drawing shows 
areas which were flooded. The eastern Edo saw the water reaching above 
eaves, according to historical records. It would have looked as if roofs were 
floating on the water surface in the urban area. Since it took one or two days 
until the flood reached Edo from where the embankments were, some 
residents who had heard of the flood approaching had left the area, while 
others stayed and took refuge in the upstairs or on the roof. It took about 
seven days until the water disappeared, and in the meantime food and water 
was provided by rescue boats operated by the shogunate and local wealthy 
merchants. In total, 223 boats took those 5,113 people who requested 
evacuation help to places of refuge on the west bank of the Sumida-gawa 
River where they were given food. The town magistrate office provided 
137,750 meals in total. [Watanabe 2013, 2016a] 
  One of the two embankments in discussion here, Gogendo Tsutsumi, was 
along the Gongendo-gawa River, which flowed out of the Tone-gawa River. 
However, the western half of the embankment was away from the 
Gongendo-gawa River, stretching westwards. Between the Tone-gawa 
River and the Gongendo Tsutsumi embankment lay a vast area where there 
were a lot of agricultural villages, and many landowners, including the 
shogunate, collected the land tax there. 
 
Embankments such as Gogendo Tsutsumi were built with a view to utilizing 
the land between the river and the embankment as an open levee. 
Embankments and other water management facilities were manually built 
with materials such as earth, logs and bamboos, and therefore creating an 
open levee was only logical and reasonable at that time.  
  Two groups of villages – one consisting of 59 villages on the northern side 
of the embankment, the other formed by 52 villages in the south of the river 
– came into conflict with each other over water management. The northern 
village group complained about the abundance of water, making effort to 
secure means of drainage. At the same time, the southern village group 
wanted no extra amount of water coming from the north of the embankment 
and hoped to build water management facilities to avoid it.  
  During flooding, the northern side of the embankment became flooded as 
an open levee, and the villages wanted to drain the water as soon as possible. 
The southern village group, on the other hand, wanted to reinforce the 
embankment so it would not be affected by flooding.  
  After 1783, when Mount Asama erupted, volcanic ashes and debris flowed 
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into rivers across the Kanto Plains, including the Tone-gawa River, resulting 
in sedimentation and a rise in river beds, which in turn caused frequent 
flooding. Gogendo-Tsutsumi burst in 1786 and 1802, but the shogunate 
repaired the embankment. Afterwards, the embankment came to be 
maintained jointly by the shogunate and also local landowners, and this 
collaborative maintenance system successfully prevented flooding for over 
thirty years.  
  However, in 1830, the shogunate attempted to create a drainage channel in 
the embankment to improve the northern villages’ water management. The 
southern village group objected to the plan, maintaining that it would 
weaken the embankment. Interestingly, the southern village group described 
Gogendo-Tsusumi “like a fort which protects Edo”. A similar rhetoric had 
been used since 1772.  
  The shogunate officials in charge of the capital’s water management also 
described Gogendo-Tsutsumi as “a fort which protects Edo”. Such 
description precisely reflected the embankment’s function which has been 
established by historical studies of water and civil engineering as well 
physical geography. [Katsushika-ku 2007; Hashimoto 2010] 
  In 1833, after receiving numerous complaints by the southern village group, 
the shogunate’s water management department decided against the plan to 
create a drainage channel in the embankment. The plan resurfaced in 1836 
but it was somehow not carried out.  
  In the following year, 1837, the shogunate officials proposed a plan to 
establish a comprehensive water management system for the area. The plan 
argued against the idea of creating a drainage channel in the embankment 
and instead suggested that, by closing the Gogendo-gawa River and 
channeling the water through to the Tone-gawa River, water management of 
north villages should be improved and also further flooding of the Gogendo-
gawa River be prevented. 1  It appears that there were different opinions 
within the shogunate’s water management department. The original plan 
was in fact not carried out until 1842, which implies that the shogunate took 
a careful approach and tried not to push through against the objection.  
  In 1842, however, a drainage channel was created in the embankment 
(Satte p.633). This means the shogunate changed its plan, although there is 
no evidence which explains the background of this change. However, this 
 
1 This is based on the results of inspections as part of the water management reform from Tempo 
7 [Iijima 1994, etc]. 
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was the year when the shogunate undertook a major political reform which 
involved new agricultural policy to pave the way for increasing the land tax. 
[Fujita]. 2  It seems that the shogunate chose to increase agricultural 
production and therefore tax revenue by improving water management in 
the north of the embankment, rather than to prepare for flooding which 
would occur every thirty years.3 
  This suggests that protecting Edo from flooding was not the absolute 
priority of the shogunate. After all, flooding did not cause any damage to the 
central part of the capital where the shogunate and the Edo castle were 
located. Flooding only affected the eastern lowland area.  
  The shogunate’s change of attitude was important in that it prioritised the 
improvement of the ordinary state of affairs (in this case agricultural 
production) and disregarded measures to respond to extraordinary situations 
(flood prevention).4 
  The management of Gogendo-Tsutsumi involved the conflict between the 
northern and southern village groups, and the shogunate needed to make 
careful decisions by taking into account the local interests, water 
management of neighbouring areas, water transport and the impact of 
flooding in the central part of Edo, as well as managing the internal 
 
2 Around 1840, the shogunate’s agricultural policy remained unchanged. In 1836, a land register 
was created, with a view to collecting information about land along rivers which was exempt 
from land tax [Sugimoto 1999]. The aforementioned water management reform started in the 
next year, and water engineering projects were selected and the information gathering for 
untaxed land along rivers was carried out. This reform also aimed to quieten conflict over water 
management (Otake 7). Following these measures, the shogunate’s land tax reform started in 
1842 [Fujita 1987].  
3 It is possible that the shogunate’s decision was related to a major civil and water engineering 
project on Inba-numa Lake, which was south of the lower section of Tone-gawa River. The 
shogunate attempted to shorten the transport route by opening a canal between Inba-numa Lake 
and Edo Bay. As Otake suggests, by reducing Gongengo-gawa River’s water levels, the Tone-
gawa River’s water levels would increase, making its lower parts prone to flooding. If there 
was to be flooding, the Inba-numa project might fail, like in the case of flooding in 1786. The 
failure of the 1786 project led to the collapse of the government at that time. If Otake is right, 
creating a drainage channel in the Gongendo-Tsutsumi embankment was imposed on, in order 
to resolve the water problem around Gongendo-Tsutsumi without increasing Tone-gawa 
River’s water levels because the shogunate needed to finish the Inba-numa project. There is 
another suggestion that the Inba-numa project was carried out to improve the inland waterway 
system to respond to the threat posed by Britain, which jus defeated China in the Opium War. 
This means the Gongendo-Tsutsumi water management issue might have had an international 
dimension, but this is yet to be researched.  
4 So far I have discussed this as an issue of embankment, but it is important to take water 
transport by boats into account [Hara 1999]. 
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disagreement. Not only that, there existed complex local dynamics between 
individual villages and also within each villages. 5  This myriad of 
intertwined interests at the local and government levels influenced the 
shogunate’s approach to deal with the ordinary and the extraordinary.  
 
2. The river system that did not reach Edo – the Tama-gawa River 
system  
  The Tama-gawa River’s source was approximately 80 kilometers away 
from Edo in the western hills, flowing south-eastwards into the Edo Bay 
with its river mouth 15 kilometers south of the capital. This means that the 
Tama-gawa River did not flow into the capital itself.  
  In the seventeenth century, with the absence of major rivers, Edo’s 
townspeople dug wells and created canals which brought water from rivers 
in the central plateau.6 The largest of such canals was the Kanda-josui (the 
Kanda waterworks). I call this water system “Edo Water System”.7 Being 
the capital of the country, Edo expanded rapidly in the seventeenth century 
and its population increased, and by the 1640s the water supply through the 
Edo Water System became insufficient.  
  In 1653, to address the water shortage, a 40 kilometer long canal was crated 
from Hamura, a village located at the apex of an alluvial fan in the middle 
section of the Tama-gawa River. This canal was called Tama-gawa Josui 
(the Tama-gawa waterworks). From the viewpoint of human-nature 
relationship, this was a remarkable achievement 8  because it created an 
 
5 Of the fifty three villages in the south side of the embankment, eleven in the lower part of it 
were most vehemently against the proposal (Saitama 13p306). Some local residents enclosed 
part of the embankment in their property, built houses and warehouses on the embankment and 
did some work on the embankment to make it suitable for using boats. These private works 
weakened the embankment (Shimotakano, 1-23).  
6 [Edo Archaeological Society 2011] showed some archaeological discoveries of remains of 
waterworks other than the Kanda and Tama-gawa waterworks, and the significance of the 
Kanda and Tama-gawa waterworks have recently been put into context. This section is based 
on these new findings.  
7 Kanda-gawa River currently belongs to the Ara-kawa River system [Department of Transport 
and Engineering]. However, I call this “the Edo water system” because humans were able to 
use it without large-scale engineering projects or in the wider natural settings where the city 
was built. Therefore my usage of “water system” is slightly different from that in physical 
geography or civil and water engineering.  
8 From this point of view, the 1960s is the watershed period (see Conclusion). There was a 
period when water coming from Sayama-ike Lake as “assisting water” flowed into the Tama-
gawa waterworks. Sayama-ike Lake (later Murayama Reservoir and Sayama-ko Lake) 
belonged to the Ara-kawa River system, so the Tama-gawa waterworks’ water was not just 
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artificial channel which brought water into the capital. It improved the water 
supply in the Musashino area, which had suffered from a lack of sufficient 
water provision. 
  Koichi Ito, who is a distinguished historian of Edo and its rural villages, 
pointed out two negative impacts of the Tama-gawa Josui [Ito 1996]. One 
of them was the reduction of water level in the lower section of the Tama-
gawa River. It was said that it became possible to cross the river on foot. The 
other negative impact was that lower parts of the Yamanote area along the 
Edo Water System such as Koishikawa, Sekiguchi and Kohinata started to 
suffer from frequent flooding. Citing a lack of documentary evidence, Ito 
only discussed this as a hypothesis.  
  I believe Ito’s hypothesis is wrong. To give some background, the Kanda 
waterworks’ source was a pond 12 kilometers west of Edo, and the water 
flowed eastwards, branching into the Kanda waterworks and the Edo-gawa 
River at a weir in the north west of the capital. The Kanda waterworks ran 
east-southeast through Korakuen (the current Tokyo Dome), crossing the 
outer moat of the Edo castle at Suidobashi, then flowing into the samurai 
residential area. The Edo-gawa River ran southeast and flowed into the 
castle’s outer moat around 1.4 kilometers west of Suidobashi. At the weir, 
the amount of water going into the Kanda waterworks was managed by the 
gatekeeper who normally maintained the water level of Kanda waterworks 
by controlling water flowing into the Edo-gawa River. In severe rains, the 
gate to the Edo-gawa River was opened fully, so no excessive water flowed 
into the Kanda waterworks. When the water level was back to normal, the 
gate was re-adjusted to maintain the Kanda waterworks’ water level.  
  Following sections look at two incidents of flooding. On 15 July 1786, 
town officials around the Edo-gawa River reported to the town magistrate 
office that “many people drowned and died, whilst those who survived were 
about to suffer from thirst and hunger”. Surprised at the report, the town 
magistrate office ordered boat owners around Ushigome-niageba (just west 
of the mouth of Edo-gawa River) to use their boats and rescue the survivors. 
“If the rescue boats had been delayed by half a day, more people would have 
drowned. The residents thank the magistrate office for its swift and graceful 
response”, according to a contemporary account (Sangyo 30 p.253). At that 
time, the outer moat of the Edo castle was used as a canal and it was a major 
 
provided by Tama-gawa River, strictly speaking. However, water from Sayama-ike Lake did 
not flow into the Tama-gawa waterworks constantly. The fact remains that water of the Tama-
gawa waterworks mostly came from Tama-gawa River. 
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water transport route towards the north-west of Edo up to Ushigome 
[Yoshida 20**]. This is why there were boat owners around Ushigome and 
their boats were utilized for the rescue operation.  
  The flooding on 25 August 1779 burst the waterway in Sekiguch and 
collapsed the embankment of Suidobashi 36 meter wide, with the debris 
piling on the drainage, cutting off the water supply for twenty days [Hensai 
2p.417; Suido 1p.570].  
  Ito is right in that areas around the Edo water system did suffer from 
flooding. Then how were those areas which were relatively high up flooded?  
  Ito only vaguely pointed out the routes through which water of the Tama-
gawa waterworks came into the north side of the castle’s outer moat. 
However recent studies found out that there was a gate in front of Yotsuya-
mon which released the Tama-gawa waterworks’ excess water into the 
castle’s outer moat. There were other seventeen gates along the Tama-gawa 
waterworks, and they were located in the south of the Edo castle [Kamiyoshi 
2001]. This means that the excess water from the Tama-gawa waterworks 
did not flow through the outer moat on the north side of the castle into 
Kanda-gawa River. Yotsuya was the highest point along the castle moat, and 
this means that water coming into the moat near Yotsuya must have flowed 
either north or south along the outer moat. Therefore the amount of water 
flowing into the moat at Yotsuya-mon should only be a small part of water 
coming from the weir at Hamura.  
  It is also worth pointing out that the Tama-gawa waterworks were 
connected to the Kanda waterworks. Through this route, water from the 
Tama-gawa waterworks flowed into the Kanda waterworks. However, the 
gate that connected both was very small, only 40 centimeter wide [Nonaka 
2012]. The Tama-gawa waterworks had another gate at Yotsuya-Okido, 
where the water level was managed. From here, excess water flowed south 
into the samurai mansion and then through the south side of the castle into 
the Edo Bay. Therefore, water from the Tama-gawa waterworks did indeed 
flow into Kanda-gawa River, but it appears that it was only small amount.  
  Following sections look at the intake of the Tama-gawa waterworks.  
  When Tama-gawa River’s water level got higher, what kind of measures 
were taken at the intake at Hamura? As the figure shows, the river was closed 
at the weir, and the water was guided through the gate towards the 
waterworks. The shogunate’s supervisors stayed and oversaw the intake, and 
it was managed and controlled by gatekeepers.  
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To control the amount of water flowing into the waterworks, there were 
several detachable devices at the intake. When the river’s water level was 
up, the devices were taken out from the weir to release excess water, whilst 
they were attached to the weir to close the river. In addition, several timber 
planks were slotted into the gate at the intake to control the water flow. When 
the river was swollen, more planks were put in so the water flowing into the 
waterworks would be limited.9 
  However, floods broke the gate at the Hamura weir. One such example was 
in 1742, when areas along the Kanda waterworks were flooded, the weir’s 
gate was destroyed. Below is a detailed description of what happened: “The 
water level of the Tama-gawa River was 1.5 meter higher than normal. 
Therefore the second gate of the Hamura weir was completely destroyed and 
gone, whilst other gates were swept away with the embankment. The 
waterworks will dry up in a couple of days”, according to a report by the 
town magistrate for the shogun’s elderly council [Suido-hen 1p.450]. This 
evidence shows that the shogunate officials in charge of managing the Tama-
gawa waterworks were seriously concerned about the situation where the 
water supply to Edo would be cut off.10  
  The movement of water shows that an excessive amount of water flowed 
into the Tama-gawa waterworks when the intake area was flooded such as 
when the weir’s gates were destroyed, but a small part of it went to the 
Kanda-gawa waterworks, and its water level was controlled at Yotsuya-Kido 
and excess water was drained into the castle’s outer moat.  
  This was not the reason why lower parts of the Yamanote area was flooded. 
Takizawa Bakin, a contemporary poet, wrote in one of his essays: “someone 
who knows a lot about water movement told me that the end of the Ushigome 
and Koishikawa area (which means lower parts of the Yamanote area) is 
flooded when Kanda-gawa River flows in the opposite direction” [Hensai 
2p.468]. Contemporary experts understood that backflow of Kanda-gawa 
River occurred when Sumida-gawa River was swollen. Sumida-gawa River 
was the lower section of Ara-kawa River and, strictly speaking, did not 
 
9 This is a summary from Hamura-Cho Shi (1974), Hamura City Museum, Tamagawa Josui 
Hamura Seki (2015). I also received information from Yasuhiro Kawamura, director of Hamura 
City Museum. “Tamagawa Josui Dome” [no.118] 100 (National Diet Library) also contains 
detailed descriptions.  
10 Hamura Choshi Shiryo 12, Sashidake Nikki (Hamura City Education Committee, 1984) also 
contains information about day-to-day management of the Hamura weir. Sedimentation 
occurred around or in the gate when the water levels rose, and clearance works were carried 
out. 
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belong to the Tone-gawa River system. However, studies by Takashi Okuma, 
a historian of civil and water engineering, and Naoko Hashimoto, a scholar 
of physical geography, imply that water from the Tone-gawa River system 
did flow into Sumida-gawa River through numerous small streams and 
rivers as well as intricate networks of canals and waterways. In addition, 
whenever flooding occurred and embankments of the Tone-gawa River burst, 
its water flowed through smaller rivers and waterways into Sumida-gawa 
River [Katsuhika-ku 2007; Matsuura 2016]. Therefore Kanda-gawa River’s 
backflow was caused by excess water both from the Ara-kawa River system 
and the Tone-gawa River system.  
  To summarise, flooding and burst embankments brought water from Tone-
gawa River through Sumida-gawa River to Edo, and this means that, when 
there was flooding, water coming from the Tone-gawa River system and the 
Tama-gawa River system flowed into the moat in the north side of the castle 
– this is my hypothesis. It is important that this was made possible by man-
made waterways, one of which was Kanda-gawa, created in 1620 to become 
the northern half of the castle moat and the other the Tama-gawa waterworks 
created in 1653.  
 
Conclusion 
 Below is the summary of this paper’s discussion. 
 1. There was recognition shared by the local people and the shogunate that 
Gogendo-Tsutusmi, which made Tone-gawa River flow eastwards, 
functioned as a sort of protective fort for Edo. Therefore its management and 
maintenance was influenced by a complex set of interests, although it was 
the shogunate which funded its maintenance. When it was broken, however, 
Edo suffered from flooding.  
  2. The Tama-gawa waterworks did not cause flooding in the lower parts of 
the Yamanote area, but it appears that some of the flooded water came from 
the Tama-gawa River system.  
  3. The Edo’s water management system brought water through the 
waterworks but at the same time let water out from the capital. Previous 
studies have considered the enlargement of arable land, improvement in 
agricultural production and resultant population increase in a positive light 
and also regarded this as a clever manner of utilizing what the nature 
provides. However, if nature is seen as an agent of history, rather than an 
object on which humans worked or a background where human activities 
took place, Edo’s water management could represent humans’ self-centred 
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engineering of the natural water system. Indeed, changing the course of 
Tone-gawa River out of Edo Bay and bringing water from Tama-gawa River 
across hills was clearly not the best or most carefully planned civil and water 
engineering. Once the capital was hit by a typhoon or a severe rain, powerful 
flooding affected Edo and its surrounding villages, with water supply to the 
city sometimes cut off.  
  Finally, findings of this paper has some implications on water management 
in the modern period.11 Tone-gawa River’s flooding continued to occur in 
the same way as the early-modern period. In 1930, the Ara-kawa discharge 
channel was built, and this put an end to flooding in the eastern side of Tokyo 
caused by an overflow of Tone-gawa River. 
  In terms of the lower parts of the Yamonote area, flooding kept occurring 
until the deluge of 1910. However, the Kathleen typhoon in 1947 did not 
cause flooding in this area. Some repair works on the former Edo-gawa 
River (current Kanda-gawa River) seem to have been carried out, although 
I have not looked into these yet.  
  Little seems to have change regarding the Tama-gawa River system until 
the 1960s. Although the new water supply to the capital from Yodobashi 
Purification Plant from 1898 was a remarkable achievement [Horikoshi 
1981], it was still the Tama-gawa River system that provided water to the 
plant, and this means the overall water supply system did not change since 
the early modern period. It was the five projects to increase Tokyo’s water 
supply from 1950 to 1963 that brought water to the city from sources other 
than the Tama-gawa River system for the first time. Since then, Tokyo’s 
water sources include river systems of Tama-gawa River, Sagami-gawa 
River, Tone-gawa River and Ara-kawa River. [Tokyo Water Management 
Department 1999] 
  Although it was an extraordinary situation where water from the Tama-
gawa River system and the Tone-gawa River system was mixed in the early 
modern period, it is the ordinary state in the present day. Whether it is water 
engineering with stone, rocks, earth and wood or with steel and concrete, 
this is a man-made water system, and that seems to be the big problem.   
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The Great Edo Flood of 1742 and the 








  In 1742, severe flooding affected Edo and its hinterland. This article 
examines this flooding and considers the relationship between the city and 
the natural environment. At the last symposium, I provided an overview of 
Edo’s wider water system that flowed into the city including waterworks 
and how it was related to natural disasters.1 Based on the symposium paper, 
this article instead discusses the issue of the quality of drinking water 
 
1. Artificial nature and flooding2 
  Edo was where the Tokugawa Shogunate was located and also a city with 
over one million people. It was a metropolis and, if we are to consider its 
natural disasters, it is important to understand the natural environment in 
which the city was built and also how it emerged.  
  Edo was built around the estuary of the Tonegawa and Arakawa river 
systems. In a sense, it was a focal point of the Kanto Region’s geography. 
If there was large-scale flooding in the Kanto Region, therefore, overflow 
water from these river systems would flood the east side of the future 
metropolis. This is where Edo was built.  
  While the city was being built, there were four phases of large-scale 
interference in nature.  
 
1 Flooding in Edo and the River System, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in the Early 
Modern Metropolis: Artificial Natural Environment and Water, Bensei-shuppan, 2020.. 
2 ibid. 
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  The first was to change the courses of big rivers. From the mid-sixteenth 
century to the mid-seventeenth century, the Tonegawa River’s course was 
artificially altered a number of times. The Tonegawa River used to flow into 
the Edo Bay, but these successive changes made about half of the river’s 
water flow east towards Choshi, creating the current course of the river. To 
enable such artificial changes, several embankments were erected along the 
right bank of the river’s middle basin. The Chujo Tsutsumi and the 
Gongendo Tsutsumi were of particular significance because, if these 
embankments were flooded or breached, the water would go southwards 
into old rivers and eventually reach Edo.  
  The second phase was water engineering works on rivers inside the city to 
change their courses. While the early-modern Edo was being built, the 
Hirakawa River, which flowed into the Hibiya estuary, was artificially 
altered by creating the outer moat (the Kandagawa River) in the 1630s. As 
a result, the Hirakawa River met the Sumidagawa River in the east of current 
Akihabara. This large-scale engineering work saved the centre of Edo from 
flooding, although overflow water from the Sumidagawa River flowed 
backward into the outer moat.  
  The third was the water provision from outside the city. In 1653, a dam 
was erected near the apex of an alluvial fan called Hamura in the middle 
Tamagawa River, and from there a 40-kilometer waterway was created on 
a plateau. This is called the Tamagawa Josui waterworks. The waterworks 
provided Edo with water from outside the city for the first time. From the 
viewpoint of the mutual relationship between nature and humans, it was a 
watershed moment because it brought water into the city that otherwise 
wouldn’t flow into it in the natural geographical state.  
  The fourth was expansion of the city area. The Shogunate had plans to 
develop the Honjo and Fukagawa area where there had been small fishing 
villages and started to carry out its plans from around the Great Meireki Fire 
of 1657. The south-east of Honjo and Fukagawa were mainly tidal flats 
which the Shogunate reclaimed so people could build homes and move in, 
although the reclaimed land was prone to flooding. If the Sumidagawa River 
was swollen, the Honjo and Fukagawa area, which lay on the eastern bank 
of the river, was flooded because its elevation was low, only at about one 
meter.3  
 
3  See Chapter 1. 
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  Thus the metropolis Edo was built, but it was destined to be affected by 
water disasters.  The city was also artificial nature created by humans.  
 
At the same time, in terms of its climate, Japan is on the eastern edge of the 
East Asian monsoon climate zone. This means that the country sees lots of 
severe rains in June and July in the solar calendar as it is coming out of a 
rainy season, whilst it is hit by many typhoons from July to September. Due 
to the geographical conditions described above, flooding frequently 
occurred in Edo.  
  Then, how often did flooding happen in Edo? Throughout the Edo period, 
there were over 100 identified cases of flooding.4 This is more than one in 
three years, although severe flooding that claimed people’s lives was much 
less frequent, taking place roughly every thirty or forty years.  
  I will explain how such severe flooding occurred by taking the case of the 
1742 flooding as an example. Firstly, the embankment in the middle 
Tonegawa River was broken and that overflow water moved southwards, 
reaching Edo and flooding its eastern lowland. In 1743, flooded water was 
up to around one meter deep in some areas and it took roughly 20 days until 
the water disappeared. Secondly, in the northern edge of Edo Sumidagawa 
River burst its banks or overflowed, although the flooding was relatively 
limited due to a high ground in the west of the river. Thirdly, the 
Sumidagawa River got swollen and this made the outer moat flow back. As 
water from the Tamagawa Josui waterworks flowing into the outer moat 
also increased, the outer moat eventually burst and flooded areas between 
higher grounds around its upper courses. This means that flooding in these 
lower areas between higher grounds was almost artificially caused. Part of 
excess water from the Tamagawa Josui waterworks flowed into the outer 
moat, and the Kanda Josui waterworks were going through these lower areas 
between the higher grounds. The outer moat was an artificial waterway, and 
water from two other artificial waterways flowed into it. In addition, the 
outer moat joined the Sumidagawa River almost at a right angle – an angle 
at which few rivers would meet in the natural world. Moreover, in the south-
west corner of where these two rivers joined, a wharf specially made for the 
Shogun stuck out in the river, making its current prone to flow back.5 
 
4 Keiko Takayama, “The formation of Edo’s fishing village Fukagawa and the development 
of the Fukagawa area”, in The Urban History Annual, 21 (2014).  
5  The reconstructed map of Edo (The Tokyo Metropolitan Government Education 
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Furthermore, there was the Ryogokubashi Bridge just south of where these 
two rivers joined. Bridges back then were wooden and had many bridge 
piers. If there was flooding, these bridge piers caught boats, timbers and 
debris from broken buildings and houses. As a result, they would stop or 
slow down the flow of water and therefore cause further flooding. These 
factors indicate that flooding in the lower areas between the higher grounds 
was almost entirely man-made. And this is how the main causes of Edo’s 
large scale flooding, particularly can be explained,  
  Flooding’s meteorological cause was often typhoons. Severe floods in 
1743 and 1856 were caused by typhoons and the courses of these have been 
identified. The 1856 case shows that, if a typhoon with particularly strong 
wind went through the west of Edo, it caused storm surges in the Edo Bay. 
Contemporary records of the 1786 typhoon have no mention of strong wind, 
which indicates that the flooding was not caused by a typhoon but by severe 
rains towards the end of a delayed rainy season.  
 
2. The Shogunate’s response to the 1742 flooding6  
  The flooding occurred on 1 August in 1742.7 Severe rains in the Chichibu 
and Okutama mountains caused the Chikumagawa River, which ran both 
sides of the mountains, and its main stream the Shinanogawa River, the 
Tonegawa River, the Arakawa River and the Tamagawa River, to flood.8 
The flooding affected vast areas including the central parts of the Japanese 
island, namely the current Kanto Region as well as Nagano and Niigata 
Prefectures. The number of victims could have been at least over 10,000. 
Some evidence suggests that 3,914 lives were lost in Edo by 7 August.    
  After the flooding started, the town magistrates built a shed on the west 
side of Shin-ohashi bridge and the officials stayed there. This could well be 
called emergency headquarters. The officials gathered vital flooding 
information such as levels of the river, speed of the water flow, extent of 
bridges’ damage and how badly areas in the west of the Sumidagawa River 
 
Department, 1988).  
6 Measure against disasters and administration of the Edo City Magistrate Office in the 18th 
Century(Japanese), Historical Journal(REKISHI HYORON), 760, 2013. 
7 The years in this article are based on Common Era. However, the dates are in the Japanese 
calendar unless otherwise stated.  
8 This pattern has been repeated in the 1910 flooding, the 1947 Kathleen Typhoon and the 
Typhoon Number 19 in 2019.  
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were affected. The information gathered by them was constantly passed 
through the town magistrate onto the Shogunate’s senior ministers including 
members of shogun's council of elders. At some point as many as six reports 
were sent to the Shogunate in a day. These reports contained not only 
information around flooding and its damage but also intelligence around 
recovery measures such as closures of bridges and provision of food for 
those affected. The senior ministers of the Shogunate gave ex-post-facto 
approvals to these measures and initiatives taken by the site officials, 
showing that they respected the local officials’ decisions. These reports and 
communications were all written down on documents.  
  In Edo’s history of natural disasters, basic measures of recovery such as 
provision of food for those affected and those in need were established 
throughout the early modern period including the case of the famine in 1641 
and the great fire in 1657. The city experienced the flooding in 1704 and the 
sharp rise in rice prices caused by the great famine in the west of Japan in 
1732, and through these experiences emerged a sense of benevolent rule that 
demanded that rulers must help those affected and those in need. These 
experiences provided a background to the recovery measures in the 
aftermath of the 1742 flooding.   
  Severe flooding in Edo affected so many areas in the city that a number of 
rescue boats were required to transport those who were left on the roofs and 
trees and also to provide food and other necessary goods. Food for those in 
refugee camps was needed too.  
  In total, 3,357 people were rescued by boats. The town magistrate provided 
186,000 meals, that is around 360 koku [1789 bushel] of rice.  
 
  The graph below shows the number of people rescued by boats. According 
to this, five days after the flooding occurred[6 August], the rescue operation 
by boats reached its peak, with 222 boats deployed to rescue 1,734 people. 
The number of boats deployed 
remained high even they 
rescued fewer people after this 
peak. This is because they 
continued to be used to provide 
food and water for those who 
were left in the flooded areas. 
After 11 August, the number of 
people rescued slightly 
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increased because a typhoon went past the east of Edo. Contemporary 
documents and evidence suggest that the water disappeared on 12 August, 
putting an end to the rescue and recovery operation by the town magistrate.   
    This graph shows how food 
was provided for flood victims. 
The figures in the graph show 
the number of people who 
received food supply. 
According to this, the peak of 
operation came later than the 
peak of the boat rescue 
operation discussed above. 
After that, reports on the 
situation of flooded areas were sent to the town magistrate. The food supply 
was gradually reduced according to these reports. The food supply 
continued twelve day after the boat rescue operation ended because the 
refugee camp at the west side of Shinohashi bridge remained open. The food 
supply ended after a report indicated that flood victims’ lives returned to 
normal.  
  As discussed so far, information about the flood affected area s was 
gathered, documented and sent to the town magistrate, forming the basis of 
decision-making on flood recovery measures. And these decisions were 
communicated back to the site operation through documents. This shows the 
document-based administration was still functioning well even during 
periods of large-scale natural disasters.  
  The Shogunate provided food for flood victims because many people, rich 
or poor, were forced to live in a difficult situation. It was recorded that 
flooding caused kitchen stoves to get wet, making it difficult for people to 
cook. Therefore, even after large-scale natural disasters, there were cases 
when food was not supplied for disaster victims. For instance, between 
around 1720 and 1792, the Shogunate did not supply food for big fir e 
victims because ‘there were no requests from them’. The famous 1772 large-
scale fire claimed 13,700 lives according to the official record, although 
there doesn’t seem to have been any rescue activity.9 The severe storm 
 
9 Koichi Watanabe, “The metropolitan response to a series of complex natural disasters in Edo 
in the Tenmei era”, in Takeshi Nakatsuka, Kaoru Kamatani and Koichi Watanabe (eds), 
Revisiting the early modern period from the perspective of climate change: statistics, system 
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caused by a typhoon in 1856 caused significant damage and destroyed more 
homes and buildings than an earthquake in the previous year did, but rise in 
water levels was not as high as other large-scale floods. It appears that the 
water disappeared rather quickly, which would probably enable people to 
use their kitchen stoves and cook, and therefore no food was supplied for 
flood victims.  
  This is how the Shogunate responded to severe floods. After flooding, 
work began to repair and rebuild river management facilities. The 
Shogunate took the lead when it came to large-scale work such as repairing 
major rivers’ embankments. However, the Shogunate’s role was to give 
orders to feudal lords to undertake the work, rather than to do the work 
themselves or pay for it. So the work was done by feudal lords for the 
Shogun. Sometimes feudal lords in the west of Japan were also ordered to 
undertake water engineering work in the Kanto Region. Feudal lords’ 
undertaking of such work was as significant as them fighting in a war to 
help the Shogun, and after the civil war period ended in 1615, it became a 
very important way of feudal lords showing their loyal service to the Shogun. 
The building of Edo, in other words the large-scale reshaping of nature, was 
carried out in the same way. The creation of the outer moat discussed in the 
first section was done by a feudal lord. The repairs of major rivers in the 
Kanto Region after the 1742 great flooding was undertaken by as many as 
eight feudal lords too. Historians argue that this also helped create jobs in 
impoverished rural villages that were affected by the flooding.10  
  As has been discussed so far, the Shogunate’s response towards flooding 
was well organized, whilst the government officials clearly worked hard for 
flood victims and recovery. All of these officials were samurai, the ruling 
elite of early modern Japan. There was an ideological background as to why 
they were involved in these disaster recovery measures.11 The rulers of the 
early modern Japan such as the Shogunate and feudal lords collected land 
tax from peasants and imposed compulsory labour on merchants and 
craftsmen whilst in return they were expected to protect the subjects’ lives. 
 
and technology (Historical Climate Adaptation Project, vol. V) Rinsen Shoten, 2019.  
10 Itoko Kitahara, “The new perspective on natural disasters as a result of new studies: the 
great flooding of 1742”, Shinano 70-4 (2018).  
11 Natural Disasters and Beliefs in Divine Punishment and Eschatology in Early Modern 
Japanese Metropolis, in the international conference ‘Natural Disasters and the Apocalypse’, 
University of Cambridge, 13 September 2018. 
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This idea of benevolent rule was also shared by peasants and merchants and 
craftsmen. At the same time, in East Asia, there was a widespread notion of 
divine admonition that a natural disaster was a warning from the deity 
against misgovernment by the rulers. Appropriate disaster recovery 
measures were therefore the rulers’ duty in early modern Japan. However, 
it was of course impossible to provide an infinite amount of disaster 
recovery measures and reliefs, so the rulers made a judgement to limit these 
measures and reliefs. 
 
3. Civic response towards natural disasters12  
  The Shogunate’s disaster recovery measures were limited, so the civil 
society filled the gap. In the 1742 flooding, 80 donations of food and goods 
for flood victims were recorded.  
  One of the agencies in the civil society which provided recovery measures 
and reliefs was wealthy merchants. Their reliefs such as supplying food for 
flood victims were large-scale. For instance, Denbei Takamatsu, who was a 
rice merchant, gave flood victims at least more than 3,000 meals of rice and 
rice porridge. They arranged their own rescue boats which went around the 
flooded areas to provide food and water for the flood victims who took 
refuge on rooftops. Takamatsu was one of the merchants who were attacked 
by rioting crowds in the popular disturbance over soaring price of rice 
caused by the great west Japan famine in 1733. It has been argued that he 
helped flood victims to avoid being attacked again.  
  Ordinary citizens also helped flood victims too. Of the 80 donations 
described above, about half of them were small donations by ordinary 
people. One medium-sized merchant, for example, allowed as many as 70 
flood victims to stay in the upstairs of his house and fed them for eight days. 
There was also a small donation worth 81 mons by a servant of a merchant. 
This amount was equivalent to 5 bowls of Soba noodles. Donations were 
made not just by individuals but collectively by groups of people such as 
neighborhood groups and trade associations. By donating collectively, these 
groups managed to donate large sums of money. Unlike rich merchants who 
 
12  Metropolitan responses toward a series of disasters in 1780s Edo, in the international 
conference ‘Cities and disasters: urban adaptability and resilience in history’ at University of 
London, Nov. 2016; Koichi Watanabe, The relation between the fire sympathy and relief in 
Early Modern Metropolis Edo (Japanese), Journal of The Institute of Cultural Sciences, 94, 
Chuo University, 2019. 
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were able to arrange their own boats and use them to help flood victims, 
these individuals and groups took their donations to the town magistrate’s 
shed. Different ways of donations represent different characteristics of 
donations.  
  The background to these acts was the Japanese called Kaji-mimai. This 
was a well-established and widespread practice in late early-modern Edo, 
conducted not only by merchants but also samurai as well as shrines and 
temples. In this tradition, friends and acquaintances of fire victims gave gifts 
and well wishes to disaster victims. Gifts were normally ready-to-eat food 
such as rice balls and rice porridge and also useful and necessary stuff such 
as timber sheets and rush mats. These are very similar to what was given to 
flood victims. It was also common to offer to help clearing up ashes, ruins 
and debris of burned houses. In case of a fire, neighbours and people who 
lived in the leeward escaped with their household items, so gifts and help 
were offered to those who had to escape. Drinks and food were customarily 
given to those who came to assist as a reward. In Edo, fires happened 
frequently and therefore the Kaji-mimai was conducted frequently too, 
creating reciprocal relationships between friends, neighbours and 
acquaintances. Moreover, people helped strangers in case of a fire, and they 
were treated with drinks and food in the aftermath of the fire. This means 
that this tradition could have contributed to high consumption and wide 
distribution of drinks, food and gifts as they were given to numerous fire 
victims and those who helped them.  
  As a result, the donation in the civil society had a continuity with mimai, 
another form of reciprocal practice. This supplemented relief measures 
provided by the Shogunate. Even after severe flooding, Edo’s society 
managed to return to its normality if it was an isolated disaster. In the case 
of 1743 flooding, however, it was a different story.  
 
4. The Tamagawa Josui waterworks’ muddy water and debate around 
how to deal with it 
  After the 1743 flooding, the water of the Tamagawa River, which was the 
source of the Tamagawa Josui waterworks, remained muddy, so did the 
Tamagawa Josui waterworks’ water. This was because the Okutama Valleys 
were severely damaged by the typhoon in 1743. There were more than seven 
landslides in the valley, and large amounts of mud stayed in the Tamagawa 
River’s riverbed and made the water muddy. In the village of Hikawa, 
sediments in the valley brought by these landslides amounted to 2.4 meter 
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to 3 meter high, practically burying the valley.  
  What was the impact of muddy water in the Tamagawa Josui waterworks? 
According to memoirs of village official’s who lived just outside the 
Okutama Valley, the muddy water annoyed Edo’s people. However, this 
village official didn’t live in Edo and his memoirs tend to contain 
misinformation such as a wildly inaccurate estimate of the number of 
victims of the 1743 flooding as 100,000. More evidence is needed.  
  Indeed, Tadasuke Ooka, one of the senior ministers of the Shogunate, 
wrote in his business diary on 19 September that his ministerial colleague 
said “After the flooding, the water is still very muddy and people don’t like 
it.” Records of a temple in the south of Edo do not mention anything about 
the muddy water of the Tamagawa Josui waterworks in this period. This 
temple was in the areas which got water from the waterworks. Ooka himself 
wrote that: “The Tamagawa River is too muddy to be good for the use of 
the Edo castle” on 5 October. Another senior minister also mentioned on 22 
October that “I hear that not only the Tamagawa River, but also others such 
as the Sumidagawa River, are still muddy. Moreover, ordinary people must 
be drinking muddy water but I don’t hear they got sick because of it.” Water 
from the waterworks was used in the centre of the Edo castle where the 
Shogun lived,13 so it appears that the senior ministers thought the muddy 
water was not good enough for its use.  
  The Shogunate therefore sought to address the issue of muddy water so it 
did some field work survey and came up with a few plans. The first plan 
was to introduce water from the Irumagawa River system. The Irumagawa 
River was a branch of the Arakawa River, which changed its name for the 
Sumidagawa River once it’s in Edo. So this was a plan to bring water from 
a different water system from the Tamagawa River system. The assumptions 
were that new waterworks would bring fresh water into the Tamagawa Josui 
waterworks and made the water clear. However, it was estimated to be 
around 20 kilometer long and it turned out to be impossible as the 
Shogunate’s field work found hills in between. This idea to bring water from 
the Arakawa River system into Tokyo and use it as drinking water did not 
materialize until 1924.  
  The second plan was to bring water from the Kanda Josui waterworks. 
Near the middle point of the Tamagawa Josui waterworks, both waterworks 
 
13  Kojiro Eimori, Kazuo Kamiyoshi and Hiroshi Hiruma (eds), The technology and 
management of Edo’s waterworks (Quori, 2000).  
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ran parallel and close to each other. The plan must have been to dig a new 
waterway to connect both waterworks which would bring water from the 
Kanda Josui to the Tamagawa Josui which was expected to clear the latter’s 
water. Moreover, the Kanda Josui’s water was not enough, so it was 
suggested that water should be taken from the Kanda Josui from the 
Shakujiigawa River. However, there were two factors that made the plan 
impossible. Firstly, the elevations of these waterworks were not appropriate 
to make the plan work, or there was simply not enough water for this scale 
of work. The other factor was cost – it was just too expensive. Some also 
pointed out that many rice fields needed to be destroyed to deliver this plan.  
  The third plan was to regulate reservoirs. If there were many regulating 
reservoirs along the Tamagawa Josui waterworks and leave muddy water in 
them for a while, the water would be clear as the mud would be settled out. 
And then clear water could be brought back to the Tamagawa Josui. This 
plan again was abandoned because many newly created rice fields needed 
to be destroyed. It is, however, a very interesting plan because the idea is 
very similar to modern waterworks.14 It was in 1898 when a similar idea 
turned into reality in Tokyo.    
  The fourth plan was to dredge mud in the upper courses of the Tamagawa 
River. The Shogunate came up with this first and attempted to carry it out 
with other plans.  
  Throughout the process of discussing plans and identifying action, reports 
were made to the Shogun and indeed his advice was sometimes sought too. 
Thus the Shogunate looked into a number of options to make the Tamagawa 
Josui waterworks clear in the autumn of 1742, but meanwhile the Tamagawa 
River’s water was becoming clearer, so the Shogunate decided to see how 
things would go.  
  One thing that is obvious in this process is that the senior ministers of the 
Shogunate as well as the Shogun himself had no issue at all with changing 
the natural environment according to their needs, showing some kind of 
developmentalism.   
 
5. The damage to villages in the Okutama Valley and relief measures 
  Villages in the Okutama Valley were severely affected by the landslides. 
Villages and their main agricultural land should have been in relatively flat, 
 
14 Toyoyuki Sabata, The watersupply as a thought: cultural history of cities and water (Chuko 
Shinsho, 1996).  
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narrow areas above the valley, and it appears that the landslides were large-
scale and affected these areas. At the moment, however, little is known 
about these landslides because there is not enough research based on 
primary evidence. What is clear is that large parts of these agricultural areas 
were exempt from land tax. In this year, 32 per cent of the land tax in the K 
village was exempt. These villages produced lacquer, but in October 1742, 
they lost on average 28 per cent of the lacquer production in weight. In the 
three villages in the upper courses, the figures went up to 36 per cent.  
  Sweetfish fishing was also another main income for the villages. But the 
landslides seem to have changed the geography in this part of the valley, 
creating a waterfall in the middle of it. The water still remained muddy too. 
Therefore sweetfish stopped coming up the river above the waterfall, and 
the number of the fish dropped significantly below it too.  
  The damage caused by the landslides was such that the villages requested 
a reduction in land tax payment and also emergency loans of food, which 
was approved by the local governor. In the T village in the north of Hikawa, 
a sixth of land was exempt from land tax in 1743, one year after the disaster. 
The three villages in the upper course of the river got a reduction of land tax 
by around 59 per cent in terms of square measure in 1744. In the K village 
in the middle of the river, 90 people received loans of food worth 10 ryo 3 
mon to pay back in five-yearly installments. People in the village of Hamura 
got an extension of their payment for previously borrowed food, while 24 
households of peasants got food loans which they would pay off in 
installments for seven years.  
  The villages also requested the Shogunate to pay for dredging work in each 
village. Peasants in the villages were expected to be employed and villages 
thought that would help them financially. There is evidence in Hamura that 
the money was actually paid to those who did the dredging work and also 
that the villagers helped each other.  
  The 1743 flooding thus caused significant damage to villages in the 
Okutama Valley. The Shogunate responded to requests from the affected 
villages and provided relief measures such as land tax reduction and food 
loans. It is also clear, as will be discussed in the next section, that the 
dredging work to clear the river’s water created employment opportunities 
for the people in the Valley and was regarded as part of the Shogunate’s 




6. The dredging work in the Okutama Valley  
  The river water in the Okutama Valley remained muddy in the following 
year, and two floods in the beginning of summer made it even muddier. 
Therefore it was decided that the fourth plan as discussed above would be 
put in place.  
  In 1743, experimental dredging work was undertaken at a point near the 
village of Hamura which was where the Tamagawa Josui waterworks started. 
The point was around 1.6 and 2 kilometer long and in the upper courses of 
the river. The work was not to actually get rid of mud and debris from the 
riverbed but, but to wash them away in the river. The water became clear as 
a result. The success was reported to Edo with a wooden bottle of “clean” 
water. The water was even checked by a senior minister of the Shogunate.  
  After this experimental work, the actual dredging work took place between 
1 May and 29 July 1744. The washing away of mud and debris was 
undertaken from the H village to Hamura, nearly 64 kilometer long. Details 
of how the work was carried out are unknown. There is evidence that in 
Hikawa in the upper courses of the river some water control facility was 
used, so this means that the control facility stopped the water like a dam, 
and possibly a large amount of water would be released with a view to 
washing mud away. For this task, workers needed to be in deep water and 
sometimes get wet up to their chest, so skilled labour was used. For other 
related tasks, people from the local villages were employed and got paid for 
the work.  
  The estimated cost was over 3,000 ryo, although the actual expenditure 
was just 1,000 ryo. The money was collected from those in Edo who used 
water from the Tamagawa Josui waterworks. This was how the waterworks’ 
usual maintenance cost was covered.  
  Throughout the process, what is particularly interesting is the Shogunate’s 
pursuit of the “cleanliness” of the water. This is probably because the 
Tamagawa Josui waterworks provided water for the centre of Edo castle 
where the Shogun lived.  
  The idea that the Tamagawa Josui waterwork’s water needed to be clean 
was shared by people in the villages near the village of Hamura, where the 
waterworks took water in. In 1836, for example, in the N village, five 
kilometer in the upper courses from the Hamura village, there was a public 
notice that fishing should not cause any problem for the waterworks. 
Reports sent from Hamura to the landlord explaining the situation of the 
village in detail also said that: “We pay very close attention to the quality of 
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water here because it goes into the Tamagawa Josui waterworks.” 
Interestingly, in 1832, when a drowned body was found in the upper courses 
from Hamura, a prayer was organized. This indicates that the sense of 
kegare (defilent) was behind the notion that the waterworks’ water should 
be clean. The waterwork’s water was used to look after the Shogun, who 
must be protected from any form of impurity, and therefore every effort was 
made to make and keep the water clean.  
 
Conclusions 
  The urban space of Edo was often affected by flooding. It was because the 
city itself was artificial nature, built a result of re-shaping the natural 
environment such as water engineering to change rivers’ courses and 
creating and maintaining waterworks. The typhoon, a natural phenomenon, 
in 1742 brought severe flooding to Edo and caused landslides in the 
Okutama Valley. In the city, the Shogunate and the civil society provided 
relief measures so the city would return to its normal state. At the same time, 
the landslides destroyed agricultural land and disrupted fishing business. 
The Shogunate responded to the situation and provided relief measures, 
whilst at the same time villages helped themselves. The mud and debris of 
the landslides, however, kept the Tamagawa River muddy and therefore the 
Tamagawa Josui waterworks remained murky. This represents the 
imperfectness of artificial nature. The muddy water was regarded as 
inappropriate for the use of the Shogun’s living space. Whilst at the same 
time, it seems to have been recognised as the cause of health issues for Edo’s 
citizens. It is possible to argue that this was a problem for the human body 
as “inner nature”. Discussions around this issue contain many elements of 
reshaping of the natural environment and developmentalism, with some 
providing the basis for the modern civil engineering. As a result of the 
discussions, however, the dredging work was carried out to wash the mud 
way in the upper courses of the Tamagawa River. Therefore the action taken 
by the Shogunate was very typically early-modern indeed. This work 
created employment opportunities for people in the local area whose 
livelihood had been affected by the landslides, and they regarded this as 
beneficial. As a result of the work, the water of the Tamagawa Josui 
waterworks regained its “cleanliness”. Human intervention in the natural 
environment helped artificial nature return to its normal state.  
  The whole situation and process initiated by the typhoon in 1743 was 
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repeated in 1859. In the Okutama Valley, thick layers of sediment were up 
to three meters high around the T village and water flowed upon the 
sediment, whilst mud was flowing downward. In the T village, the waterfall 
that had appeared in 1742 disappeared. The mud in the valley made the 
Tamagawa River muddy and therefore the Tamagawa Josui waterworks was 
murky too. Learning from the case of the 1744 dredging, similar work was 
undertaken.   
  After 1898, more modern waterworks system was gradually established in 
Edo, and clean water became accessible to its citizens. From the viewpoint 
of the state and urban administration, it was one of the means to turn humans 
into bodies of a modern nation. Cleanliness was one of the key words of the 
hygienic system of the modern nation state.  However, recent studies show 
that people’s perception and behavior around cleanliness was extremely 
varied and complex. For instance, in terms of opinions for or against 
cremation, both sides of the debate use the idea of ”cleanliness”.15 There are 
even cases where the concept of cleanliness which was based on disinfection 
and originated from Europe was understood to be connected to the 
traditional idea of defilement in Japan.  
  The enlargement of modern cities created three problems that are relevant 
to this paper. The first is water shortage. This problem was addressed by 
undertaking an even larger-scale reshaping of the natural environment. The 
second is the deterioration of the quality of water. To deal with this, the most 
up-to-date technologies available at the time have been used and nowadays 
people use highly artificial water that is cleaned through an advanced water 
purification method using ozone and biological activated carbon.16 The third 
problem is housing development of flood-prone areas. This problem became 
acute during natural disasters, a point just proven by the typhoon 19 in 2019.  
 
15 Hitonari Ishii, ”The formation of the idea of cleanliness and the modernisation of medicine”, 
in Historical Society on Meiji Restoration (ed), Lecture Series Meiji Restoration, vol. 10: 
Meiji Restoration and the ideas and the society (Yushisha, 2016); ibid., ”The discourse 
of ’cleanliness’ in the year Meiji I: the debate on banning cremation”, The Journal of the 
Historical Science Society of Japan, 808 (2007).  





The Deluge of Istanbul in 1563:  









    With the growing public concerns over the environment in the last 
several decades, historians have recently paid greater attention to natural 
disasters than before. In particular, since the Great East Japan Earthquake 
on 11th March 2011, Japanese historians have highlighted the importance 
of historical studies on natural disasters such as earthquakes. 
    At the same time, historians of the Ottoman Empire have just started to 
follow this trend. Despite the length and breadth of Ottoman history, 
which covers over 620 years from its establishment in north-western 
Anatolia to its abolishment in 1922 in the aftermath of the World War I 
and also vast territory including parts of Asia, Africa and Europe, only 
limited amount of works, with a few notable exceptions, has been done on 
its history of natural disasters. 
    Even when historians of the Ottoman Empire look at the subject, their 
interest has focused only on earthquakes, primarily because Turkey, 
which was the central part of the empire, experienced a number of 
earthquakes, like Japan. For instance, out of the nineteen articles in 
Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.), Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire, 
Rethymnon, 1999, which is one of the few examples in Ottoman historical 
studies that treated natural disasters as the main subject, as many as 
fourteen examined earthquakes. 
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    Needless to say, however, earthquakes were not the only kind of natural 
disasters that occurred in the Ottoman Empire. Large-scale floods also 
caused as significant damage to the society as great earthquakes. In 
particular, a flood in 1563 that hit Istanbul, which was the imperial capital 
at that time, had a devastating impact on the city and its surrounding areas. 
Featured in the opening part of Tarih-i Selâniki, a famous sixteenth- 
century chronicle by Mustafa Selaniki, the flood is well known as “the 
Deluge of Istanbul in 1563” among historians of the sixteenth-century 
Ottoman Empire, but no historian has looked into this important natural 
disaster.1 
    Since there was no big river in and around the capital, one would 
naturally ask why and how such a large flood occurred in Istanbul. 
Without any water source nearby, the city depended on a vast network of 
aqueducts which provided water from its rural hinterland. So how was it 
affected by the deluge? This paper, using contemporary and historical 
documents as primary sources, aims to answer these questions with a view 
to drawing historical lessons out of what happened and to presenting some 
comparative perspective for international historical studies of urban 
natural disasters. 
 
I. The Ottoman Empire and Istanbul in the late sixteenth century 
    In the late sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was reaching its 
zenith under Süleyman I (1494-1566), who was hailed as “il magnifico” 
by contemporary Europeans. At the end of his reign, Süleyman I extended 
the empire’s territory which included Ukraine in the north and Yemen and 
Ethiopia in the south, whilst, in the east, obtaining western parts of Iran 
from the Safavid dynasty and, in the west, edging closer to Vienna, which 
was the Hapsburg stronghold. 
    The Byzantine Empire, which had dominated the Mediterranean region 
throughout the Middle Ages, had collapsed after Mehmed II (1432-81), 
who was the great-grandfather of Süleyman I, conquered its capital 
Constantinople in 1453. At the same time, Mehmed II made 
Constantinople the new capital of the Ottoman Empire and quickly 
restored it from the damage caused during the decline of the Byzantine 
 
1 Çeçen, Kazım has mentioned the deluge of Istanbul in 1563 and its impact on the capital’s 
sewage system in Çeçen, Kazım, İstanbul’un Osmanlı Dönemi Suyolları, İstanbul, 2001, 43-
47. 
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Empire and also by the Ottoman attack. By the end of the fifteenth 
century, Constantinople established itself as a thriving imperial capital.2 
    However, Istanbul was hit by a devastating earthquake in 1509, only 56 
years later after the Ottoman conquest. The extent of the damage was such 
that it was described as “Kıyamet-i suǧra”, the end of the world, in a 
chronicle, but it appears that the empire’s centralized administration 
helped the capital recover from the damage relatively quickly.3 
    By the mid-sixteenth century, having recovered from damages caused 
by wars and natural disasters, Istanbul developed into the capital of the 
mighty Ottoman Empire, becoming the centre of politics, economy and 
culture of the Middle East and the Mediterranean regions. However, the 
capital struggled to feed the rapidly increasing population, ending up with 
constant food scarcity,4 whilst a great number of its migrants causing 
urban problems such as difficulty of keeping the peace.5 
 
II: The Deluge of Istanbul in 1563 
    The Deluge hit Istanbul in the midst of its rapid and complicated 
development into a thriving imperial capital. One might think that the 
flood was caused by overflow of water from a big river, but, as it has been 
pointed out, there was no big river in and around Istanbul. So what caused 
this flood? 
    The direct cause of this flood was heavy rain between 19th and 20th 
September 1563 (the end of Muḥarram and the beginning of Ṣafar 971 in 
the Hijri year)6. At the same time, its wider background appears to have 
been cooling of climate and an overall increase of rainfall in the 
 
2 For recovery measures taken by Mehmed II, Kayoko Hayashi, “The establishment of 
Istanbul as the new Ottoman capital”, in Toru Horikawa (ed.), Islam spreading across the 
world (Tokyo, 1995), 304-45 (in Japanese). This paper calls the city Istanbul, but its name 
changed throughout the Ottoman period. For instance, it was called Kostantiniyye (Ottoman 
spelling of Constantinople) or Der Saadet, which means where the peace lies. 
3 For the earthquake that hit Istanbul in 1509 and the capital’s recovery from it, Kazuaki 
Sawai, “The earthquake of Istanbul in 1509 and Subsequent recovery”, Mediterranean 
World, no.22, Tokyo, 2015, 29-42. 
4 Kazuaki Sawai, “Food provision in Istanbul in the late sixteenth century”, in Research 
Institute for Humanity and Nature, metropolis projects – reports from Whole Earth Urban 
Historical Research Seminar, 4, 2011, 13-31(in Japanese). 
5 Kazuaki Sawai, “Migration to Istanbul in the late sixteenth century and measures towards 
it”, Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies, 23-1, 2007, 175-195 (in Japanese). 
6 It begins its count from 622 AD, the year of the migration of Muhammad and his followers 
from Mecca to Medina. This paper uses H. for a Hijri year. 
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Mediterranean region from the mid-sixteenth century.7 
    The Ottoman Empire was at the end of the long Süleyman’s reign. 
According to Tarih-i Selâniki, Süleyman I was hunting in Halkalı, a valley 
in Istanbul’s outskirts in the morning of 19th September 1563. Sensing 
the severity of rain, Süleyman I and his entourage left the valley and 
headed for a villa in Ayastefanos8 on the southern coast. However, due to 
the heavy rain, they had to stay in the villa and were unable to go back to 
the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul. 
    In the afternoon on the following day, the villa was swallowed by a 
torrent which was overflowing from the Halkalı valley towards the sea. 
Süleyman I, who was 69 years old, failing to escape from the villa, almost 
drowned in his room but was rescued by a servant who was tall and strong 
enough to get him on a chest of drawers. 
    Around the same time, in Belgrad Ormani,9 a forest with many rivers 
and lakes, 55 km north of Istanbul, there occurred a large-scale flood 
caused by severe rain. Tarih-i Selâniki describes the heavy rain and floods 
in detail: 
    In the Monday morning of the end of Muḥarram and the beginning of 
Ṣafar H.971, Ｈis Imperial Majesty, admired as the refuge of the world, 
went to the valley of Halkalı for hunting. Having seen signs of rain, he 
hurried himself to the İskender Çelebi garden in a village near the sea 
known as Aya Stefanoz. The moment he was about to sit down in the 
garden, the sky and stars suddenly changed their look, causing dreadful 
roaring thunders and blinding lightning strikes all over the horizon which 
had never been seen or heard in the past. 
    The gigantic storm kept the severe rain coming down constantly 
throughout the day and night. There were 74 lightning strikes. After the 
time of afternoon worship, a flood came out of the valley of Halkalı like 
a tsunami, sweeping all the people and animals in its way. 
 
7  Some scientists call the cooling of this period “Little Ice Age''. See Kazuaki Sawai, 
“Climate change and the Ottoman Empire: the cooling of the climate during ‘Little Ice 
Age’”, in Tsukasa Mizushima (ed.), Environment and historical studies (supplement for Asia 
Yuugaku 136), Tokyo, 2010, 143-53 (in Japanese). 
8 25 km west of Istanbul, Ayastefanos is known as the place where the Treaty of San Stefano 
was signed, which ended the Russo-Turkish War that started in 1867. Today the town is 
called Yeşilköy, where Istanbul Atatürk International Airport is located. 
9 The forest was named after Belgrade in Serbia. It is believed that many migrants from 
Belgrade lived there. See Yalıtırık, Faik, ʻʻBelgrad Ormanı,’’ Dünden Bügüne İstanbul 
Ansiklopedisi, vol.2, İstanbul, 1994, pp.147-150. 
 165 
    The flood surrounded the İskender Çelebi garden and came into the 
saray, almost destroying it from its foundation. His Imperial Majesty, 
admired as the refuge of the world, was carried on the shoulders of a well-
built servant and put on a chest of drawers to escape the troubles. … 
    At night, the flood, carrying all the debris and rubble in it, filled the 
arches of the newly-built aqueduct with them, turning all the valleys into 
the sea, whilst muddy water ran on the aqueduct and destroyed it. The 
aqueduct, known as Maǧlava, collapsed overnight with a dreadful, 
apocalyptic noise. And other aqueducts were swallowed by the sea-like 
flood. Those tall plane trees in Kağıthane turned into a summit of debris 
and rubble. The flood, passing Kağıthane, reached the town of sacred Ebu 
Eyyûb el-Ensarî, invading the holiest mosque, where the water came up 
to as high as one zira. 
    The flood, not contained in the port of Golden Horn and the Galata 
straits, destroyed city walls and houses along the coast, turning them into 
ruins. Only very well built houses survived. Around the palace cape, 
where the current is normally very fast, the colour of the sea was different 
for over a week. The bridges in Silivri, in the Great and Litte Çekmece 
Lakes and in the Halkalı valley, however strong and well built, were 
unable to withstand the power and shock of the flood and turned into 
ruins.10 
    A closer look at Tarih-i Selâniki shows that the heavy rain that caused 
the flood started on 19th September 1563 – normally at the end of summer 
in Istanbul. The capital and its surrounding areas are in a so-called 
Mediterranean climate zone, and while they are free from typhoons or 
hurricanes, they are occasionally hit by low-pressure and severe weather. 
For instance, Istanbul was hit by low-pressure on 9th September 2009. 
    The rain which continued from 19th September 1563 over a day and a 
night appears to have caused floods in two separate areas near Istanbul. 
The overflow of water in the Halkalı valley became a rapid torrent, 
heading towards south, and reached the Sea of Marmara. It was this torrent 
which affected Süleyman I, who was staying in a villa for shelter. 
    The severe and constant rain triggered another large-scale flood in the 
Belgrade Forest in the north of Istanbul. As in the Halkalı valley, a huge 
amount of rainwater turned into strong currents that flowed downwards 
towards the sea and destroyed new bridges in their path which had been 
 
10 Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, (Mehmet İpşirli, ed.,) Tarih-i Selaniki, vol.1, İstanbul, 1989, p.1f. 
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built to provide water for Istanbul. It appears that these currents carried 
debris and rubble in them as they destroyed well-built stone bridges and 
also as some historical documents sources show. 
    These currents passed through the Kağıthane district and reached Eyüp, 
a holy place at the rearmost part of Golden Horn. The water flooded a 
sacred temple there, reaching as high as 75 cm. The currents flowed into 
Golden Horn, creating storm surges that swept and destroyed houses along 
the coast, and out towards Boshporus Strait. The flood changed the colour 
of the sea for over a week. This is the second flood caused by the severe 
weather. 
    Tarih-i Selâniki also shows that the heavy rain and so-called “drift 
effect” produced storm surges not only in Golden Horn but also along the 
coast of the Sea of Marmara. This is probably why bridges in Silivri, 67 
km west of Istanbul, and Çekmece Lakes, also in the west of Istanbul, 
which connected Europe and the capital, were severely damaged or 
destroyed. 
    Tarih-i Selâniki described the deluge in 1563 which did significant 
damage to Istanbul as “Afet-i semavi” (divine disaster).11 At the same 
time, it was referred as “tufan-ı seyl”, a deluge like Noah’s Flood in the 
Book of Genesis of the Old Testament, in Süleyman I’s decree to 
reconstruct the capital after the deluge in Mühimme Defteri, a collection 
of copies of imperial decrees.12 These descriptions show that the deluge 
and its damage were seen as unprecedented at that time. 
    Moreover, the deluge’s damage and impact were long-lasting. Istanbul 
failed to cope with a huge amount of rainwater, but ironically, it was 
affected by severe and long-term scarcity of water in the aftermath of the 
deluge. This water-supply problem resulted from the destruction of 
Belgrade Forrest aqueducts by one of the two floods caused by the heavy 
rain. 
    As has been pointed out, Istanbul depended on a vast network of 
aqueducts which provided water from its rural hinterland since the Roman 
times when the capital was called Constantinople. Extensive water pipes 
were laid down, and aqueducts sent water from rural areas over hills and 
valleys to the city.13 This water-supply system was severely damaged by 
the deluge of Istanbul in 1563. 
 
11 Selaniki, op cit., p.3. 
12 MD6:548, 555. 
13 For Istanbul’s water-supply system, see Çeçen, op. cit. 
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III. The restoration of Istanbul in the midst of water scarcity 
    Little is known about what kind of activities were undertaken to recover 
from the flood’s damage in the Kağıthane district, where plane trees were 
submerged under the water, and in Eyüp, which was on the other side of 
the Kağıthane district in Gold Horn, where its sacred mosque and 
mausoleum was flooded with the water level rising up to 75cm high inside 
it. It is also unclear how houses along the coast of Golden Horn that were 
destroyed by storm surges were restored. As will be discussed below in 
detail, most of the contemporary accounts describe how aqueducts outside 
Istanbul were re- built. This appears to suggest that the impact of the 
destruction of aqueducts and the scarcity of water caused by it was felt 
most serious and long-lasting in Istanbul, which had been developing from 
a city into a metropolis in this very period. 
    E.12005 document kept at the Topkapı Palace Museum Archives 
describe how three of the six aqueducts in the Belgrade Forest which 
provided water to Istanbul, including the Mağlava Aqueduct referred in 
Tarih-i Selâniki, were destroyed by the 1563 flood in detail: 
    These are six aqueducts in total, and the flood didn’t damage three of 
them. The other three were destroyed. One of the three surviving 
aqueducts was the Güzelce Aqueduct, another the Kovak Aqueduct and 
the other the Orta Aqueduct. The flood exposed the foundations of the 
Güzelce and Kovak aqueducts, but there was no damage. 
    One of the destroyed aqueducts was the Mağlava Aqueduct, another the 
Uzun Aqueduct and the other the Ayvad Aqueduct. Four of the arches on 
one end of the Mağlava Aqueduct survived, so did two on the other end, 
but the arches in the middle were all gone. All the water flowing through 
the aqueduct gathered there. 
    Fifteen of the arches on one end of the Uzun Aqueduct survived, and 
two of them were damaged by lightning strikes. But they didn’t collapse. 
On the other end, five arches survived, so did sixteen arches in between. 
Twelve arches between the surviving fifteen and sixteen ones were 
destroyed, so were two in between the sixteen and five surviving arches. 
    The Ayvad Aqueduct had one arch, where a big tree carried by the flood 
was stuck, and, as a result, the flood went over the aqueduct and destroyed 
all the middle part of it, with some of pillars on either end left surviving.14 
 
14 Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi (The Topkapı Palace Museum Archives), E.12005. 
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    According to Tarih-i Selâniki, immediately after it stopped raining, 
Süleyman I visited the sites of these aqueducts with his entourage. Aiming 
to rebuild destroyed aqueducts quickly, he made Mimar Sinan15, who was 
Hassa Mimar Başı (principal court architect), in charge of engineering and 
also Piyale Paşa16, Kaptan-ı Derya (commander-in-chief of the navy), and 
Ali Aǧa17, Yeniçeri Aǧası (commander-in-chief of the Janissary corps), in 
charge of obtaining labourers. The Janissary infantry, which formed the 
core part of the standing army, employed a number of cadets called Acemi 
oǧlanı, who did miscellaneous duties. The navy also kept many prisoners 
and criminals in order to use them as rowers in galleys which formed the 
navy’s main squadron at that time. It appears that the Ottoman 
government mobilised these labourers effectively with a view to quickly 
rebuilding the severely damaged water-supply system. Tarih-i Selâniki 
describes how the rebuilding project was carried out in detail: 
    In the meantime, in order to restore the peace, the emperor paid a visit 
to all the aqueducts that were destroyed with all of his great ministers 
among all the senior government officials and, granting a robe of honour 
to Sinan Aǧa, who was the chief of architects (ser-mimaran) and the best 
architect of the time, ordered, “I am prepared to permit you to spend 
whatever is needed to rebuild aqueducts in a most suitable method or 
otherwise”. He also ordered, “To make captains, irregular soldiers and 
rowers under the command of Admiral Piyale Paşa and the strongest 
among craftsmen and cadets of the Janissary infantry work in rotation and 
make sure they make the utmost effort to complete the repair work. Also 
to promote them according to the rules and grant them ranks and honours”. 
With this edict, the provision of materials and parts for reconstructing the 
aqueducts started immediately with the utmost effort. 
 
15 Sinan Aǧa (1489?-1588), known as Mimar Sinan was one of the most celebrate architects 
of the Ottoman Empire. He served three emperors including Süleyman I as Hassa Mimar 
Başı and is believed to have built over 450 buildings including Süleymaniye Mosque 
throughout his long career. 
16 Piyale Paşa (1515-78), originally from Croatia, served as Kaptan-ı Derya (commander-in-
chief of the navy) for over 14 years and was later promoted from the third minister to the 
second. 
17 According to Robert Anhegger, who examined Menakıb-ı Sultan Süleyman presented by 
Eyyubi, Ali Aǧa, who was Yeniçeri Aǧası (commander-in-chief of the Janissary corps) at 
that time, was later promoted to Kaptan-ı Derya, and he was Muezzinzade Ali Paşa (d.1571) 
who died in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. See Anhegger, Robert, ʻʻEyyubi’nin Menakıb-ı 
Sultan Süleyman’ı,’’ Tarih Dergisi, no.1-1, 1949, pp.137. 
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Rabī‘ al-awwal in H.971 (from 10 October to 17 November 1563).18 
    This description shows that specially selected strong men were 
deployed to repair the aqueducts in rotation, day and night. As it cites “I 
am prepared to permit you to spend whatever is needed”, which is 
believed to be Süleyman I’s own word, a vast amount of money was spent 
on the repair work. According to Çeçen, the repair of the destroyed part 
of the aqueduct system cost 9,791,144 akçe in total. The cost of building 
the whole system was 40,263,063 akçe, so the cost of the repair work 
amounted to almost one fourth of the building cost.19 
    Despite the large amount of money spent and labour deployed, the 
repair of the three destroyed aqueducts and also of the water supply system 
was not something that could be completed immediately. Therefore in the 
summer of 1564, one year after the flood, the water supply to Istanbul was 
not fully restored yet. According to Tarih-i Selâniki, Istanbul saw severe 
water shortage during the heat wave and was unable to provide enough 
water for its population. As a result, the water price went up as high as 15 
akçe per bag of water brought in from the city’s hinterland, but people 
rushed to buy that expensive water.20 
    At the same time, Mühimme Defteri contains an edict on 13 December 
1564, more than a year and three months after the flood, to provide 
architects and joiners from the Rumelia area of the Ottoman Empire such 
as Adrianople (Edirne) and Thessaloniki (Selanik) for the repair of 
aqueducts in Istanbul.21 Another edict dated on the same day ordered to 
the governor-general in Egypt that he send 150 labourers (hammal) to 
Istanbul to help carry stones and woods for the repair of aqueducts.22 In 
fact, Anhegger quotes evidence from Menakıb-ı Sultan Süleyman which 
shows that the repair work was finally completed in the year of H.972 
(August and July 1565).23 Considering the fact that an edict to repair 
aqueducts was issued in late December 1564, it appears that the water 
supply system started working again around spring or early summer in 
1565. 
    While the recovery from the flood progressed slowly, there was some 
 
18 Selaniki, op. cit., p.2f. 
19 Çeçen, op. cit. p.47f. 
20 Selaniki, op. cit., p.3. 
21 MD6: 477. 
22 MD6: 555. 
23 Anhegger, op. cit., p.137. 
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kind of limit to Istanbul’s flood prevention. Due to the lack of a big river 
in the city, prevention of flood caused by heavy rain required large-scale 
construction works such as creating regulating ponds and also building 
check dams to prevent debris flows. The coastal areas of the city also 
needed large-scale embankments to avoid damages from storm surges. 
    However, in the Ottoman Empire in the late sixteenth century, it was 
not easy to carry out such flood prevention measures that required high 
levels of engineering skills. 
    Therefore Istanbul, mainly its districts in lower parts of the city, still 
suffered from floods after the Deluge of 1563. Mühimme Defteri contains 
a record of a flood in Istanbul on 5 January1579, more than 15 years after 
1563. It shows that the damage caused by this flood was not as devastating 
as the Deluge of 1563, but districts in Istanbul’s lower parts were flooded 
and an edict ordered that drain gutters in these parts be widened to prevent 
flooding in future.24 As this edict suggests, the Ottoman government could 
only undertake basic flood prevention measures such as widening and 
clearing drain gutters. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
    This paper examined the Deluge of Istanbul in 1563 by utilising 
primary sources. It showed that the heavy rain that started on 19th 
September 1563 caused two separate floods in Halkalı and the Belgrad 
Forest, both of which were in the capital’s outskirts. It also showed that 
the damage along the coast of Golden Horn and the Sea of Marmara was 
probably worsened by storm surges, contrary to the accepted explanation 
that the damage was caused just by the flood. 
    Although there are a limited amount of primary sources which help 
understand how Istanbul recovered from the flood’s damage, the capital’s 
repair works were carried out in the midst of water scarcity caused by the 
destruction of its water supply system. The Ottoman Empire concentrated 
its resources on the capital’s recovery and spent a vast sum of money to 
rebuild the water supply system by deploying labourers in rotation and 
continuing the work ceaselessly. 
    However, repairing all the three aqueducts that were destroyed by the 
flood was no easy task, even with the genius of Mimar Sinan, known as 
the best architect of the time. Not until before the summer of 1565, two 
 
24 MD36: 55. 
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Storms, Flooding and the 




In this paper I want to focus in particular on the impact of storms and 
flooding on London – especially on the important economic hinterland of 
the Thames estuary, which lay between the city itself and the sea. To begin 
with, though, I would like to set the scene with some discussion of London’s 
development and especially its relationship to the river Thames and the 
Thames estuary. 
 
1. London’s geographical situation  
Medieval London, a great commercial city, owed its very existence and 
prosperity to water, especially that of the river Thames. The city was 
established by the Romans in the first century AD by the banks of the River 
Thames: the Romans built the first set of City walls, and the line of the walls 
remained approximately the same throughout the middle ages and into the 
early modern period. The topography of the River Thames and its north and 
south banks were crucial in determining where London was founded. The 
city was founded at the lowest crossing point of the Thames – along the 
north/south routes built by the Romans – and on a well-drained site where a 
bridge could be built. Most of the land south of the river was vulnerable to 
flooding, as I’ll discuss later: this meant that there was only limited 
development on the south side by the bridge and along the river front on that 
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side for many centuries. The walled Roman city – Londinium – was 
therefore situated entirely to the north of the river.1 
The City was abandoned for a while after the fall of the Roman empire, 
but it was reoccupied in the ninth century when the city walls were rebuilt 
in exactly the same place. The walls enclosed what became the medieval 
City of London, with gradually expanding suburbs lying beyond these walls. 
We can see the City walls again here in a 13th century image, which and 
captures some of the most important features of London: the City wall and 
its gates, St Pauls’ Cathedral, but it also shows the river Thames at the top 
–and it is clear that the river had great practical as well as symbolic 
importance.  
The medieval bridge over the Thames occupied virtually the same site as 
its Roman predecessor – which has been made of wood - and was one of the 
most obvious and powerful symbols of London. This was especially so from 
the late twelfth century onwards, when it was rebuilt in stone in an operation 
closely associated with the growth of the citizens' collective identity and of 
their communal government under the mayor. The rebuilding of the bridge, 
and the creation of an endowment to maintain it, was perhaps the most 
impressive enterprise undertaken by the citizens of medieval London.2 
The bridge was a vital strategic connecting point – economically and 
politically. It was part of important north-south inland trading routes which 
had originally been established in the Roman period. It was the only 
crossing point of the River Thames in London until 1750 when Westminster 
Bridge was built. It also had to function as part of London’s defences. So 
the bridge was an important symbol of London’s power and independence. 
The bridge was also a significant barrier in another sense, and this brings 
me on to the main theme of this paper. The Thames is a tidal river for much 
 
1 For the topography of Roman London see M.D. Lobel (ed.) The British Atlas of Historic 
Towns III: London c. 1520 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).  Much, however, has 
recently been discovered about the Roman City, and some of the latest archaeological 
findings are included in Lacey M. Wallace, The Origin of Roman London (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
2 A useful summary of the building and history of medieval London Bridge can be found at 
"Introduction." London Bridge: Selected Accounts and Rentals, 1381-1538. Eds. Vanessa 
Harding, and Laura Wright. London: London Record Society, 1995. vii-xxix. British History 
Online. Web. 28 June 2019. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/london-record-soc/vol31/vii-
xxix. [date accessed: 20 June 2019]. 
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of its length – and indeed it has a large tidal range, about 7 metres today. 
The tidal flow of the Thames was an important factor in determining its 
construction: as you can see from the images, it was built on a large number 
of stone ‘starlings’ which had to be extremely strong to withstand the forces 
of the tides. One of the consequences of this was that large ships could not 
travel beyond the Bridge, so as a result the area below the Bridge became 
associated with the Port of London and was where institutions such as the 
Customs House were set up. Eventually, in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries the needs of much larger ships meant that the dockyards had to 
move further down river to new London industrial suburbs such as Wapping 
and Shadwell. In broad terms, then, the position and nature of London 
Bridge had a very significant effect on the character of those areas of 
London that were above and below it.3 
With this context in mind, I now want to turn to the main part of the paper, 
where I want to talk about the relationship between London and its estuarine 
hinterland – and the relationship between climate, geography and 
economics. This was the subject of a research project which ran in London 
at the Centre for Metropolitan History which looked at the impact of 
flooding in the Thames estuary.4  
 
2. The Estuarine Zone of the Thames 
Within the estuarine zone, the various land-uses and environments 
complemented one another, and changes in one habitat impacted upon the 
others. This was a highly dynamic environment, subject to rapid and radical 
change in response to both natural and human stimuli. 
The primary concern of those who ruled London was with trade, fishing, 
maintaining the flow of the Thames, and mitigating the impact of serious 
flooding on the economic hinterland as well as the city itself. It is significant 
that by the early twelfth century London’s rulers in fact controlled the 
 
3 Work by Derek Morris in particular has helped to chart the development of the eastern 
suburbs of London and the docks in the 17th and 18th centuries: e.g. D. Morris and K. 
Cozens, ‘The Shadwell Waterfront in the Eighteenth Century’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 99 
(2013), 86-91.  
4 See https://www.history.ac.uk/projects/research/tidal-thames [date accessed: 20 June 2019]. 
The project was directed by Dr James A. Galloway and ran from 2008-10, funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council, award ref. RES-000-22-2693. 
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Thames far beyond the small extent of its territorial jurisdiction, which as 
we have seen was limited to the walled city and its immediate suburbs on 
the north bank. Upstream, London's authority extended some forty miles (65 
km.) to Staines, presumably because the royal reeves responsible for the city 
were also, as sheriffs, responsible for the county of Middlesex. Downstream 
the jurisdiction extended thirty-eight miles (61 km.) to Yantlet Creek and 
the Medway at the beginning of the Thames estuary. Here control was less 
exclusive, for both citizens and royal officers had an interest in ensuring that 
ships and merchants approaching London from overseas did not land their 
goods at quays other than those in the city.5  
The Thames estuary lay at the heart of the commercialised economy of 
the London region in the middle ages. This was a gateway to the rest of 
England and the wider world beyond, but at the same time served as a highly 
productive and well-connected rural umland, a key part of the supply zone.6 
In this sense The Thames was more than a commercial artery, however, no 
matter how vital. It was also a complex hydrological system, supporting a 
wide variety of ecosystems within and adjacent to the main channel of the 
river. The tidal nature of the river enhanced its value as a trade route, 
allowing larger vessels to penetrate up river, but human intervention had 
influenced the flow and the height of tides through embankment, 
reclamation, bridging and dredging. But it was a region that was (and still 
is) highly vulnerable to environmental conditions and changes.  Londoners 
had strong and varied direct interests in the estuarine zone as merchants, 
fishermen, landlords and tenants of individual marshland holdings, while 
the strategic value of the Thames to the city and the kingdom is shown by 
significant and continuing military investment in water-side fortifications. 
Industries, notably shipbuilding, increasingly clustered in the lower Thames 
area during the later middle ages. The power of the tidal river and its 
 
5 James A. Galloway, ‘‘Tempests of weather and great abundance of water’: the flooding of 
the Barking marshes in the later middle ages’, in M. Davies and J.A. Galloway (eds.) London 
and Beyond: essays in honour of Derek Keene (London: Institute of Historical Research, 
2012), p. 67. 
6 This was explored in earlier projects which focussed on the supply of food and fuel to the 
capital, see J. A. Galloway, D.J. Keene and M. Murphy, ‘Fuelling the City: Production and 
Distribution of Firewood and Fuel in London's Region, 1290-1400’, Economic History 
Review, 49 (2008), 447-72. 
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tributaries was harnessed to process grain by means of tide-mills, recent 
examples of which have been uncovered by archaeologists. Many other 
valuable resources for metropolitan consumption - including meat, cheese 
and wool from animals grazed on the Thames-side marshes, fish from the 
river and marshland creeks, fuel and building materials from the uplands – 
were readily or potentially available within reach of the many small ports or 
hythes of the tidal river and the estuary. 7  
 
3. Flooding in the Thames 
As London grew in importance from 1100 onwards, the estuary became 
more and more intensively managed. The twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries saw widespread embankment and draining of the Thames 
marshlands, and their conversion from tidal saltmarsh, mudflat and back-
fen, exploited for extensive grazing, fishing, fowling and the cutting of reeds 
and rushes, into intensive pasture land and high-yielding arable. Part of 
wider English and European transformation of coastal wetlands, this 
movement can also be seen as an important aspect of agricultural 
intensification within London’s hinterland. This reclaimed land was, 
however, highly vulnerable to flooding, and we can see a similar 
vulnerability in coastal wetlands around the North Sea region. In particular, 
the effects of intensification of land-use, and interventions such as the 
systematic use of embankment, meant that the storage capacity needed to 
accommodate excess flood-water was reduced considerably by the 
fourteenth century. 8 
What is clear is that the later Middle Ages saw repeated flood disasters 
and massive land losses in coastal wetlands: in England, the Low Countries, 
 
7 ‘Introduction’ in J.A. Galloway (ed.) Tides and Floods: New research on London and the 
tidal Thames from the middle ages to the Twentieth century (London: Institute of Historical 
Research, 2010), xi-; for tide mills see D. Goodburn and S. Davis, ‘Two new Thames tide 
mill finds of the 690s 
and 1190s and a brief up-date on archaeological evidence for changing medieval tidal levels’, 
in Tides and Floods, ed. Galloway, pp. 1-13. For the discovery of a medieval tide mill on the 
Thames estuary in 2009 see https://www.mola.org.uk/blog/museum-london-uncover-rare-
medieval-waterwheel [date accessed: 20 June 2019]. 
8 Seem especially S. Rippon, The Transformation of Coastal Wetlands: Exploitation and 
Management of Marshland Landscapes in North West Europe during the Roman and 
Medieval Periods (Oxford, 2000). 
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Northern Germany and Southern Scandinavia thousands of hectares of 
reclaimed land and hundreds of villages were lost to the sea. For instance, 
in the Scheldt Estuary in the present-day province of Zeeland (The 
Netherlands), more than 110 medieval villages were permanently lost 
between the later thirteenth and the early seventeenth century. A series of 
studies have shown that major flooding events became progressively more 
frequent between the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries, before declining 
again thereafter. The extent to which this was the result of increased 
storminess over the North Sea because of increased climatic instability is a 
subject of very active debate: what we have is largely the impact of flooding, 
which is taken as proxy evidence of the actual incidence of storms. The 
interaction between human action and the effects of climate change and 
natural forces is complex, of course: but recent studies have emphasised the 
role of human agency in fostering or hampering the resilience of coastal 
wetlands – cities, towns and communities had at their disposal a range of 
institutions and techniques that could limit the risk of uncontrolled flooding, 
and what we need to do therefore is to study how these were used, and the 
wider socio-economic circumstances which determined this. What is 
becoming clear, however, is that climate change on its own is an insufficient 
explanation for the effects of flooding that we see in the sources.9 
In London, these events can be explored through the records of 
institutions which owned lands along the Thames estuary. Again, we have 
to use proxy evidence – in this case the records of expenditure on 
maintaining walls and drainage. Among the areas most affected were parts 
of the Barking, East Ham and Dagenham marshes, the Isle of Dogs, Erith 
and Lesnes marshes and the marshes around the mouth of the river Medway. 
Using different types of proxy evidence, we can create a pattern of major 
flooding events that closely matches what we can see from similar evidence 
from other North Sea coastal areas. The most serious and wide-ranging 
episodes of surge-related flooding affecting the Thames-side lands occurred 
in the 1280s, 1323-4, 1334, the mid 1370s, 1404, 1421, c.1450, 1477 and 
1530, although many other less severe or more localised floods have been 
 
9 For an important intervention, and summary of the debates and evidence see T. Soens, 
‘Flood Security in the Medieval and Early Modern North Sea Area: A Question of 
Entitlement?’, Environment and History, 19 (2013), pp. 209-22. 
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identified and are not shown on this timeline. Storm surges driving in from 
the North Sea posed a recurrent threat to reclaimed marshlands, as did 
extreme high tides, while intense rainfall could provoke freshwater flooding 
through rapid run-off from adjacent higher ground. 10 
What, then, were the implications for London and its region? And in 
particular, how can we characterise the responses to flooding, given the 
wide variability in human responses across the North Sea region, and these 
complex interactions with environmental events?  
 
4. Multiple Factors Forming Responses to Flooding 
The storm surges certainly had serious implications for London: some of 
its close suburbs, especially south of the river, lay on areas of reclaimed 
marshland – Bermondsey and Southwark in particular. Marshland along the 
Thames estuary and elsewhere was sought after and protected at 
considerable expense because it was potentially highly fertile and when 
drained could provide both rich grazing and high-yielding arable land. An 
effective network of drainage ditches and sluices, together with sufficiently 
high and robust walls along the river front, supplemented by cross-walls to 
compartmentalize the marshes, was therefore essential to minimize the 
threat of damage to the valuable reclaimed lands.  Even in periods when 
storm surges were absent or rare, sea-walls needed to be kept in repair 
against spring tides and ‘normal’ winter storms, while sewers and drainage 
ditches had to be regularly scoured out to counteract silting and prevent 
fresh-water flooding of reclaimed lands. As already mentioned, the evidence 
for this work provides us with our best indications of the frequency and 
seriousness of flooding events in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.11 
Individually, many Londoners owned lands in the Thames marshes, and 
thus faced similar problems to other landholders there in the later middle 
ages. Collectively the citizens of London reacted with concern to many of 
the changes that were occurring. Flooded marshes were seen as a threat to 
navigation through obstruction of the Thames channel, and reduction of 
tidal heights, while weirs in flooded marshes were blamed for the 
destruction of fish stocks. One result of all this was that the jurisdiction of 
 
10 Galloway, ‘”Tempests of weather and great abundance of water”’, pp. 70-71. 
11 Galloway, ‘”Tempests of weather and great abundance of water”’, pp. 70-71. 
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the Mayor over the river was extended to cover flooded ground along the 
tidal Thames – in other words not just the Thames where it ran through the 
City itself. 12  This was a period when rapid reclamation of land by the 
Thames gave way to a much more complicated picture which highlighted 
the connections between wider environmental and economic change, and 
the role of metropolitan demand and commercial organisation in these 
processes. As a result some areas were given back to the sea, while other 
areas were maintained at high cost by the City in the face of regular threats 
from flooding. So here the proxy evidence can be misleading – the lack of 
expenditure, especially later in the period – might just be a result of 
decisions to give up trying to hold back the sea. London’s interests in the 
riverside lands, and in the threat posed to them by marine flooding, seem by 
the close of the middle ages to have become largely confined to the issues 
of navigation and fisheries, whereas at an earlier period the marshlands had 
been important to the city as sources of agrarian produce – grain, meat, wool 
and dairy produce. This change reflects wider changes in economy and 
society after the Black Death, and in particular from the 1370s, when 
collapsing demand for bulk agricultural produce was translated into long-
term price falls. At the same time, wages were inexorably rising with labour 
scarcer, with serious consequences for the profitability of the Thames-side 
marshes – and indeed the availability of labour to assist with flood 
protection. All of this points to what one historian has called a ‘general crisis, 
socio-economic as much as environmental’ along the Thames estuary.13 In 
other words the actions of London’s government and other institutions were 
determined in large part by wider socio-economic and demographic changes, 
and these in turn had a profound impact on responses to flooding - helping 
to shape its impact, perhaps in many cases overriding the needs and 
demands of local inhabitants. These impacts can be seen in specific 
examples such as Barking Abbey, for instance, which stopped pouring 
money into attempting to recover flooded lands for practical reasons and 
because agricultural prices remained depressed. Instead they did their best 
 
12 J.A. Galloway, ‘‘‘Piteous and grievous sights’: the Thames marshes at the close of the 
middle ages’, in Tides and floods: new research on London and the tidal Thames from the 
middle ages to the twentieth century, ed. J.A. Galloway (London, 2010), pp. 25-26. 
13 Galloway, ‘”Tempests of weather and great abundance of water”’, pp. 74-75. 
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to obtain compensation from the Crown for their losses, and to try to exploit 
flooded areas for lower alternative forms of revenue. 
To look at one example, fisheries in the tidal river and estuary of the 
Thames were profoundly influenced by the management of the marshlands 
and the effects of flooding. ‘Natural’ marshlands provide feeding for fish at 
high tides, and have an important role as nurseries for young fish. 
Embankment reduced or removed these opportunities of feeding and shelter 
for river and estuarine fish (although drainage ditches offered more limited 
homes to freshwater and brackish-water species). It also reduced the scope 
for human exploitation of marshland fisheries through the use of weirs or 
‘kiddles’ set up on the foreshore or in creeks along the marshes. Late 
medieval flooding partially reversed this process and had unexpected 
impacts upon fish stocks in the river, upon the balance of species caught, 
and upon the supplies that were available for consumption in London. New 
weirs could be placed in flooded marshes and - a recurrent complaint - 
stocks damaged by the trapping of small fish resorting to the marshes at high 
tide. Londoners took a keen interest in this issue, from the late twelfth 
century onwards, out of concern both for metropolitan fish supply and for 
the navigability of the river and the estuary, and attempted to regulate the 
fishing activities of smaller communities up and down-river. This 
periodically brought the city of London into conflict with these communities 
and with the Constable of the Tower, a royal official who claimed a rival 
jurisdiction over the Thames waterway.14 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the situation of the Thames marshes at the close of the 
middle ages was highly complex. Where two centuries years earlier the 
picture had been one of general reclamation of the marshes, now they 
presented a patch-work; many reclaimed marshes continued to be used as 
agricultural land, defended against the tides, while others had reverted to 
inter-tidal conditions and their fisheries and other natural resources came to 
assume greater importance. Changes in the structure of demand from the 
 
14 J.A. Galloway, ‘Storm flooding, coastal defence and land use around the Thames estuary 
and tidal river c.1250–1450’, Journal of Medieval History, 35 (2009), pp. 171-88, at pp. 177-
8. 
 181 
London market – including a decline in the bulk grain trade and rising 
demand for fresh fish as living standards rose – had impacted upon the 
productive but vulnerable Thames marshes more intensely than elsewhere. 
The 1370s appear to represent a turning point in the history of the Thames 
marshes, after which the rapid repair of storm damaged sea- and river-
defences was less likely to be the automatic response of marshland lords and 
communities. In many places, such as Barking for instance, two centuries 
of reclamation were reversed, and significant areas of land reverted to tidal 
saltmarsh and mudflat.  These conditions substantially persisted through the 
fifteenth century, and this pattern fits with responses in other parts of the 
North Sea region where it is argued that ‘entitlement to flood protection’ 
and the allocation of resources was determined by the interaction of local 
political and economic forces. In the sixteenth century, the dissolution of 
the monastic orders and the changes of ownership that ensued added 
institutional disruption to the mix, and acted to prolong instances of flooding 
at some Thames-side locations. It was probably not until the second half of 
the sixteenth century, as London’s population regained and then rapidly 
exceeded its peak medieval level, that the momentum for recovery of 





Bridging London’s River’s 
General Situation of London, the 




Like many cities around the world, the city of London is located at a key 
point on a major river; on England’s longest river, in fact, at the lowest point 
where it could be bridged, until modern times. The Thames extends some 
215 miles (346 km) from its source to the sea, draining a large and fertile 
hinterland across southern England and linking London with coastal and 
continental ports. Much of it is navigable, and the lower reaches are strongly 
tidal. The relationship between the city, the river, and the bridge has thus 
been important for the whole of London’s history, influencing London’s 
physical development, its security, communications, and its engagement in 
patterns of national and international trade.  
The Roman city of Augusta, later Londinium, was founded in the 1st 
century CE, on a couple of low hills on the north bank, with low-lying land 
all around and on the south bank. The site may have been chosen for its 
defensive potential, and because the flood tide brought ships up from the 
estuary with minimal effort, but it also proved to be a suitable bridgehead. 
A timber bridge was built in the 1st century, linking the north bank 
settlement to a network of roads on the south bank.  
Whether and how the bridge survived after the 5th century, when 
Londinium itself fell into decay, remains uncertain: whether it was still 
operative, partially ruined but still visible, or wholly lost over time. 
Certainly ships were able to pass the site of the Roman bridge to reach the 
8th-century settlement further upstream along the Strand. But a timber bridge 
was built or restored in the 9th or 10th century, when the site of the Roman 
settlement was (re)occupied and developed, and the bridge played an 
important part in struggles for control of London in the early 11th century. 
There may have been several rebuildings or restorations of the timber 
bridge, following storm damage and other destruction, between the early 
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11th and the late 12th century. It was finally replaced by a substantial stone 
bridge, begun in 1176 and completed by 1209. This is the bridge that 
dominates representations of the city of London through to the 19th century, 
that shaped the river and the city’s relationship with it, and that through its 
needs and nature helped to form London’s civic identity and the practice of 
municipal government. For six centuries it was the only river crossing in or 
near the city, and it played a correspondingly important part in the history 
of London. 
 
The physical impact of bridge and river 
Little is known of the structure and building techniques of the Roman 
and Saxon timber bridges, and even their exact line is uncertain, though it 
was probably very close to that of the medieval stone bridge. 
Details of the construction process of the stone bridge are lost, and the 
fabric was much altered over time, but its essential character remained the 
same. Nineteen pointed arches, with variable gaps between them, spanned 
some 900 ft. (275 m.) of fast-flowing, tidal river, with a wider arch for a 
drawbridge towards the southern end. The multiple arches were required 
because of the strong flow of the river in both directions, but they also 
created a problem by partially damming the river, holding back both the 
natural flow outward and the tidal flow inward and causing dangerous 
turbulence at some states of the tide. The flow and turbulence tended to 
undermine the piers or pillars of the bridge, which had to be reinforced with 
breastworks of piling and rubble, but these breastworks – known as 
‘starlings’1 - further narrowed the space for the passage of water.  
Over time, with constant reinforcement, the starlings increased in size 
until they took up about 2/3 of the whole width of the river, so that the 
natural flow of the river was held back even more and the tidal flow altered. 
This had a number of effects: it may well have helped the use of the river 
above the bridge, making it easier and safer for small boats; it probably 
made it easier to develop and build out the upstream waterfront of the city, 
subject to a less vigorous tidal regime, as well. When the removal of the 
stone bridge was being discussed in the early 19th century, considerable 
anxiety was expressed about the effects of demolishing such a substantial 
and by now essential part of the river. On the other hand, the dam effect, 
and perhaps the low salinity of the river above the bridge, must have 
contributed to the freezing of the river as well, especially notable in the 17th 
century, and the ice could further damage the bridge.  
 
1 From ‘staddling’ or ‘staddle’ = foundation, base, support: OED. 
 
 184 
And the bridge was a major impediment to east-west communications 
by river. At its maximum, at the bottom of the ebb tide from below the 
bridge, the fall in water-level from above to below the bridge was as much 
as five feet (1.5m), so that passing up must have been impossible and 
passing down very dangerous. There are many references to accidents 
involving important persons, such to the duke of Norfolk's barge in 1428, 
when he and some companions were saved by leaping onto the starlings, but 
many more were lost, or the accident in which one of Queen Henrietta 
Maria's maids of honour was drowned in the 17th century. Many more fatal 
and non-fatal accidents must have gone unrecorded.  
The bridge thus limited the access of shipping and boats from the lower 
Thames, the coastal trade, and overseas to the upper river, and therefore 
really determined the eastward shift of maritime and port-related activities. 
Larger barges and ships could only pass through when the drawbridge was 
raised. The development of the Vintry area, above the bridge, in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, and also of the Saltwharf at Queenhithe,  suggest 
that it was not a complete barrier to trade, even of wine- and salt-ships, 
which were among the largest using the port, but they may have used 
lighters. 
In the late 14th century, some 500-600 seagoing ships were using the 
port every year; the records of tolls paid for raising the drawbridge suggest 
that only a minority of these were passing under the bridge. In 1464 it was 
noted that the upstream Queenhithe market was declining, because of the 
inconvenience caused by the Bridge. To remedy this the Mayor and 
Aldermen ordered that one in every two ships and boats coming up the 
Thames with victuals (grain, vegetables, fish, and eels) from the lower 
reaches and the estuary should be obliged to pass through the Bridge to 
Queenhithe market, rather than concentrate at Billingsgate below the bridge. 
It is not clear how effective this was: by this time at most 80 ships were 
passing through each year.  
The tolls were last collected in 1476, and in 1477 it was stated that the 
drawbridge could not be raised because the stonework needed repair. This 
statement is repeated in every account thereafter. The drawbridge had been 
raised against Fauconberg's rebel army in 1471, but in 1481 the wardens 
petitioned that it should only be raised for the defence of the city and not for 
the passage of ships, and in fact it does not appear that it was ever raised 
again.  
However, the bridge’s dam effect probably eased river traffic in the 
middle reaches of the Thames, keeping more water in the river and reducing 
the current. Much traffic between the city and Westminster went by river 
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rather than by land. The river remained an important transport route to the 
towns and royal palaces above London, at Richmond, Hampton Court, and 
Windsor. 
As noted above, the bridge’s impact on the river also had an impact on 
the city’s waterfront, with seaborne trade and its appurtenances (quays, 
warehouses, customs facilities, and eventually enclosed wet docks) 
concentrating below the bridge, and river-trades concentrating above. When 
in the 16th century there was a major review of the port, virtually the whole 
waterfront below the bridge was licensed for international trade, but only 
three quays and the Steelyard of the Hanse merchants above. By the time 
we have representations of the waterfront in detail, the effect of the bridge 
on the use of the river is clear. 
There were also measurable social effects, in an increasing difference 
between the occupations and wealth of the inhabitants of the upper and 
lower waterfront areas. Breweries and dye-houses lined the upper 
waterfront; manufacturing occupations above contrasted with mercantile 
ones below. Rent values were lower in the waterfront parishes above the 
bridge, and health outcomes were poorer, compared with waterfront 
parishes below the bridge.  
Though the bridge was an obstacle to river traffic, it was also London's 
gateway to the southern road network, including the roads to the channel 
ports. Stane Street and Watling Street converged on Southwark and the 
bridge foot, bringing with them traffic from radiating roads through Kent 
and Surrey.  
Nearer at hand, the bridge linked the city with Southwark, a much 
smaller settlement, in a relationship that was unequal but symbiotic: 
Southwark's economy was dependent on and complementary to that of the 
city, in that it housed activities and individuals not welcome in the latter. 
Strong government in the city exiled noisome trades to the suburbs; 
Southwark became known for brothels and theatres, and housed foreign 
craftsmen and prostitutes. It also offered space for institutions found in other 
London suburbs such as hospitals, prisons, and the London homes of nobles 
and ecclesiastics. It had very little of the mercantile, professional and high-
class retail activities that characterised the city. For the whole of the 
medieval and early modern periods, the metropolitan population south of 
the river was only a fraction of that to the north. Only in the 18th century, 
and still more in the 19th, did south London's population expand, and this 
was of course tied in to the building of several more bridges and new road 
and rail systems. 
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Another aspect of the bridge's economic importance is its development 
as a place of trade and specialist retail. The stone bridge did not at first have 
houses on it, though there was probably a defensive gate as well as towers 
for the drawbridge, but within a few years it was lined with houses and shops. 
In 1358 there were 138 shops and two mansions, together rented for over 
£160 per annum. The bridge remained an active and profitable area even 
when rents in other parts of the city were falling in the later-medieval 
depression. The same number of shops was rented for over £180 in 1404; 
by 1537, when rebuilding and rearrangement had reduced the number of 
shops to 100, the value of the property had nearly doubled.  
The shops were occupied in the middle ages by modest craftsmen and 
retailers. In the 14th and 15th centuries tenants included fletchers and 
bowyers (makers of arrows and bows), and in 1488 the guild of bowyers 
maintained a light before the rood and St George in the chapel on the bridge. 
By the 16th century, when rents were rising, the bridge became, for a time, 
a fashionable place for merchants to live and do business. The poet William 
Dunbar in c. 1500 referred to the 'lusty bridge of pillars white,' with 
'merchants full royal to behold'; around 1600, the houses were said to be 
inhabited by wealthy citizens and furnished with all manner of trades, 
including goldsmiths. In 1633, the dominant trade was that of accessory-
retailer (haberdashers, hat-sellers, hosiers, glovers, a milliner), with some 
textile retailers (silkmen, woollen-drapers, a linen-draper, a mercer). But by 
this time, fashionable London was moving west. The bridge seems to have 
developed a different retail speciality, that of bookselling: at least a dozen 
booksellers occupied premises there between the 1630s and 1700, in some 
cases in a long line of succession. Retail specialisation suggests that 
customers were attracted because they knew they would find a particular 
commodity there, rather than just the passing trade. 
 
The bridge as civic enterprise 
Little contemporary documentation survives for the first construction of 
the bridge, but some aspects of its management can be traced back, and there 
is a voluminous and well-kept archive from the mid-fourteenth century, 
itself evidence of the importance of the bridge to the city. 
A cleric called Peter of Colechurch (d. 1205) was principal fundraiser 
for the stone bridge, as well as overseer of the building work. One or more 
guilds or fraternities were formed to raise money, relying on local piety and 
the importance attached to the maintenance of roads and bridges as works 
of charity, and in particular on the currently developing cult of the London-
born martyr and saint Thomas Becket. The popular pilgrimage route to 
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Thomas’s shrine at Canterbury began in Southwark, and the chapel on the 
bridge was dedicated to him.  
Citizens' benefactions and pious bequests, probably mostly dating from 
the thirteenth century, contributed to the formation of a large property 
portfolio which produced the revenues that supported the repair of the 
bridge. Further small donations were recorded in many 14th-century wills 
and in 15th-century accounts. After a period when the crown claimed control 
of the bridge, but failed to maintain it satisfactorily, the City effectively took 
over its administration in the later 13th century. Thereafter, important 
decisions about the estate and regulations about the bridge's use were 
authorised by the mayor, aldermen, and citizens, who kept a close eye on its 
administration and finances, and defended its interests. The mayor and 
aldermen made or approved leases of property devoted to the bridge's 
upkeep, and other business concerning the bridge was issued under the 
City's common seal. The day-to day running of the bridge and its estate was 
in the hands of wardens or masters elected by and answerable to the citizens; 
auditors of their accounts were appointed annually. The organisation was 
known as the Bridge House, with its headquarters in Southwark, where there 
was an office and a storehouse for building materials.  
Responsibility for this, the largest and in many ways the most successful 
of the city's enterprises, must have been a factor in the maturing of civic 
bureaucracy of the high middle ages, and the records document the 
importance of the bridge to the civic mind. There are in fact much earlier 
and more complete records of the administration of the bridge than of any 
other aspect of civic administration. Muniments of title date from the 12th 
century, rentals and detailed accounts for the management of the estate from 
the 14th, and very full week-by-week accounts of building works from the 
early 15th. From the 16th century we have further records about materials 
and supplies, and the series continues into the 19th. There are frequent 
references to the bridge in the other administrative memoranda of the city - 
especially the appointment of wardens and auditors of the accounts, and any 
special actions or policy decisions taken about the use or repair of the 
structure. When things went wrong, the city devoted time and effort to 
sorting them out; though at one time or another it borrowed from the bridge 
revenues to support other works, such as the building of Guildhall in the 
early 15th century, it also raised capital sums to pay for work on the bridge, 
and it never diverted the revenues to any significant degree.  
The maintenance of the bridge was the largest and longest-running 
building enterprise in medieval or early modern London. The only possible 
comparator would be St Paul’s cathedral, the other physical symbol of 
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London’s identity, but no major construction project was undertaken there 
after the 13th century, until the Wren rebuilding after the Fire of 1666. The 
sums involved were considerable: the bridge wardens accounted for income 
and expenditure of some £750 a year in the late 14th century and around 
£1,500 in the mid-16th (equivalent to some £400-450,000 in 21st-century 
money). 
The staff of the Bridge House varied according to the projects on hand, 
but apart from the wardens and their clerks there was a master mason, with 
a team of four to six masons, and one or more master carpenters with a larger 
team of carpenters, sometimes ten or twelve. The masons worked mainly on 
the bridge itself, while the carpenters’ work focused on the houses on the 
bridge and the rented properties elsewhere in the city and Southwark, 
though some also worked on the starlings. In addition there were a large 
number of labourers, who served the masons and carpenters but also worked 
in shifts on the starlings of the bridge, reinforcing the elm piles with rubble 
and cement. Other building workmen, including sawyers, plasterers, 
daubers, glaziers, and paviours, were employed from time to time. There 
were also one or more boatmen, and a carter and a team of horses. 
Unlike many other building projects, the bridge was a permanent work 
in progress; maintenance work went on for much of the year, and continued 
from year to year. Individual masons and carpenters worked for long periods 
for the Bridge House, and apprentices and family members also took up 
employment. The structural problems were caused principally by the 
continuous assault of tide and river, and to a lesser extent by the vibration 
of traffic and the drawbridge; careless watermen also damaged the bridge 
by collision, and fishermen's nets and anchors may have dragged at the 
foundations.  But there were also emergency repairs and new construction. 
Five arches of the bridge were swept away in 1282, following severe frost 
and snow; a major fundraising effort for repairs in 1289 may relate to this. 
In 1437 the gatehouse tower and the arch or arches on which it stood 
collapsed, necessitating immediate and expensive repairs, and work 
continued to at least 1440. The city remained concerned about the bridge, 
appointing committees to review and report on necessary repairs in 1453, 
1456, and 1462. The drawbridge tower, built or rebuilt in 1426, also had 
serious problems. It was damaged during Cade's revolt in 1450, when the 
bridge was stormed and the drawbridge burned, and the houses round it were 
burned by Fauconberg's rebels in 1471. After 1476 it was impossible to raise 
the drawbridge, 'until the stonework of the drawbridge tower be amended'. 
The pier on which the chapel stood underwent repair in 1501–2, and one of 
the arches at the Southwark end was repaired in 1537–8. The chapel itself 
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was deconsecrated at the Reformation, and evidently decayed, but continued 
to be used as a storehouse. A fire on the bridge in 1633 destroyed a block of 
houses, though not the stonework, but the bridge was left with a gap-tooth 
look until the rest of the houses were cleared in the 18th century in an attempt 
to enable the bridge to carry more traffic. 
The materials bought by the bridge wardens give some idea of the nature 
of the bridge’s construction. They included stone, notably ashlar or squared 
blocks, Reigate and Maidstone stone, rag stone, and chalk rubble for the 
starlings. The masons used iron clamps, lead, and a waterproof cement made 
with pitch and rosin, delivered hot, to fix the stonework. Oak timber was 
bought for house-building, and elm trees were bought and hewn into piles 
and boards for the waterworks. Smiths supplied iron shoes for the piles, and 
mended and sharpened tools (adzes, augers, axes) for masons at the 
waterworks. There were two or more mechanical pile-drivers or gins. The 
wardens' activity in seeking and securing building materials, the prices they 
paid, and the costs of delivery, are thoroughly documented in the medieval 
and early modern accounts. 
 
The bridge as civic symbol 
The symbolic importance of the bridge was, if anything, even greater 
than its strategic. It was an important image of the city, and of civic pride 
and enterprise; it had been built by the citizens' donations, and was 
maintained by good management and effectively a department of the city 
government. It clearly attracted the attention of outsiders and visitors, and 
is one of the most obvious and recognisable visual images of the city 
between the 13th and the 18th centuries - far more so than either St Paul's 
cathedral or the Guildhall. Most of all, though, it played an important part 
in the representation of the city through ceremony and pageantry, and 
particularly those aspects that linked the city with the outside world - royal 
entries and triumphal processions, and, by complement, the ritual 
humiliation of traitors by exposing their heads or mutilated bodies to public 
gaze. 
English kings, like many other European princes, used the urban 
landscape as backdrop for pageants and processions of national importance. 
Most medieval and early modern monarchs made at least one ceremonial 
entry into the city of London; one of the complaints against the Stuarts was 
that they neglected these rituals. There were obviously several coronation 
entries, but royal weddings (Katherine of France, Margaret of Anjou, 
Katherine of Aragon) and visits of foreign princes (the emperor Sigismund, 
the emperor Charles V, the queen-mother Marie de Medicis) also provided 
 
 190 
splendid occasions. The entry was also used for more overt political 
purposes: the victorious return of Henry V after Agincourt was marked by 
a procession through London that both elevated the monarchy and 
complimented the city, whose supply of money and materials had been 
crucial, while London's quarrel with Richard II in 1392 was in some sense 
healed by the staging of a sumptuous 'reconciliation' pageant that figured 
Richard II as Christ and London as the new Jerusalem. 
The bridge played a major part in these royal entries, almost all of which 
began by crossing the bridge into the city before parading through the streets 
to St Paul’s or Westminster. Occasionally an entry or procession started 
from the Tower, but for the most part it is clear that the crossing of the bridge 
into the city was an essential part of the proceedings. On the processional 
route, there were a number of stages or locations at which a pageant or 
tableau vivant would be presented. The structure of the bridge supplied 
three appropriate spaces - before the bridge foot in Southwark, where the 
wide street of the market narrowed into the bridge roadway; at the stone gate 
itself, where the tall gate-tower offered points of vantage for figures to stand 
and a big frontage for decoration; and at the drawbridge gate, another tower 
and open space. The bridge itself was evidently thronged with people as 
well: nine people were crushed to death on the bridge during the procession 
for the wedding of Richard II and Isabel of France in 1396. 
The processions as a whole were carefully scripted, with each pageant 
or tableau conveying its own message, and culminating in a major pageant 
at the west end of Cheapside by St Pauls'. The bridge pageants therefore 
could set the tone for each; in some cases they gave the entrant a sketch of 
what was to come. Thus in 1432 the young king Henry VI was greeted on 
the bridge by three empresses, representing Nature, Fortune, and Grace, 
who gave him the gifts of grace and kingship, a recurrent theme in all the 
pageants of that entry. A second theme of the entry, the union of the crowns 
of England and France in Henry's person, was also initiated on the bridge 
with the arms of England and France displayed together. As the first to be 
seen, the bridge pageants may have been specially impressive; on the other 
hand, there was a need to keep the procession going, and Katherine of 
Aragon was apparently hurried on from the bridge before everything had 
been said, so that she could get to the next one at Gracechurch Street in time. 
Some of the bridge pageants seem to have had a more military or defensive 
character than those of some other locations. There are references to giants 
there from at least 1413; there were lions and giants for Henry V in 1415, 
and for his entry with Katherine of France in 1421; a giant armed as a 
champion against the king's enemies for Henry VI in 1432; even the 
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wedding entry of Katherine of Aragon in 1501 was greeted by Hercules and 
Samson. The entry of Henry V after Agincourt was understandably very 
military in character, with a figure of St George on the bridge and a display 
of St George’s cross, which also forms part of the city’s arms. 
The symbolism of the open gates and welcoming crowds was always 
important, but it must have been specially pointed when the gates had 
recently been shut against rebels or invaders. Equally striking was the use 
of the bridge gate to display traitors' heads and quarters; Henry V's return 
from Agincourt must have passed under the heads of the men executed for 
conspiracy on the eve of his campaign. After the collapse of Cade's rebellion, 
contemporaries must have appreciated the grisly irony of displaying the 
executed leader's head on the bridge that his rebels had won.  
The practice dates from at least the early fourteenth century, when the 
head of Scottish rebel - or patriot - William Wallace was displayed there; it 
continued through the later medieval and early modern period. Given a 
fairly generous interpretation of the statue of treason - invoked for offences 
such as coining - there can have been few times when the bridge was not so 
adorned. The reign of Henry VIII provided a good crop, from the 
Carthusians and the catholic martyrs like More and Fisher to staunch 
protestants like Cromwell. Although common, it was never quite 
commonplace: both Londoners and visitors remarked on it, and the heads 
on the bridge are a notable feature of 17th-century views of the city.  
 
Conclusion 
River, bridge, and city are intertwined in the political, economic and 
cultural history of London. The river had determined where London was 
first founded; the bridge reshaped both river and city in physical terms. It 
was a vital part of London’s infrastructure, funnelling road traffic and 
redirecting river trade. The long-term task of maintaining the fabric of the 
bridge against natural and human actions focused the attention and 
resources of the civic government and the citizens, and made it a symbol of 
civic wealth, competence, and pride.  
